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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Wisegreen2 sentences2007Primerica Financial Svcs. v. Wise, 217 Ga. App. 36, 41 (6) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995) (“the state law and policy with respect to the signature requirement [of OCGA § 9-9-2 (c) (9)] must yield to the paramount federal law”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2007Primerica Financial Svcs. v. Wise, 217 Ga. App. 36, 41 (6) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995) (“the state law and policy with respect to the signature requirement [of OCGA § 9-9-2 (c) (9)] must yield to the paramount federal law”) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Langfitt v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2013Langfitt v. Jackson, 284 Ga. App. 628, 635 (3) ( 644 SE2d 460 ) (2007), citing Primerica Financial Svcs. v. Wise, 217 Ga.App. 36, 41 (6) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). 2013Langfitt v. Jackson, 284 Ga. App. 628, 635 (3) ( 644 SE2d 460 ) (2007), citing Primerica Financial Svcs. v. Wise, 217 Ga.App. 36, 41 (6) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). | 2 | 2 |
Agee v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Agee, 311 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (affirming the waiver of a right to a jury trial based on the trial court’s clear and detailed colloquy); Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 715, 717 (4) ( 572 SE2d 60 ) (2002) (holding that the defendant’s signature on a waiver of jury trial form supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, but a “waiver in open court is preferred”). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Agee, 311 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (affirming the waiver of a right to a jury trial based on the trial court’s clear and detailed colloquy); Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 715, 717 (4) ( 572 SE2d 60 ) (2002) (holding that the defendant’s signature on a waiver of jury trial form supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, but a “waiver in open court is preferred”). 2023See Agee, 311 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (affirming the waiver of a right to a jury trial based on the trial court’s clear and detailed colloquy); Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 715, 717 (4) ( 572 SE2d 60 ) (2002) (holding that the defendant’s signature on a waiver of jury trial form supported the trial court’s finding that the defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, but a “waiver in open court is preferred”). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Hestergreen2 sentences1999Recognizing that Spence had the burden of establishing his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof, see In the Matter ofHenritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 SE2d 383 ) (1981), and that “each petition for reinstatement is unique and presents facts and factors distinct from other such petitions,” see In the Matter of Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 366 ( 320 SE2d 541 ) (1984), the special master recommended, in a report filed December 12, 1997, that Spence’s Petition be granted. 1999Recognizing that Spence had the burden of establishing his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof, see In the Matter ofHenritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 SE2d 383 ) (1981), and that “each petition for reinstatement is unique and presents facts and factors distinct from other such petitions,” see In the Matter of Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 366 ( 320 SE2d 541 ) (1984), the special master recommended, in a report filed December 12, 1997, that Spence’s Petition be granted. | 1 | 1 |
CCC Builders, Inc. v. City Councilgreen2 sentences1995Accordingly, we must conclude that “ ‘the state law and policy with respect [to the signature requirement] must yield to the paramount federal law. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” CCC Builders v. City Council of Augusta, 237 Ga. 589, 592 ( 229 SE2d 349 ) (1976). 1995Accordingly, we must conclude that “ ‘the state law and policy with respect [to the signature requirement] must yield to the paramount federal law. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” CCC Builders v. City Council of Augusta, 237 Ga. 589, 592 ( 229 SE2d 349 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Southtrust Bank of Georgia v. Parker
green
1 sentence2012A party challenging the validity of the signature may rebut the presumption that it is valid by “produc(ing) other evidence separate from the sworn denial of execution of the signature in defense of the forgery, and there exist irregularities on the face of the negotiable instrument that would place a reasonable person on notice under a reasonable commercial standard.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Southtrust, supra, 226 Ga. at 294 (1). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In the Matter of Henritze
green
2 sentences1999Recognizing that Spence had the burden of establishing his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof, see In the Matter ofHenritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 SE2d 383 ) (1981), and that “each petition for reinstatement is unique and presents facts and factors distinct from other such petitions,” see In the Matter of Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 366 ( 320 SE2d 541 ) (1984), the special master recommended, in a report filed December 12, 1997, that Spence’s Petition be granted. 1999Recognizing that Spence had the burden of establishing his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof, see In the Matter ofHenritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 SE2d 383 ) (1981), and that “each petition for reinstatement is unique and presents facts and factors distinct from other such petitions,” see In the Matter of Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 366 ( 320 SE2d 541 ) (1984), the special master recommended, in a report filed December 12, 1997, that Spence’s Petition be granted. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Flewellen
green
1 sentence1984In overruling Jones, as opposed to distinguishing it, the majority appeared to have approved the form used in Jones (see 164 Ga. App. at 895 ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
DeGive v. Meador & Tumlin
neutral
1 sentence1907The bond does not become functus officii until there has been entered on the minutes a rearrest of the defendant under order -of the judge at his discretion (Smith v. Kitchens, 51 Ga. 160 ), or unless there has been a surrender of the principal, or a judgment absolute for the amount of the obligation, or there has been a rearrest of the defendant by an order entered in pursuance of a motion to strengthen ■ the bond by additional security. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.