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11 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Detention Swansongreen2 sentences1999See In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (had Legislature intended initial detention period to be measured in days rather than hours, it would have said so). 1999See In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (had Legislature intended initial detention period to be measured in days rather than hours, it would have said so). | 2 | 2 |
Vitek v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1999See CPC Fairfax Hospital, 129 Wash.2d at 453 , 918 P.2d 497 (once the State has granted a liberty interest by statute, "`due process protections are necessary "to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."'") (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 ). 1999See CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wn.2d at 453 (once the State has granted a liberty interest by statute, “ ‘due process protections are necessary “to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” ’ ”) (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489 ). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. TB v. CPC Fairfax Hosp.green2 sentences1999See CPC Fairfax Hospital, 129 Wash.2d at 453 , 918 P.2d 497 (once the State has granted a liberty interest by statute, "`due process protections are necessary "to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."'") (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 ). 1999See CPC Fairfax Hosp., 129 Wn.2d at 453 (once the State has granted a liberty interest by statute, “ ‘due process protections are necessary “to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” ’ ”) (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489 ). | 2 | 2 |
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Id.; cf. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 244 , 11 P.3d 762 (overturning I-695 in part because it attempted to sidestep the signature requirement for referendums). [4] I-747's challengers also argue that proponents could have drafted I-747 such that it provided an alternative text if I-722 were declared unconstitutional. 2007Id.; cf. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 244 (overturning 1-695 in part because it attempted to sidestep the signature requirement for referendums). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kullgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 88 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005). 29 Furthermore, even if the trial court applied CrR 3.3(f)(1), a Supreme Court order in effect at the time due to COVID waived a defendant’s signature requirement. 2025See State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 88 , 118 P.3d 307 (2005). 29 Furthermore, even if the trial court applied CrR 3.3(f)(1), a Supreme Court order in effect at the time due to COVID waived a defendant’s signature requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Kathleen Hanson, V. Jose Luna-ramirezgreen1 sentence2023See Russell v. Maas, 166 Wn. App. 885, 887-88, 891 , 272 P.3d 273 (2012) (signature requirement satisfied when an attorney signs a trial de novo request on behalf of a client); see also Hanson v. Luna-Ramirez, 19 Wn. App. 2d 459 , 462, 496 P.3d 314 (2021) (noting that cases permitting “only an attorney, rather than the aggrieved party, to sign a request for trial de novo . . . have been superseded by statute”). | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Maasgreen2 sentences2023See Russell v. Maas, 166 Wn. App. 885, 887-88, 891 , 272 P.3d 273 (2012) (signature requirement satisfied when an attorney signs a trial de novo request on behalf of a client); see also Hanson v. Luna-Ramirez, 19 Wn. App. 2d 459 , 462, 496 P.3d 314 (2021) (noting that cases permitting “only an attorney, rather than the aggrieved party, to sign a request for trial de novo . . . have been superseded by statute”). 2023See Russell v. Maas, 166 Wn. App. 885, 887-88, 891 , 272 P.3d 273 (2012) (signature requirement satisfied when an attorney signs a trial de novo request on behalf of a client); see also Hanson v. Luna-Ramirez, 19 Wn. App. 2d 459 , 462, 496 P.3d 314 (2021) (noting that cases permitting “only an attorney, rather than the aggrieved party, to sign a request for trial de novo . . . have been superseded by statute”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Foxhoven
green
2 sentences2012Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 174 . a. 2011Id. at 175 . | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway
green
1 sentence2025“This signature requirement essentially abrogates an attorney’s authority as an agent to sign the [trial de novo] request on behalf of the aggrieved party.” Crossroads, 2 Wn.3d at 539 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Detention of Marshall v. State
green
2 sentences2012See ER 703; In re Det. of Marshall, 156 Wn.2d 150 , 161-62, 125 P.3d 111 (2005). 14 In Marshall, this court held that Dr. Phenix properly relied on records, which were inadmissible hearsay, to form her opinion that the accused was an SVP. 156 Wn.2d at 162-63 . 2012See ER 703; In re Det. of Marshall, 156 Wn.2d 150 , 161-62, 125 P.3d 111 (2005). 14 In Marshall, this court held that Dr. Phenix properly relied on records, which were inadmissible hearsay, to form her opinion that the accused was an SVP. 156 Wn.2d at 162-63 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Washington State Grange v. Locke
green
2 sentences2007Resp'ts' Br. at 27-28 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash.2d 475, 483 , 105 P.3d 9 (2005)). 2007Resp'ts' Br. at 27-28 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wash.2d 475, 483 , 105 P.3d 9 (2005)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Department
green
2 sentences1999Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 191 , 829 P.2d 1061 (1992) (issue not briefed deemed waived). [1] RCW 71.05.020(15) defines "mental disorder" as "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions...." [2] Of course, the majority fails to define the parameters of this judicially created exception or to explain why substantial compliance is applicable only if "unique circumstances" are present. [3] Had the Legislature intended to create an exception to the signature requirement, it would 1999Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 191 , 829 P.2d 1061 (1992) (issue not briefed deemed waived). [1] RCW 71.05.020(15) defines "mental disorder" as "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions...." [2] Of course, the majority fails to define the parameters of this judicially created exception or to explain why substantial compliance is applicable only if "unique circumstances" are present. [3] Had the Legislature intended to create an exception to the signature requirement, it would | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Fisher Bros. Corp. v. Des Moines Sewer Dist.
green
2 sentences1988Corp. v. Des Moines Sewer Dist., 97 Wn.2d 227, 230-31 , 643 P.2d 436 (1982). [2] The purpose of the signature requirement of RCW 35.13.130 is to insure that a significant number of the persons most affected by a decision to annex support that decision. 1988Corp. v. Des Moines Sewer Dist., 97 Wn.2d 227, 230-31 , 643 P.2d 436 (1982). [2] The purpose of the signature requirement of RCW 35.13.130 is to insure that a significant number of the persons most affected by a decision to annex support that decision. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Whitemarsh Township Authority v. Finelli Bros.
neutral
1 sentence1973Thus, an express signature requirement was treated as a matter of substance in Whitemarsh Township Auth. v. Finelli Bros., Inc., 408 Pa. 373 , 184 A.2d 512 (1962), and in certain other instances was treated merely as a matter of form. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.