89 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences1985"In the absence of a transcript we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court." Moore v. State, 151 Ga. App. 413, 415 ( 260 SE2d 350 ) (1979). 1985"In the absence of a transcript we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court." Moore v. State, 151 Ga. App. 413, 415 ( 260 SE2d 350 ) (1979). | 5 | 5 |
In the Interest of A. A.green2 sentences2011See In the Interest of A. A., 293 Ga. App. at 828 ; see also In the Interest of J. 2011See A. A., 293 Ga. App. at 828 ; see also In the Interest of J. | 4 | 4 |
Lawal v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Whitaker v. State, 244 Ga. App. at 244 (4); Lawal v. State, 201 Ga. App. at 798 (2). 2. 2013Whitaker v. State, 244 Ga. App. at 244 (4); Lawal v. State, 201 Ga. App. at 798 (2). 2. | 2 | 3 |
FRAZEN v. DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF ATLANTAgreen2 sentences2021Auth. of Atlanta, 309 Ga. 411, 421-422 (3) (c) ( 845 SE2d 539 ) (2020) (concluding that superior court made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), to support conclusion that enterprise zone bond proposal and corresponding security provided by infrastructure fees was sound, feasible, and reasonable, despite court’s isolated recitation that “both the issuance of the [bonds] and the security therefor are sound, feasible, and reasonable, as demonstrated by the evidence adduced at the hearing, including the fact that the bonds will be issued only upon proo 2021Auth. of Atlanta, 309 Ga. 411, 421-422 (3) (c) (845 5 As explained more fully in Division 4, supra, the superior court correctly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over these issues. 20 SE2d 539 ) (2020) (concluding that superior court made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), to support conclusion that enterprise zone bond proposal and corresponding security provided by infrastructure fees was sound, feasible, and reasonable, despite court’s isolated recitation that “both the issuance of the [bonds] and the security therefor are soun | 2 | 2 |
Sifuentes v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See id. 2018See id. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Prestongreen2 sentences2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P 2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P | 2 | 2 |
State v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P 2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P | 2 | 2 |
Whitaker v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Whitaker v. State, 244 Ga. App. at 244 (4); Lawal v. State, 201 Ga. App. at 798 (2). 2. 2013Whitaker v. State, 244 Ga. App. at 244 (4); Lawal v. State, 201 Ga. App. at 798 (2). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Vansant v. Stategreen2 sentences2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P 2013However, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Underwood, 283 Ga. 498, 500 ( 661 SE2d 529 ) (2008), quoting Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994); State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008), quoting Vansant, supra. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that, on the morning of June 27, 2011, officers from the Columbus P | 2 | 2 |
In Re AAgreen2 sentences2011See In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 828 , 668 S.E.2d 323 ; see also In the Interest of J.C., 308 Ga.App. at 337, 708 S.E.2d 1 . 2011See A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 828 , 668 S.E.2d 323 ; see also In the Interest of J.C., 308 Ga.App. 336, 337 , 708 S.E.2d 1 (2011). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Jcgreen2 sentences2011See In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 828 , 668 S.E.2d 323 ; see also In the Interest of J.C., 308 Ga.App. at 337, 708 S.E.2d 1 . 2011See A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 828 , 668 S.E.2d 323 ; see also In the Interest of J.C., 308 Ga.App. 336, 337 , 708 S.E.2d 1 (2011). | 2 | 2 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences1991We find no error. “ ‘In the absence of a transcript we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing [on defendant’s motions] supported the findings of the court.’ [Cits.]” Evans v. State, 166 Ga. App. 602, 603 ( 305 SE2d 121 ) (1983). 1991We find no error. “ ‘In the absence of a transcript we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing [on defendant’s motions] supported the findings of the court.’ [Cits.]” Evans v. State, 166 Ga. App. 602, 603 ( 305 SE2d 121 ) (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Santone v. Stategreen2 sentences1989“In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, ‘ “we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.” ’ ” Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 ( 371 SE2d 428 ). 1989“In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, ‘ “we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.” ’ ” Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 790 ( 371 SE2d 428 ). | 2 | 2 |
Brannon v. Stategreen2 sentences1988In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, “ ‘we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.’ ” *791 Brannon v. State, 176 Ga. App. 781 (5) ( 337 SE2d 782 ). 1988In the absence of a transcript of the suppression hearing, “ ‘we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.’ ” *791 Brannon v. State, 176 Ga. App. 781 (5) ( 337 SE2d 782 ). | 1 | 3 |
Murray v. Hooksgreen2 sentences2013Murray v. Hooks, 313 Ga. App. 485, 485-486 ( 722 SE2d 82 ) (2011). 2013Murray v. Hooks, 313 Ga. App. 485, 485-486 ( 722 SE2d 82 ) (2011). | 1 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1994Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 ( 396 SE2d 891 ) (1990). 1994Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 ( 396 SE2d 891 ) (1990). | 1 | 2 |
Gibson Law Firm, LLC v. Miller Built Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2017In this case, notwithstanding the evidence adduced at the hearing on remand, the trial court again awarded fees of $5,000 to Christina Greene and $5,000 to Jim and Rebecca Greene without making a determination concerning the reasonableness and necessity of the fees (i.e., the court did not specify the bases for the particular amounts awarded, and did not show that the fee awards were limited to those fees incurred because of Flores’s improper conduct). “[T]he trial court’s order, on its face fails to show the complex decision making process necessarily involved in reaching a particular dollar 2017In this case, notwithstanding the evidence adduced at the hearing on remand, the trial court again awarded fees of $5,000 to Christina Greene and $5,000 to Jim and Rebecca Greene without making a determination concerning the reasonableness and necessity of the fees (i.e., the court did not specify the bases for the particular amounts awarded, and did not show that the fee awards were limited to those fees incurred because of Flores’s improper conduct). “[T]he trial court’s order, on its face fails to show the complex decision making process necessarily involved in reaching a particular dollar | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Robinson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 736, 745 (4) (a) ( 719 SE2d 601 ) (2011). 3 Guided by these principles, we turn to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 2012See Robinson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 736, 745 (4) (a) ( 719 SE2d 601 ) (2011). 3 Guided by these principles, we turn to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress. | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of J. C.green1 sentence2011See A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 828 , 668 S.E.2d 323 ; see also In the Interest of J.C., 308 Ga.App. 336, 337 , 708 S.E.2d 1 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
City of Indianapolis v. Edmondgreen1 sentence2011State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874 ( 611 SE2d 139 ) (2005). 2 See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3) ( 497 SE2d 367 ) (1998) (“Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped.”) (citation omitted). 3 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. at 48 (III) (Courts’ inquiry into the purpose of a police checkpoint or roadblock “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level”; cou | 1 | 1 |
LaFontaine v. Stategreen2 sentences2011State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874 ( 611 SE2d 139 ) (2005). 2 See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3) ( 497 SE2d 367 ) (1998) (“Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped.”) (citation omitted). 3 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. at 48 (III) (Courts’ inquiry into the purpose of a police checkpoint or roadblock “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level”; cou 2011State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874 ( 611 SE2d 139 ) (2005). 2 See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3) ( 497 SE2d 367 ) (1998) (“Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped.”) (citation omitted). 3 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. at 48 (III) (Courts’ inquiry into the purpose of a police checkpoint or roadblock “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level”; cou | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Mitchell v. State, 250 Ga. App. 292, 296 (2) (a) ( 551 SE2d 404 ) (2001). 2010See Mitchell v. State, 250 Ga. App. 292, 296 (2) (a) ( 551 SE2d 404 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Overby v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 516 SE2d 585 ) (1999). 2008See Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 516 SE2d 585 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Banker v. Colegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lambropoulous v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelms v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gibby v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conyers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirton v. Biggersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ross v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rush v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Gatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Placegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence v. Daygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Galgano v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rachel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2014So, when a juvenile challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia,6 and we consider whether the evidence adduced at the hearing would permit a rational 4 See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 5 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). 6 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the acts with which []he is charged.7 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults with a deadly weapon or with any object, device or ins 2014So, when a juvenile challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia,6 and we consider whether the evidence adduced at the hearing would permit a rational 4 See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 5 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). 6 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the acts with which []he is charged.7 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults with a deadly weapon or with any object, device or ins | 10 | 2011–2014 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1994Defendant filed a motion for new trial, claiming (in pertinent part) that the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statement that he and the 13-year-old victim entered into consensual sexual intercourse. 1 The evidence adduced at a hearing conducted pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908), reveals the following: During the afternoon of August 7, 1991, Agent Dean McManus of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and Investigator Grady Toney of the Laurens County Sheriff’s Department executed three arrest warrants charging defendant with aggravated sodomy, aggr 1991In the case sub judice, the evidence adduced at a hearing conducted pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908), reveals that defendant was questioned by a sole detective in an interrogation room at police headquarters; that the interview was conducted at “about 2:15 P.M.” on the day of defendant’s arrest and that defendant did not then appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. | 3 | 1990–1994 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cwiek v. State
green
2 sentences1998“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the trial court’s findings.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cwiek v. State, 220 Ga. App. 36 (1) ( 467 SE2d 608 ) (1996). 1998“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the trial court’s findings.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cwiek v. State, 220 Ga. App. 36 (1) ( 467 SE2d 608 ) (1996). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1991The interrogating detective testified that he did not “offer [defendant] any hope, reward or benefit for his statement” and that before questioning he advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694). 1990Special Agent Berry advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Williford v. State
green
1 sentence2017Moreover, “[i]n the absence of a transcript we must assume as a matter of law that the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the findings of the court.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Tousley
green
2 sentences2011State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874 ( 611 SE2d 139 ) (2005). 2 See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3) ( 497 SE2d 367 ) (1998) (“Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped.”) (citation omitted). 3 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. at 48 (III) (Courts’ inquiry into the purpose of a police checkpoint or roadblock “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level”; cou 2011State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874 ( 611 SE2d 139 ) (2005). 2 See LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (3) ( 497 SE2d 367 ) (1998) (“Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped.”) (citation omitted). 3 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. at 48 (III) (Courts’ inquiry into the purpose of a police checkpoint or roadblock “is to be conducted only at the programmatic level”; cou | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Towns v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Koulianos v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Gillespie v. Gillespie green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| White v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Johnson v. State neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Jowers v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Mancil v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Reid v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Mathis v. State neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Mattox v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Burgess v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Byrd v. Byrd neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Lane v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Johnston green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Wood v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Wight v. Hester green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Proctor v. Proctor green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Crute v. Crute green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Zuber v. Zuber green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Martin v. Harris neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Smith v. Smith green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.