7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1965–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School District of Sheboygan Fallsgreen2 sentences1998The trial court also noted, however, that the City presented no evidence to support a finding that the hiring and official records should be insulated from disclosure under a balancing test, and the City does not dispute that. ¶ 13 We decline the City’s invitation to fashion a blanket rule protecting law enforcement agency personnel and IAD records from a public records request, because the balancing test must be applied on a case-by-case basis “to determine whether a particular record should be released.” Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School District of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis.2d 768 , 546 N. 1998The trial court also noted, however, that the City presented no evidence to support a finding that the hiring and official records should be insulated from disclosure under a balancing test, and the City does not dispute that. ¶ 13 We decline the City’s invitation to fashion a blanket rule protecting law enforcement agency personnel and IAD records from a public records request, because the balancing test must be applied on a case-by-case basis “to determine whether a particular record should be released.” Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School District of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis.2d 768 , 546 N. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-78539-2green2 sentences1994The court held that “[wjhile an intent to place the officer in reasonable apprehension of physical injury was a necessary element of the state’s case, such specific intent could be clearly inferred, from the evidence adduced at hearing.” Id. at 256 , 693 P.2d at 911 (emphasis added). 1994The court held that “[wjhile an intent to place the officer in reasonable apprehension of physical injury was a necessary element of the state’s case, such specific intent could be clearly inferred, from the evidence adduced at hearing.” Id. at 256 , 693 P.2d at 911 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Corr v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1973In Corr v. Industrial Commission, 16 Ariz.App. 12 , 490 P.2d 841 (1971), we summarized the law with regard to the review of Commission awards as requiring that the petitioner affirmatively show that he is entitled to compensation; that the evidence adduced at the hearing be considered in a light most favorable to sustaining the award; that conflicts in the evidence or inferences drawn therefrom, resolved or drawn by the Commission, not be disturbed unless wholly unreasonable; and finally, that the award not be set aside unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support it. 1973In Corr v. Industrial Commission, 16 Ariz.App. 12 , 490 P.2d 841 (1971), we summarized the law with regard to the review of Commission awards as requiring that the petitioner affirmatively show that he is entitled to compensation; that the evidence adduced at the hearing be considered in a light most favorable to sustaining the award; that conflicts in the evidence or inferences drawn therefrom, resolved or drawn by the Commission, not be disturbed unless wholly unreasonable; and finally, that the award not be set aside unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support it. | 2 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Acree
green
2 sentences1982State v. Acree, 121 Ariz. 94 , 588 P.2d 836 (1978). 1982State v. Acree, 121 Ariz. 94 , 588 P.2d 836 (1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Holbrook v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1973In addition to the requirements of Corr, we have the law in Holbrook v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz.App. 51 , 495 P.2d 491 (1972), which permits the Commission to reject evidence when the intrinsic character of the evidence or the extrinsic circumstances of the case cast doubt on petitioner’s testimony. 1973In addition to the requirements of Corr, we have the law in Holbrook v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz.App. 51 , 495 P.2d 491 (1972), which permits the Commission to reject evidence when the intrinsic character of the evidence or the extrinsic circumstances of the case cast doubt on petitioner’s testimony. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Sproul v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1971It is the opinion of the Court that the evidence adduced at the hearing meets the “open labor market” test set forth in Sproul v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 128 , 370 P.2d 279 (1962), and we find no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s denial of additional hearings. 1971It is the opinion of the Court that the evidence adduced at the hearing meets the “open labor market” test set forth in Sproul v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 128 , 370 P.2d 279 (1962), and we find no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s denial of additional hearings. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Application of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
2 sentences1965An examination of the enumeration of issues which The Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company urges remain to be decided at a trial on the merits, reveals that either they (1) must necessarily have been determined adversely to Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company at the hearing on the preliminary injunction and are of such a nature that no additional evidence could alter the adverse findings; or (2) were heretofore resolved by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the cases of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Corporation Commission, 86 Ariz. 27 , 339 P.2d 1046 , (1959), and Applicati 1965An examination of the enumeration of issues which The Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company urges remain to be decided at a trial on the merits, reveals that either they (1) must necessarily have been determined adversely to Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company at the hearing on the preliminary injunction and are of such a nature that no additional evidence could alter the adverse findings; or (2) were heretofore resolved by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the cases of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Corporation Commission, 86 Ariz. 27 , 339 P.2d 1046 , (1959), and Applicati | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Corporation Commission
green
2 sentences1965An examination of the enumeration of issues which The Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company urges remain to be decided at a trial on the merits, reveals that either they (1) must necessarily have been determined adversely to Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company at the hearing on the preliminary injunction and are of such a nature that no additional evidence could alter the adverse findings; or (2) were heretofore resolved by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the cases of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Corporation Commission, 86 Ariz. 27 , 339 P.2d 1046 , (1959), and Applicati 1965An examination of the enumeration of issues which The Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company urges remain to be decided at a trial on the merits, reveals that either they (1) must necessarily have been determined adversely to Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company at the hearing on the preliminary injunction and are of such a nature that no additional evidence could alter the adverse findings; or (2) were heretofore resolved by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the cases of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Corporation Commission, 86 Ariz. 27 , 339 P.2d 1046 , (1959), and Applicati | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.