evidence adduced hearing (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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evidence adduced hearing in Indiana

11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Egbert v. Egbertgreen
ind · 1948 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012GMAC Mortgage, LLC also demonstrated that it was assigned the mortgage by MERS or that, as the holder of the promissory note, it, in effect, became a holder of the mortgage. 2 The statute provides that a promise or order is payable to the bearer if it “does not state a payee.” 7 See Egbert v. Egbert, 226 Ind. 346, 351 (1948) (holding that the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage operates as an assignment of the mortgage).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Nunn v. Nunn green
indctapp · 2003
1 sentence

2015Nunn, 791 N.E.2d at 787 . [34] First, we must note that there is no evidence in the record that Mother even requested joint custody.

12015–2015
Dye v. Young green
indctapp · 1995
1 sentence

2015Dye v. Young, 655 N.E.2d 549 , 550- 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).2 [35] Without worksheets, the trial court instead relied on the evidence adduced at the hearing to calculate the parties’ income.

12015–2015
Brinkmann v. Brinkmann green
indctapp · 2002
1 sentence

2003Brinkmann, 772 N.E.2d 441 at 444 .

12003–2003
Summers v. State green
ind · 1967
2 sentences

1980That case said, in 248 Ind. at 561 , 230 N.E.2d at 325 , that a waiver was proper: [I]f the offense has specific prosecutive merit in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney; or if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, greater weight being given to offenses against the person than to offenses against property, or, even though less serious, if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would lead to a determination that said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile procedures; or where it is found to be in the best interest of

1980That case said, in 248 Ind. at 561 , 230 N.E.2d at 325 , that a waiver was proper: [I]f the offense has specific prosecutive merit in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney; or if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, greater weight being given to offenses against the person than to offenses against property, or, even though less serious, if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would lead to a determination that said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile procedures; or where it is found to be in the best interest of

11980–1980
Reynolds v. State green
ind · 1897
1 sentence

1975The ultimate probative value of such evidence to foster reasonable doubt of guilt appears slight at best (Reynolds v. State [1897], 147 Ind. 3, 7 ), and, conceivably, the large withdrawal so soon after receipt of the Christmas Club refund could imply a need for money.

11975–1975
Gariup v. Stern green
ind · 1970
1 sentence

1973Gariup v. Stern, supra; Johnson v. Tipton Comm. School Corp., supra. *659 With these standards in mind, we proceed to an examination of the evidence adduced at the hearing on Commission’s petition.

11973–1973
Waye v. State green
ind · 1970
2 sentences

1970NOTE. — Reported in 263 N.E.2d 165 .

1970Note.—Reported in 263 N. E. 2d 165 .

11970–1970
Indianapolis, Decatur & Western Railway Co. v. Hood green
ind · 1892
2 sentences

1969Bron-nenberg v. Goins (1915), 183 Ind. 225 , 108 N. E. 862 ; The Indianapolis, Decatur and Western Railway Company v. Hood et al. (1892), 130 Ind. 594 , 30 N. E. 705 ; 23 I.L.E., §§ 231-34, pp. 434-40.” The appellant therefore, cannot now be permitted to complain about the sufficiency of the charges against him. *186 The evidence adduced at the hearing before the board on the Request for Dismissal, consists of the testimony of ten witnesses and encompasses 44 pages of the transcript.

1969Bron-nenberg v. Goins (1915), 183 Ind. 225 , 108 N. E. 862 ; The Indianapolis, Decatur and Western Railway Company v. Hood et al. (1892), 130 Ind. 594 , 30 N. E. 705 ; 23 I.L.E., §§ 231-34, pp. 434-40.” The appellant therefore, cannot now be permitted to complain about the sufficiency of the charges against him. *186 The evidence adduced at the hearing before the board on the Request for Dismissal, consists of the testimony of ten witnesses and encompasses 44 pages of the transcript.

11969–1969
Bronnenberg v. Goins neutral
ind · 1915
2 sentences

1969Bron-nenberg v. Goins (1915), 183 Ind. 225 , 108 N. E. 862 ; The Indianapolis, Decatur and Western Railway Company v. Hood et al. (1892), 130 Ind. 594 , 30 N. E. 705 ; 23 I.L.E., §§ 231-34, pp. 434-40.” The appellant therefore, cannot now be permitted to complain about the sufficiency of the charges against him. *186 The evidence adduced at the hearing before the board on the Request for Dismissal, consists of the testimony of ten witnesses and encompasses 44 pages of the transcript.

1969Bron-nenberg v. Goins (1915), 183 Ind. 225 , 108 N. E. 862 ; The Indianapolis, Decatur and Western Railway Company v. Hood et al. (1892), 130 Ind. 594 , 30 N. E. 705 ; 23 I.L.E., §§ 231-34, pp. 434-40.” The appellant therefore, cannot now be permitted to complain about the sufficiency of the charges against him. *186 The evidence adduced at the hearing before the board on the Request for Dismissal, consists of the testimony of ten witnesses and encompasses 44 pages of the transcript.

11969–1969
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Torrez neutral
indctapp · 1931
2 sentences

1944Upon petition of the appellees the full Industrial Board, on January 24, 1944, entered the following order in the matter: “IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED AND ORDERED by the Full Industrial Board of Indiana by a majority of its Members that the approval of the stipulation of facts that was entered into by and between the parties at the time that the case was originally set for trial at Vincennes, Indiana, on November 2, 1943, is hereby revoked, and set aside, and the said stipulation is hereby set aside, and the case is hereby remanded for hearing before a Single Member of the Industrial

1944Upon petition of the appellees the full Industrial Board, on January 24, 1944, entered the following order in the matter: “IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED AND ORDERED by the Full Industrial Board of Indiana by a majority of its Members that the approval of the stipulation of facts that was entered into by and between the parties at the time that the case was originally set for trial at Vincennes, Indiana, on November 2, 1943, is hereby revoked, and set aside, and the said stipulation is hereby set aside, and the case is hereby remanded for hearing before a Single Member of the Industrial

11944–1944
Bounell v. Berryhill neutral
ind · 1851
1 sentence

1909Bounell v. Berryhill (1851), 2 Ind. 613 , was a habeas corpus proceeding by the guardian to obtain the custody of certain children who were his wards.

11909–1909
Johns v. Emmert green
ind · 1878
1 sentence

1909His counsel appear to have overlooked the fact that in Johns v. Emmert, supra, the court said: “Neither in appellee’s return to the writ, nor in the evidence adduced on the hearing, was there any cause shown why the appellant’s legal right to the custody of his ward should be denied him. ’ ’ In Palin v. Voliva, supra, this court also said: “The evidence given on the hearing does not show any reason why appellee's legal right to the custody of his ward should be denied.” These expressions of the court in the two cases in question clearly distinguish them, under the facts, from the case now befo

11909–1909

Where else courts name it

NY 555 (1936–2026) TX 128 (1916–2024) LA 109 (1925–2025) GA 89 (1904–2021) OH 69 (1925–2024) IL 61 (1913–2025) CA 58 (1914–2026) MO 25 (1960–2023) VA 23 (1992–2020) FL 21 (1955–2019) AL 20 (1891–2015) PA 19 (1900–2022) CT 15 (1975–2015) TN 13 (1997–2022) NC 11 (1936–2021) IN 11 (1909–2015) NJ 9 (1960–2026) CO 8 (1980–2024) NE 8 (1898–2021) DC 8 (1976–2015) MA 7 (1945–2025) AZ 7 (1965–1998) AR 6 (1903–1997) WV 6 (1933–1989) RI 6 (1967–2023) MN 5 (1936–1989) OK 5 (1958–2024) MD 5 (1975–2013) WA 5 (1939–2020) KS 5 (1906–2020) WY 5 (1941–2008) ID 5 (1952–1978) ME 4 (1993–2021) NM 4 (1981–1990) IA 4 (1932–1978) MS 4 (1973–1997) HI 4 (1953–2024) MI 3 (1983–2024) NV 3 (1938–1994) OR 3 (1972–2008) WI 2 (1972–1984) MT 2 (1928–1935) KY 2 (1967–2024) ND 2 (1955–1963) DE 2 (1921–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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