evidence adduced hearing in West Virginia

1989Comm’n, 161 W.Va. 141 , 240 S.E.2d 686 (1977), that the “Commission, if it finds from the evidence adduced at a hearing that public convenience and necessity require the proposed service, may grant a certificate[.]” We also pointed out that the PSC in Weirton Ice found “that the existing transportation facilities were not ‘reasonably efficient and adequate.’ ” 161 W.Va. at 147 , 240 S.E.2d at 690 . 3 In this case, the PSC has utilized what it terms the “regulated competition theory,” which it stated it first applied in Mac’s Wrecker Serv., Inc., supra. 4 In its final order, the PSC explained:

1989Comm’n, 161 W.Va. 141 , 240 S.E.2d 686 (1977), that the “Commission, if it finds from the evidence adduced at a hearing that public convenience and necessity require the proposed service, may grant a certificate[.]” We also pointed out that the PSC in Weirton Ice found “that the existing transportation facilities were not ‘reasonably efficient and adequate.’ ” 161 W.Va. at 147 , 240 S.E.2d at 690 . 3 In this case, the PSC has utilized what it terms the “regulated competition theory,” which it stated it first applied in Mac’s Wrecker Serv., Inc., supra. 4 In its final order, the PSC explained:

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1981We must rely on the facts and logic upon which the hearing examiner ruled, Cf. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967), and determine whether he erroneously applied them in reaching his final determination.

1977Va. 574 , 103 S.E.2d 409 (1958), the Court made this statement: “The decree of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County provides that the plaintiff and the infant children shall have ‘exclusive use of that certain dwelling house located at 2453 Collis Avenue, Huntington, West Virginia, the house being owned jointly by both parties.’, and we find that such is supported by the bill and the evidence adduced at the hearing.

1977This decree does not, as contended by counsel for the appellant, give a life estate in the property to the wife.” 143 W.

1975New Hampshire-Vermont Physician Service v. Durkin, supra. Although the Commissioner can require Blue Cross to negotiate contracts with the participating hospitals in order to insure that the amounts paid by the hospitals have a reasonable relationship to the hospitals’ actual cost of operation, consideration should be given to necessary operation expenses of such hospitals.

1975New Hampshire-Vermont Physician Service v. Durkin, supra .

1933Va. 47 , 166 S. E. 700 , it appears that the commissioner, after a pre *260 liminary investigation, advised claimant, by letter, that his claim was refused on the ground that his disability was not proved to be due to an injury; and upon a timely objection and request for a hearing, advised claimant that since his claim had not been filed within six months from-date of injury, it would be a waste of time to hold a hearing, and a hearing would be refused.

1933He did not experience any pain at the time he was supposed to have injured himself, and went on and finished the day’s work and worked the next day, laid off two or three days, back to work and worked over a year,’ it is therefore ordered stricken from the order heretofore entered herein and the Commissioner upon a further consideration of the awards heretofore made herein and the evidence adduced at the hearing, and the evidence showing that there was no report of injury or application for compensation filed within six months, as required by law, and the commissioner declining to exercise the