deficiency hearing (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

deficiency hearing in California

12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

CaseFollowedCited
Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.green
cal · 2003 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 , 63 P.3d 937 ].) The UCL “ ‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.” (29 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) Ramirez’s UCL claim is based on her allegation that Balboa violated the Rees-Levering Act by failing to comply with the Act’s requirement that an NOI contain the specific “conditions precedent” to reinstatement of her vehicle loan. (§ 2983.2, subd. (a)(2).) She sought to certify a class of individuals whose vehicles were repossessed by or su

2013(Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 , 63 P.3d 937 ].) The UCL “ ‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.” (29 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) Ramirez’s UCL claim is based on her allegation that Balboa violated the Rees-Levering Act by failing to comply with the Act’s requirement that an NOI contain the specific “conditions precedent” to reinstatement of her vehicle loan. (§ 2983.2, subd. (a)(2).) She sought to certify a class of individuals whose vehicles were repossessed by or su

12
People v. Mesagreen
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant “must establish his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 25 standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” (People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007 (Mesa), citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 686–687.) “ ‘ “The burden of sustaining a charge of inadequate or ineffective representation is upon the defendant.

11
Middleton v. McNeilgreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

11
People v. Hugginsgreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

11
People v. Letner and Tobingreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

2011(Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 235 P.3d 62 ]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ].) The alleged deficiency in the standard instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 *357 B.

11
Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Districtgreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003Under California law, a duty to protect the minor from a sexual assault does not exist unless it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of harm could occur. ( Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Although the law generally does not impose a duty on a defendant to control the conduct of another or to warn of such conduct, the special relationship that exists between a school district and its students may impose such a duty. ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712, 715 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 .) However

2003Under California law, a duty to protect the minor from a sexual assault does not exist unless it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of harm could occur. ( Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Although the law generally does not impose a duty on a defendant to control the conduct of another or to warn of such conduct, the special relationship that exists between a school district and its students may impose such a duty. ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712, 715 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 .) However

11
Bennett v. Forrestgreen
cal · 1944 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993(Bennett v. Forrest (1944) 24 Cal.2d 485, 491-492 [ 150 P.2d 416 ].) 5 As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA designated the Secretary of Labor to bring actions to enforce it.

1993(Bennett v. Forrest (1944) 24 Cal.2d 485, 491-492 [ 150 P.2d 416 ].) 5 As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA designated the Secretary of Labor to bring actions to enforce it.

11
Bargioni v. Hillgreen
cal · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

11
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighinogreen
cal · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

11
Kerrigan v. Maloofgreen
calctapp · 1950 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

11
Rochin v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1952 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

11
In Re Marriage of Flahertygreen
cal · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

11
Morrissey v. Brewergreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

11
Sokol v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Thomas green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2026(People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) “A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given. [Citations.] The alleged deficiency in the standard [reasonable doubt] instruction given here was supplied by other instructions, which did expressly inform the jury that every element of the charged crimes and special circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) Bertsch also contends, in yet another forfeited claim, that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.90 violated the equal protection clause of the federal Cons

12026–2026
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
1 sentence

2025To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant “must establish his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 25 standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” (People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007 (Mesa), citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 686–687.) “ ‘ “The burden of sustaining a charge of inadequate or ineffective representation is upon the defendant.

12025–2025
Life Savings Bank v. Wilhelm green
calctapp · 2000
2 sentences

2003In Life Savings Bank v. Wilhelm (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 174 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 657 ] (Life Savings Bank), the court considered the characterization of the deficiency judgment in a different context and described the foreclosure and deficiency judgments as the products of separate actions. {Id. at pp. 178-179.) The creditor in Life Savings Bank missed the three-month filing deadline for requesting a deficiency hearing after the foreclosure sale.

2003In Life Savings Bank v. Wilhelm (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 174 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 657 ] (Life Savings Bank), the court considered the characterization of the deficiency judgment in a different context and described the foreclosure and deficiency judgments as the products of separate actions. {Id. at pp. 178-179.) The creditor in Life Savings Bank missed the three-month filing deadline for requesting a deficiency hearing after the foreclosure sale.

12003–2003
Leger v. Stockton Unified School District green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

2003Under California law, a duty to protect the minor from a sexual assault does not exist unless it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of harm could occur. ( Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Although the law generally does not impose a duty on a defendant to control the conduct of another or to warn of such conduct, the special relationship that exists between a school district and its students may impose such a duty. ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712, 715 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 .) However

2003Under California law, a duty to protect the minor from a sexual assault does not exist unless it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of harm could occur. ( Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 .) Although the law generally does not impose a duty on a defendant to control the conduct of another or to warn of such conduct, the special relationship that exists between a school district and its students may impose such a duty. ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 712, 715 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 .) However

12003–2003
Cornelison v. Kornbluth green
cal · 1975
1 sentence

1991(Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 601 ; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 42 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 378 P.2d 97 ]; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 123 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) “[Section 580b], and the related sections passed at the same time, were intended to prevent creditors from buying in property for a nominal sum, after the debtor had defaulted, and then holding the defaulting debtor for a large deficiency judgment. [Citations.]” (Kerrigan v. Maloof (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 605, 616 [ 221 P.2d 153 ].) “ ‘Section 580b was apparently drafted in con

11991–1991
Union Bank v. Gradsky green
calctapp · 1968
2 sentences

1989Although the parties have not brought to our attention a California case dealing with a mortgage guaranty insurer who, having paid the claim of the lender after a nonjudicial foreclosure, seeks to obtain reimbursement for such payment from the debtor, we find the facts herein substantially similar in effect to those in Union Bank v. Gradsky (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 40 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 64 ], and conclude that the indemnity agreements herein are nothing more than attempts to recover a deficiency in violation of the antideficiency statute.

1989Although the parties have not brought to our attention a California case dealing with a mortgage guaranty insurer who, having paid the claim of the lender after a nonjudicial foreclosure, seeks to obtain reimbursement for such payment from the debtor, we find the facts herein substantially similar in effect to those in Union Bank v. Gradsky (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 40 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 64 ], and conclude that the indemnity agreements herein are nothing more than attempts to recover a deficiency in violation of the antideficiency statute.

11989–1989
People v. Ramirez green
cal · 1979
1 sentence

1985(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; Rochin v. People of California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 171-172 [ 96 L.Ed. 183, 189-190 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ]; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 654 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 508 , 646 P.2d 179 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268 ; Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 673 , 418 P.2d 265 ].) Under the circumstances present here, the county’s refusal to provide a knowledgeable caseworker in attendance at the pretermination hearing resulted in

11985–1985
Aday v. Superior Court green
cal · 1961
1 sentence

1985(See ante, p. 729, fn. 3.) It concludes, however, that the flaws should be ignored here because this is a capital case, maintaining that we have long followed the rule in death penalty appeals that "a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded and the entire record will be examined to determine if a miscarriage of justice resulted." ( Ibid. ) While it may be appropriate to be more solicitous of "technical insufficienc[ies]" in evidentiary objections in capital appeals, the inadequacy here cannot be dismissed as a mere "technical insufficiency." What the majority's

11985–1985

Where else courts name it

TX 36 (1986–2022) FL 27 (1960–2019) CT 22 (1976–2022) IL 17 (1978–2026) CA 12 (1985–2026) PA 11 (1969–2025) NY 11 (1916–2006) GA 11 (1944–2025) ID 8 (2016–2024) NJ 8 (1934–2022) UT 8 (2020–2022) MI 7 (1988–2022) MO 7 (1932–2015) VT 6 (1915–2005) WA 6 (1971–2023) OH 6 (2003–2025) AZ 5 (1982–2024) LA 4 (1983–2015) AL 4 (1940–2002) IA 3 (1980–2026) WI 3 (1936–2025) TN 2 (1998–2001) IN 2 (1958–2018) MS 2 (1984–2002) NC 2 (2004–2023) MN 2 (1937–2010) OK 2 (1925–2020) NV 2 (1973–2018) KS 2 (1982–1996) OR 2 (1998–2016) DE 2 (2018–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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