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12 California opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Home Indemnity Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc.green2 sentences2014Davis, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 863, 871-872 (Home Indem.), explained the application of the exclusion is necessarily a fact-driven inquiry, stating: “[I]n varying factual situations the precise exclusion has been held both ambiguous and unambiguous. 2014Davis, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 863, 871-872 (Home Indem.), explained the application of the exclusion is necessarily a fact-driven inquiry, stating: “[I]n varying factual situations the precise exclusion has been held both ambiguous and unambiguous. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Kendrickgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934 , 946; People v. Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778 [as-applied challenge invites a fact-driven inquiry].) Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in overruling McRoberts’ objection to this condition. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gatlingreen1 sentence2023(E.g., Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 352 , 362 [“good cause” in discovery turns on “‘factual justification’”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 721 [“good cause” in probate action “‘“calls for a factual exposition”’”]; People v. Gatlin 5 (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 40 [“good cause” for continuances in criminal cases is a factual question to be determined by the trial court].) Because, until Gray, “good cause” was not relevant to the admission of a hearsay statement falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the parties also had no incentive to in | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Mandekic (In re Estate of Kerkorian)green1 sentence2023(E.g., Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 352 , 362 [“good cause” in discovery turns on “‘factual justification’”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 721 [“good cause” in probate action “‘“calls for a factual exposition”’”]; People v. Gatlin 5 (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 40 [“good cause” for continuances in criminal cases is a factual question to be determined by the trial court].) Because, until Gray, “good cause” was not relevant to the admission of a hearsay statement falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the parties also had no incentive to in | 1 | 1 |
Ghirardo v. Antonioligreen2 sentences2006A mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law is one which “ ‘requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values’ rather than merely ‘experience with human affairs.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) As we discuss below, the right of access is limited by well-defined legal principles, and the threshold question — whether there has been an impairment of that right — is primarily a legal one, in that it requires consideration of legal principl 2006A mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law is one which “ ‘requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values’ rather than merely ‘experience with human affairs.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) As we discuss below, the right of access is limited by well-defined legal principles, and the threshold question — whether there has been an impairment of that right — is primarily a legal one, in that it requires consideration of legal principl | 1 | 1 |
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2006A mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law is one which “ ‘requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values’ rather than merely ‘experience with human affairs.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) As we discuss below, the right of access is limited by well-defined legal principles, and the threshold question — whether there has been an impairment of that right — is primarily a legal one, in that it requires consideration of legal principl 2006A mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law is one which “ ‘requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values’ rather than merely ‘experience with human affairs.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) As we discuss below, the right of access is limited by well-defined legal principles, and the threshold question — whether there has been an impairment of that right — is primarily a legal one, in that it requires consideration of legal principl | 1 | 1 |
Talbot v. Fresno-Pacific Corp.green2 sentences2002(Talbot v. Fresno-Pacific Corp. (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 425, 432 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 361 ].) Moreover, even if the unity of interest and ownership element is shown, alter ego will not be applied absent evidence that an injustice would result from the recognition of separate corporate identities, and “[difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) Similarly, the principal/agent theory is a fact-driven inquiry that requires examination of whether the parent exercises a sufficient degree 2002(Talbot v. Fresno-Pacific Corp. (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 425, 432 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 361 ].) Moreover, even if the unity of interest and ownership element is shown, alter ego will not be applied absent evidence that an injustice would result from the recognition of separate corporate identities, and “[difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) Similarly, the principal/agent theory is a fact-driven inquiry that requires examination of whether the parent exercises a sufficient degree | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jennifer L. v. Marjorie L.
green
1 sentence2026(A.L., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 .) The “court’s primary concern in determining the best interests of children when making any orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children” is “the health, safety, and welfare of children.” (Fam. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Flores v. Town of Islip
green
1 sentence2020Similarly in Flores v. Town of Islip (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 382 F.Supp.3d 197 , the district court relied on Pope and other Second Circuit cases for its pronouncement that determining whether the evidence of white bloc voting satisfies the third Gingles factor “is largely a fact-driven inquiry” ( Flores, supra, at p. 231 ) that requires flexibility and for which reason “courts have deviated from a bright-line rule” (ibid.). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Irvin
green
1 sentence2013(See People v. Irvin (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1070-1072 .) Suffice it to note that we have examined the two cases that Morrow cites and conclude that neither supports his argument because each is factually distinguishable. 64 DISPOSITION The judgments are affirmed. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Oakland Unified School District v. Public Employment Relations Board
green
2 sentences2013We recognize that in the present case we are concerned with prearbitration bargaining and not with a challenge to conduct by an employer, as was the case in Oakland Unified, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 1007 . 2013We recognize that in the present case we are concerned with prearbitration bargaining and not with a challenge to conduct by an employer, as was the case in Oakland Unified, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 1007 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brumer v. LOS ANGELES CTY. METRO. TRANSP. AUTH.
green
1 sentence2006A mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law is one which “ ‘requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values’ rather than merely ‘experience with human affairs.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) As we discuss below, the right of access is limited by well-defined legal principles, and the threshold question — whether there has been an impairment of that right — is primarily a legal one, in that it requires consideration of legal principl | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Estate of Ross
green
2 sentences1998Safety is not an option.” (Italics added.) 6 Because a finding of prejudice is necessarily a fact-driven inquiry based upon the particular record in each case, defendant errs in placing such great reliance upon Estate of Ross (1919) 179 Cal. 629 [ 178 P. 510 ] in which our Supreme Court concluded that in that particular case the failure to deliver the “wilfully false” instruction was prejudicial error. 1998Safety is not an option.” (Italics added.) 6 Because a finding of prejudice is necessarily a fact-driven inquiry based upon the particular record in each case, defendant errs in placing such great reliance upon Estate of Ross (1919) 179 Cal. 629 [ 178 P. 510 ] in which our Supreme Court concluded that in that particular case the failure to deliver the “wilfully false” instruction was prejudicial error. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.