exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine in Texas

2024Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 798 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also City of Houston v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709, 717 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (explaining the related principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not required when an agency attempts to exercise authority beyond its statutorily conferred powers); Jackson v. Houston Indep.

2015See Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559 (naming school district as defendant); O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413 (naming county appraisal district, chief appraiser, appraisal review board, and board’s former chairman); Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440 (naming City of Houston as defendant); Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709 (naming City of Houston as defendant); City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d 681 (naming Public Utility Commission of Texas as defendant); Mag-T, L.P., 161 S.W.3d 617 (naming appraisal district, appraisal review board, and tax assessor-collector as 28 Again, Audi confuses the “ultra vires” exception to the exhaustion o

2016“Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when there are purely questions of law involved.” Grounds, 707 S.W.2d at 892 (holding that the determination of teachers’ and school districts’ rights under contracts was “not a pure question of law” and requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies). 13 But the parents’ claims here *558 do nqt present pure questions of law; they present questions of historical fact (such as what has happened up until now in the district and its individual schools with respect to funding and student performance), questions of la

2011“Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when there are purely questions of law involved.” Grounds v. Tolar Ind. School Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1986); see also Mitz v. Texas State Bd. of Veterinary Med.

2015Appraisal Dist., 161 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (if agency has exclusive authority, suit subject to dismissal unless claim “falls into one of the exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine”).

2015See Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559 (naming school district as defendant); O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413 (naming county appraisal district, chief appraiser, appraisal review board, and board’s former chairman); Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440 (naming City of Houston as defendant); Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709 (naming City of Houston as defendant); City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d 681 (naming Public Utility Commission of Texas as defendant); Mag-T, L.P., 161 S.W.3d 617 (naming appraisal district, appraisal review board, and tax assessor-collector as 28 Again, Audi confuses the “ultra vires” exception to the exhaustion o

2020See Strayhorn v. Lexington Ins., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004), aff’d, 209 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2006). 11 procedure to enforce those rights.’” Clint Indep.

2013Co., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004) (explaining that the policy reason “for the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is to allow the agency to resolve disputed issues of fact and policy and to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute”) aff’d, 209 S.W.3d 83, 84, 90 (Tex. 2006).

2015Comm’n of Tex., 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983) (“[I]t has been held that when there is an absence of jurisdiction in an administrative agency, then the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable.”); Public Utility Comm’n of Texas v. Cities of Harlingen, 311 S.W.3d 610, 624 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“[F]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies does not bar judicial review when the error alleged is that the agency acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 8 It is well established that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for the

2015Because “the legislative intent to exclude municipally-owned utilities from the Act’s jurisdictional provisions is clear,” id. at 684 , the Court reasoned, the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine did not apply, id. at 683 .

2012Strayhorn , 128 S.W.3d at 780 ; Gibson v. Waco ISD , 971 S.W.2d 199 , 201–02 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998), vacated on other grounds , 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000); see Larry Koch, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res.

2012Strayhorn, 128 S.W.3d at 780 ; Gibson v. Waco ISD, 971 S.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998), vacated on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex.2000); see Larry Koch, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res.

2020Essenburg v. Dallas Cty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998).

2003Importantly, however, the Essenburg court observed "[t]he presentment requirement... is not analogous to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement." Id.

1995Westheimer , 567 S.W.2d at 785 .

1995Westheimer, 567 S.W.2d at 785 .

2009“The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies directs that where the legislature has given a person administrative remedies for action by an administrative agency which aggrieves him that person must first exhaust those remedies before he can raise his claims in court.” Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009“The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies directs that where the legislature has given a person administrative remedies for action by an administrative agency which aggrieves him that person must first exhaust those remedies before he can raise his claims in court.” Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2001Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (listing exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies).

2001Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (listing exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies).

2025Dist. v. Axberg, 535 S.W.3d 21, 34 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (noting that “there are exceptions to the exhaustion-of- administrative-remedies doctrine,” including “when an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers”); Brennan v. City of Willow Park, 376 S.W.3d 910, 921-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (parties were not required to pursue any type of protest procedure where they alleged that agency acted outside its statutory powers).

2016Brennan, 376 S.W.3d at 921–22.

2022Murphy v. City of Galveston, 557 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

2020Murphy v. The City of Galveston, 557 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

2020See Strayhorn v. Lexington Ins., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004), aff’d, 209 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2006). 11 procedure to enforce those rights.’” Clint Indep.

2013Co., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004) (explaining that the policy reason “for the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine is to allow the agency to resolve disputed issues of fact and policy and to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute”) aff’d, 209 S.W.3d 83, 84, 90 (Tex. 2006).

2011Exam’rs, 278 S.W.3d 17 , 23-24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. dism’d); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm’n on Environmental Quality, 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). “[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent’s action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence.” Rylander v. Caldwell, 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2011Exam'rs , 278 S.W.3d 17, 23-24 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, pet. dism'd); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm'n on Environmental Quality , 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). "[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent's action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence." Rylander v. Caldwell , 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2011Exam’rs, 278 S.W.3d 17 , 23-24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. dism’d); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm’n on Environmental Quality, 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). “[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent’s action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence.” Rylander v. Caldwell, 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2011Exam'rs , 278 S.W.3d 17, 23-24 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, pet. dism'd); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm'n on Environmental Quality , 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). "[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent's action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence." Rylander v. Caldwell , 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2010See Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 959 F.2d 655 , 659 (7th Cir.1992); see also Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv.

2010See Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 959 F.2d 655 , 659 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv.

2009“Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, failure to comply with the administrative review procedures of the [Tax] Code to their fullest extent precludes judicial review.” Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Fund Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex. App.—Dallas -3- 04-09-00026-CV 1994, writ denied).

2009“Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, failure to comply with the administrative review procedures of the [Tax] Code to their fullest extent precludes judicial review.” Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex.App.Dallas 1994, writ denied).

2009Davis , 259 S.W.3d at 285 ( A termination is a condition of work and subject to the grievance process @ ) . 10 The Texas Education Code was amended in 1995 to narrow the range of grievances over which the Commissioner of Education retains jurisdiction.

2009Davis, 259 S.W.3d at 285 ("termination is a condition of work and subject to the grievance process”). 10 .

2025Id.

2024Requiring a party to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit does not deprive him of any legal rights; “[r]ather, it honors the Legislature’s intent that the appropriate body adjudicate[] the dispute[] first . . . []thereby ensur[ing] an orderly procedure to enforce those rights.” Berrelez, 562 S.W.3d at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement permits the agency in question to apply its expertise and develop a factual record if a suit is later filed.”).

2020Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex. 1990))).

2016Id.

2015See Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 16 ; City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d at 683 ; Tex. Mut.

2009Bennett, 35 S.W.3d at 15 .

2018Id. (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction: 1, 28 TEX.

1973That doctrine is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law, McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), and has long been recognized in Texas. 3 When by reason of statute or rule an agency order is made subject to appeal to higher administrative authority, it has long been regarded that administrative remedies have not been exhausted until the order has been submitted to the higher authority and until that authority has acted.

2018One such exception is that “the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when there are purely questions of law involved.” Id. at 557 & n.13 (quoting Grounds v. Tolar Indep.

2018Dist. v. Marquez , 487 S.W.3d 538 , 546 (Tex. 2016) (noting that the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement "applies only to complaints that the Legislature has authorized the Commissioner to resolve").

2011Exam’rs, 278 S.W.3d 17 , 23-24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. dism’d); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm’n on Environmental Quality, 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). “[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent’s action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence.” Rylander v. Caldwell, 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2011Exam'rs , 278 S.W.3d 17, 23-24 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, pet. dism'd); Juliff Gardens, L.L.C., v. Texas Comm'n on Environmental Quality , 131 S.W.3d 271, 277-80 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). "[W]hen a party [alleges that its] rights have been violated by a state agent's action pursuant to an unconstitutional law, that party may sue to remedy the violation or prevent its recurrence." Rylander v. Caldwell , 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.