12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re RESgreen2 sentences2011His ineffectiveness claim was based on his counsel's failure (1) to make arrangements for him to participate in the proceedings (he was still incarcerated at the time of the show-cause hearing), and (2) "to call any witnesses to support his preference that members of his family provide care for D.T." Id. at 194 . 2011His ineffectiveness claim was based on his counsel’s failure (1) to make arrangements for him to participate in the proceedings (he was still incarcerated at the time of the show-cause hearing), and (2) “to call any witnesses to support his preference that members of his family provide care for D.T.” Id. at 194 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Antj. P.green2 sentences2010In In re Antj.P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002), we held that the trial court did not err in drawing an adverse inference regarding a birth father’s relationship with his son where the father appeared at a hearing designed to determine whether his parental rights should be terminated, but failed to testily. 2010In In re Antj.P., 812 A.2d 965, 971 (D.C.2002), we held that the trial court did not err in drawing an adverse inference regarding a birth father's relationship with his son where the father appeared at a hearing designed to determine whether his parental rights should be terminated, but failed to testify. | 2 | 2 |
In Re JGgreen2 sentences2007See also In re J.G., supra, 831 A.2d at 1001 ("Not-withstanding the presumption in favor of the birth parent, however, we have repeatedly held that the parent's rights may and must be overridden when such a drastic measure is necessary in order to protect the best interests of the child."). [10] Perhaps, if our guiding legal principle on appeal were "the best interests of the parents," appellants' plea would indeed be reasonable. [11] Although D.P. argues that the court abused its discretion by not weighing heavily D.P.'s drug free period, his argument lacks merit. 2007See also In re J.G., supra, 831 A.2d at 1001 ("Not-withstanding the presumption in favor of the birth parent, however, we have repeatedly held that the parent's rights may and must be overridden when such a drastic measure is necessary in order to protect the best interests of the child."). [10] Perhaps, if our guiding legal principle on appeal were "the best interests of the parents," appellants' plea would indeed be reasonable. [11] Although D.P. argues that the court abused its discretion by not weighing heavily D.P.'s drug free period, his argument lacks merit. | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Gerstenfeldgreen2 sentences2004Initially, we note that this argument is not properly before us because R.W. failed to raise it at the trial court level. [3] See In re J.W., 806 A.2d 1232 , 1235 (D.C.2002) (citing Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C. 1986)). 2004Initially, we note that this argument is not properly before us because R.W. failed to raise it at the trial court level. 3 See In re J.W., 806 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.2002) (citing Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C.1986)). | 2 | 2 |
In Re JWgreen2 sentences2004Initially, we note that this argument is not properly before us because R.W. failed to raise it at the trial court level. [3] See In re J.W., 806 A.2d 1232 , 1235 (D.C.2002) (citing Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C. 1986)). 2004Initially, we note that this argument is not properly before us because R.W. failed to raise it at the trial court level. 3 See In re J.W., 806 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.2002) (citing Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C.1986)). | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012The government responds that appellant’s due process rights were not violated because the government had the same legal theory, albeit under slightly different factual scenarios, at both proceedings. “[T]he decision to revoke probation is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and typically involves a two step analysis: (1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation, and (2) a discretionary determination as to whether violation of a condition warrants revocation.” Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 188 (D.C.2006). | 1 | 1 |
In Re ARgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., In re J.G., Jr., 831 A.2d at 999 n. 15; In re A.R. 679 A.2d 470, 473 (D.C.1996). 2004Id. at 478 . [9] Indeed, the statute provides that "[e]vidence of continued drug-activity shall be given great weight." D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(5). [10] In her brief and during oral argument, R.W. suggested (based on H.B.'s testimony at the show cause hearing) that H.B. was under the "misconception" that adoption was the only permanency option available and that H.B. would have been satisfied with legal guardianship had she known about this option. | 1 | 1 |
Mannan v. District of Columbia Board of Medicinegreen1 sentence1999“In general, a judge may take judicial notice of the contents of court records.” S.S. v. D.M., supra, 597 A.2d at 880 (citing Mannan v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 558 A.2d 329, 338 (D.C.1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen2 sentences1995No separate evidentiary hearing was held on the other alleged violations of the voluntary agreement, since the Ohs had previously admitted one violation and agreed to accept a five-day suspension of their license. [3] The Capitol Hill Group Ministry is an association of about twenty churches of various denominations in the Capitol Hill area, which includes the area immediately adjacent to Lincoln Park. [4] Under 23 DCMR § 1502 (1988), the Board was required to investigate whether such a violation had occurred, and to seek an opinion from the Office of the Corporation Counsel as to whether ther 1995We reject the Board's argument that petitioners waived this point by failing to object when the Board ruled, at the outset of the hearing, that it would not consider Trant’s violation of the voluntary agreement at the hearing on the renewal application, but would address it in "a separate proceeding.” All that the law requires is "that all claims be first raised at the agency level....” Hughes v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 498 A.2d 567, 570 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Mooregreen2 sentences1987Williams v. Williams, 495 A.2d 754, 755 (D.C.1985) (parties impliedly consented to try the issue of divorce); Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 768 (D.C.1978) (“the clearest indications of a party’s implied consent to try an issue lie in the failure to object to evidence ... which is clearly appropriate to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings.”); cf. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(b). 13 Since the record demonstrates Wilkes was on notice that title to the accounts would be decided at the show cause hearing, his contention that he was denied an opportunity to present his full case 1987Williams v. Williams, 495 A.2d 754, 755 (D.C.1985) (parties impliedly consented to try the issue of divorce); Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 768 (D.C.1978) ("the clearest indications of a party's implied consent to try an issue lie in the failure to object to evidence . . . which is clearly appropriate to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings."); cf. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(b). [13] Since the record demonstrates Wilkes was on notice that title to the accounts would be decided at the show cause hearing, his contention that he was denied an opportunity to present his full c | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1987Williams v. Williams, 495 A.2d 754, 755 (D.C.1985) (parties impliedly consented to try the issue of divorce); Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 768 (D.C.1978) (“the clearest indications of a party’s implied consent to try an issue lie in the failure to object to evidence ... which is clearly appropriate to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings.”); cf. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(b). 13 Since the record demonstrates Wilkes was on notice that title to the accounts would be decided at the show cause hearing, his contention that he was denied an opportunity to present his full case 1987Williams v. Williams, 495 A.2d 754, 755 (D.C.1985) (parties impliedly consented to try the issue of divorce); Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762, 768 (D.C.1978) ("the clearest indications of a party's implied consent to try an issue lie in the failure to object to evidence . . . which is clearly appropriate to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings."); cf. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(b). [13] Since the record demonstrates Wilkes was on notice that title to the accounts would be decided at the show cause hearing, his contention that he was denied an opportunity to present his full c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re SM
green
2 sentences2010But the mother in this case, unlike the father in In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 , 2009 WL 4681875 , at *5, was adjudicated neglectful prior to the show cause hearing. 2010But the mother in this case, unlike the father in In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 , 2009 WL 4681875 , at *5, was adjudicated neglectful prior to the show cause hearing. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Estate of Presgrave v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2006We affirmed the trial court's disposition, concluding that the evidence presented by Mr. Stephens "clearly and convincingly supports the trial judge's finding that the decedent intended to create a present interest and right of survivorship in [Mr.] Stephens, and that [he] had met his burden to show that the accounts belonged to him rather than the estate." Id. at 280 . 2006We affirmed the trial court’s disposition, concluding that the evidence presented by Mr. Stephens “clearly and convincingly supports the trial judge’s finding that the decedent intended to create a present interest and right of survivorship in [Mr.] Stephens, and that [he] had met his burden to show that the accounts belonged to him rather than the estate.” Id. at 280 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re TS
green
1 sentence2004Rather, her argument was simply that the trial court had exceeded the scope of his authority as an impartial fact finder. [5] R.W.'s reliance on In re T.S., 829 A.2d 937 (D.C.2003), is misplaced. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ss v. Dm
green
2 sentences1999We stated: “[W]e are satisfied that the judge, after reciting the allegations of the neglect petition and summarizing the court orders in the neglect proceeding, by way of background, based virtually all of his findings of fact on the evidence that he heard at the show cause hearing and on the orders in the neglect proceeding to which appellant’s counsel interposed no objection.” Id. at 883 . 1999“In general, a judge may take judicial notice of the contents of court records.” S.S. v. D.M., supra, 597 A.2d at 880 (citing Mannan v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 558 A.2d 329, 338 (D.C.1989)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Woe v. Cuomo
green
1 sentence1987One might ask whether it is reasonable to assume that a law firm would send an inexperienced first-year associate to such a "hearing," if the firm realized that in fact the hearing was to be a final determination on the merits. [3] See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.1986); Gellman v. State of Maryland, supra ; Am.Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3319 v. Colburn, 531 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir.1975); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Mabel Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987One might ask whether it is reasonable to assume that a law firm would send an inexperienced first-year associate to such a "hearing," if the firm realized that in fact the hearing was to be a final determination on the merits. [3] See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.1986); Gellman v. State of Maryland, supra ; Am.Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3319 v. Colburn, 531 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir.1975); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
American Federation of Government Employees v. Colburn
neutral
1 sentence1987One might ask whether it is reasonable to assume that a law firm would send an inexperienced first-year associate to such a "hearing," if the firm realized that in fact the hearing was to be a final determination on the merits. [3] See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.1986); Gellman v. State of Maryland, supra ; Am.Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3319 v. Colburn, 531 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir.1975); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Irwin F. Gellman v. State of Maryland
green
2 sentences1987As the court in Gellman v. State of Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.1976) states in discussing the conversion of a hearing on a preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction hearing without notice to the parties: “Although there is no indication that plaintiff would have produced further testimony if notified earlier that the entire case would be disposed of after a single hearing, this does not sanction the court in changing, sub silentio, the nature of the game at halftime.” Id. at 605 (quoting T.M.T. 1987As the court in Gellman v. State of Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.1976) states in discussing the conversion of a hearing on a preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction hearing without notice to the parties: “Although there is no indication that plaintiff would have produced further testimony if notified earlier that the entire case would be disposed of after a single hearing, this does not sanction the court in changing, sub silentio, the nature of the game at halftime.” Id. at 605 (quoting T.M.T. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Davis v. Altmann
green
1 sentence1987(One of Stephens' witnesses traveled to the District of Columbia from Florida.) Presumably a twelve-day continuance was granted on October 21, 1985, until November 1, 1985. [4] See also id. § 20-107 ("An interested person, the beneficiary of a trust or the Register [of Wills] may, at any time, apply to the Court to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration."). [5] Professors Wright and Miller point out that the modern federal rules of civil procedure sought to avoid the complexities, technical requirements and burdens on the parties and court of a rule to show cause. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Application of Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass'n
green
2 sentences1987Wilkes’ reliance on Application of Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 53 N.C.App. 326 , 280 S.E.2d 748 (1981) (any error in entering a final judgment on the merits after a show cause hearing was harmless because all of the relevant evidence was presented to the trial judge), is also misplaced; on appeal Wilkes has failed to make a sufficient proffer that all the relevant evidence was not presented at the show cause hearing. 1987Wilkes’ reliance on Application of Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 53 N.C.App. 326 , 280 S.E.2d 748 (1981) (any error in entering a final judgment on the merits after a show cause hearing was harmless because all of the relevant evidence was presented to the trial judge), is also misplaced; on appeal Wilkes has failed to make a sufficient proffer that all the relevant evidence was not presented at the show cause hearing. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.