show cause hearing in Virginia

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2021He further contends that he violated the order because of wife’s “unreasonable refusal to cooperate . . . with [his] efforts to sell the two condominiums.” “[T]o hold a litigant in contempt, the litigant must be ‘acting in bad faith or [in] willful disobedience of [the court’s] order.’” Zedan v. Westheim, 60 Va. App. 556, 574-75 (2012) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696 (1991)). 4 Because we find that wife obtained valid substituted service on husband pursuant to Code § 8.01-296(2)(a), we decline to address husband’s alternative arg

2013Furthermore, “[i]n a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696 , 406 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1991).

2025“Once the movant - 10 - proves noncompliance, ‘the burden is on the obligor to provide justification for the failure to comply.’” Id. at 737-38 (quoting Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 704 (1993)).

2021He further contends that he violated the order because of wife’s “unreasonable refusal to cooperate . . . with [his] efforts to sell the two condominiums.” “[T]o hold a litigant in contempt, the litigant must be ‘acting in bad faith or [in] willful disobedience of [the court’s] order.’” Zedan v. Westheim, 60 Va. App. 556, 574-75 (2012) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696 (1991)). 4 Because we find that wife obtained valid substituted service on husband pursuant to Code § 8.01-296(2)(a), we decline to address husband’s alternative arg

2013See, e.g., Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 319 , 362 S.E.2d 650, 656 (1987) ("p?]he 'right of self-representation is not a license' to fail 'to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ ” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). .

2013See, e.g., Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 319 , 362 S.E.2d 650, 656 (1987) ("p?]he 'right of self-representation is not a license' to fail 'to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ ” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). .

2013See, e.g., Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 319 , 362 S.E.2d 650, 656 (1987) ("p?]he 'right of self-representation is not a license' to fail 'to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ ” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). .

2013See, e.g., Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 319 , 362 S.E.2d 650, 656 (1987) ("p?]he 'right of self-representation is not a license' to fail 'to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ ” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). .

2001“The offending party then has the burden of proving justification for his or her failure to comply.” Id. (citing Frazier, 3 Va.App. at 87 , 348 S.E.2d at 407 ). “[T]he inability of an alleged contemner, without fault on his part, to tender obedience to an order of court, is a good defense to a charge of contempt.” Laing v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 511, 514 , 137 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1964) (citation omitted); see also Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va.App. 696, 704 , 427 S.E.2d *204 209, 215 (1993) (“A trial court may hold a support obligor in contempt for failure to pay where such failure is based on unwilli

2001“The offending party then has the burden of proving justification for his or her failure to comply.” Id. (citing Frazier, 3 Va.App. at 87 , 348 S.E.2d at 407 ). “[T]he inability of an alleged contemner, without fault on his part, to tender obedience to an order of court, is a good defense to a charge of contempt.” Laing v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 511, 514 , 137 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1964) (citation omitted); see also Barnhill v. Brooks, 15 Va.App. 696, 704 , 427 S.E.2d *204 209, 215 (1993) (“A trial court may hold a support obligor in contempt for failure to pay where such failure is based on unwilli

2020Although it was clear that Green’s violation was not willful and was due to the “subsequent inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen medical condition[,] . . . the inmate necessarily will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the trial court has the discretion to revoke all or part of the inmate’s suspended sentence . . . .” Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 511 (2004).

2017When a defendant can no longer participate in such a program, whether due to either willful noncompliance or unforeseen circumstances beyond his control, he “necessarily will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the [circuit] court has the discretion to revoke all or part of [his] suspended sentence.” Peyton, 268 Va. at 511 , 604 S.E.2d at 21 .

2021He further contends that he violated the order because of wife’s “unreasonable refusal to cooperate . . . with [his] efforts to sell the two condominiums.” “[T]o hold a litigant in contempt, the litigant must be ‘acting in bad faith or [in] willful disobedience of [the court’s] order.’” Zedan v. Westheim, 60 Va. App. 556, 574-75 (2012) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696 (1991)). 4 Because we find that wife obtained valid substituted service on husband pursuant to Code § 8.01-296(2)(a), we decline to address husband’s alternative arg

2021“In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Id.

2020See Cilwa, 298 Va. at 269-70. -5- “Under Rule 5A:18, we do not consider trial court error as a basis for reversal where no timely objection was made except in extraordinary situations to attain the ends of justice.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220 (1997).

2009This Court reiterated the requirement of Redman that the appellant “ ‘must demonstrate more than that the Commonwealth failed to prove an element of the offense.’ ” 32 Va.App. at 608 , 529 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting Redman, 25 Va.App. at 221 , 487 S.E.2d at 272-73 ).

2026“Constitutional guarantees of procedural due process provide certain ‘minimum requirements’ that ‘must attend administrative hearings.’” Va. Bd. of Med. v. Hagmann, 67 Va. App. 488, 501 (2017) (quoting Hladys v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 145, 147 (1988)).

2026“Constitutional guarantees of procedural due process provide certain ‘minimum requirements’ that ‘must attend administrative hearings.’” Va. Bd. of Med. v. Hagmann, 67 Va. App. 488, 501 (2017) (quoting Hladys v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 145, 147 (1988)).

2022Appellant asserts that “[a]lthough no litigation was pending” when he moved to continue the show cause hearing, “a continuance would hardly have prejudiced the Commonwealth.” He further argues that he was prejudiced because, if he is granted a writ of actual innocence in the future and is exonerated of the Danville offenses, he “would nevertheless . . . find himself serving the fifteen-year sentence imposed by the trial court.” “When a defendant makes a last minute request for a continuance, he must demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist.” Reyes v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 379, 387

2021Graham v. Bazemore, 32 Va. App. 451, 455 (2000) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 696 (1991)).

2021Husband asserts that the Washington address provided in the divorce decree was not his “usual place of abode.” He contends that it is, instead, his last home or last residence. 3 By contrast, the long-arm statute does expressly require “proof of personal service” on a nonresident when jurisdiction arises from the person having “conceived or fathered a child in this Commonwealth.” Code § 8.01-328.1(A), (A)(8)(iii). - 10 - A person’s “usual place of abode” is distinct from his “last home” or “last known residence.” See Washburn, 144 Va. at 515 (“Last home, or residence, or place of abode, are no

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2011See Winston, 51 Va. App. at 82 , 654 S.E.2d at 345 (holding that because appellant failed to include an argument in his question presented (now assignment of error), the Court would not address it on appeal; see also Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31 , 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785 , 789 n.4 (2001) (declining to address an issue on appeal because it was not expressly stated in the questions presented (now assignments of error)). -9- “In a show cause hearing, the moving party need only prove that the offending party failed to comply with an order of the trial court.” Alexander

2007In other words, “[a]s a general principle, when a prior order of a court with jurisdiction to hear a matter is collaterally attacked, ‘the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption of regularity which attends the prior [judgment] because “every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears.”’” Clements v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 56, 60 , 596 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (2004) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 620, 624 , 500 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1998)).

2007In other words, “[a]s a general principle, when a prior order of a court with jurisdiction to hear a matter is collaterally attacked, ‘the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption of regularity which attends the prior [judgment] because “every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears.”’” Clements v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 56, 60 , 596 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (2004) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 620, 624 , 500 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1998)).

2007Thereafter, at the show cause hearing on May 21, the trial judge ordered that Powell “had been duly cited to appear and could not be served with process.” “Courts are presumed to act in accordance with the law and orders of the court are entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Napert v. Napert, 261 Va. 45, 47 , 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001).

2007Thereafter, at the show cause hearing on May 21, the trial judge ordered that Powell “had been duly cited to appear and could not be served with process.” “Courts are presumed to act in accordance with the law and orders of the court are entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Napert v. Napert, 261 Va. 45, 47 , 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001).

2007In other words, “[a]s a general principle, when a prior order of a court with jurisdiction to hear a matter is collaterally attacked, ‘the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption of regularity which attends the prior [judgment] because “every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears.”’” Clements v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 56, 60 , 596 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (2004) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 620, 624 , 500 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1998)).

2007In other words, “[a]s a general principle, when a prior order of a court with jurisdiction to hear a matter is collaterally attacked, ‘the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption of regularity which attends the prior [judgment] because “every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears.”’” Clements v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 56, 60 , 596 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (2004) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 620, 624 , 500 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1998)).

2002See Wright v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 148, 152-53 , 526 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 , aff'd on other gds., 261 Va. 1 , 539 S.E.2d 432 (2000) (explaining a trial court can impose a new period of suspension after a show cause hearing, if the time limitation of Code § 19.2-306 is met).

2002See Wright v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 148, 152-53 , 526 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 , aff'd on other gds., 261 Va. 1 , 539 S.E.2d 432 (2000) (explaining a trial court can impose a new period of suspension after a show cause hearing, if the time limitation of Code § 19.2-306 is met).

2002See Wright v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 148, 152-53 , 526 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 , aff'd on other gds., 261 Va. 1 , 539 S.E.2d 432 (2000) (explaining a trial court can impose a new period of suspension after a show cause hearing, if the time limitation of Code § 19.2-306 is met).

2002See Wright v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 148, 152-53 , 526 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 , aff'd on other gds., 261 Va. 1 , 539 S.E.2d 432 (2000) (explaining a trial court can impose a new period of suspension after a show cause hearing, if the time limitation of Code § 19.2-306 is met).

2002See Lawrence v. Nelson, 200 Va. 597, 599 , 106 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1959) (holding that where appellant has not made the evidence on which a decree is based part of the record on appeal, it is impossible to pass on certain issues and the decision of the trial court is presumed to be correct).

2002See Lawrence v. Nelson, 200 Va. 597, 599 , 106 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1959) (holding that where appellant has not made the evidence on which a decree is based part of the record on appeal, it is impossible to pass on certain issues and the decision of the trial court is presumed to be correct).

1995See Nesselrodt v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 448 , 452 S.E.2d 676 (1994) (en banc).

1995See Nesselrodt v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 448 , 452 S.E.2d 676 (1994) (en banc).