show cause hearing in Michigan

2022Respondent has not demonstrated any error with the manner in which the show-cause hearing was conducted.5 Further, we are not persuaded that the trial court’s comments during the parenting-time hearing reflected any bias or a “predetermined outcome.” Respondent has not demonstrated error, let alone plain error. 4 “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 666 . (citations omitted). 5 The

2016We review for an abuse of discretion a lower court’s decision whether to hold a party in contempt, In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 671 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009), as well as its decision whether to convene a show-cause hearing, Davis v Detroit Fin Review Team, 296 Mich App 568, 624 ; 821 NW2d 896 (2012).

2021In any event, MCL 287.280 provides for the euthanasia of a dog, after a show cause hearing before an appropriate township official, if a person “sustains any loss or damage to livestock . . . that is caused by dogs” or if “the livestock of a person is necessarily destroyed for having been bitten by a dog.” As we will explain in this opinion, the evidence that defendant’s dogs destroyed the horse was sufficient under both MCL 287.280 and MCL 287.286a(1)(b). -4- harms caused by their dangerous animals.” People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 53 ; 836 NW2d 883 (2013) (emphasis omitted).

2021In any event, MCL 287.280 provides for the euthanasia of a dog, after a show cause hearing before an appropriate township official, if a person “sustains any loss or damage to livestock . . . that is caused by dogs” or if “the livestock of a person is necessarily destroyed for having been bitten by a dog.” As we will explain in this opinion, the evidence that defendant’s dogs destroyed the horse was sufficient under both MCL 287.280 and MCL 287.286a(1)(b). -4- harms caused by their dangerous animals.” People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 53 ; 836 NW2d 883 (2013) (emphasis omitted).

2021Before the foreclosure judgment is entered, the GPTA provides various procedural safeguards to afford those with an interest in the property notice of the foreclosure by mail, by publication, and by a personal visit to the property,17 and it provides an opportunity to be heard via a show-cause hearing and a judicial- foreclosure hearing.18 Once the foreclosure judgment enters and the redemption and appeal periods expire, fee simple title to the property vests in the foreclosing governmental unit.19 Once entered, circuit courts generally may not alter a judgment of foreclosure. 15 Krohn v Home-

2021Before the foreclosure judgment is entered, the GPTA provides various procedural safeguards to afford those with an interest in the property notice of the foreclosure by mail, by publication, and by a personal visit to the property,17 and it provides an opportunity to be heard via a show-cause hearing and a judicial- foreclosure hearing.18 Once the foreclosure judgment enters and the redemption and appeal periods expire, fee simple title to the property vests in the foreclosing governmental unit.19 Once entered, circuit courts generally may not alter a judgment of foreclosure. 15 Krohn v Home-

2018The critical feature that determines whether the remedy is civil or criminal in nature is not when or whether the contemnor is physically required to set foot in a jail but whether the contemnor can avoid the sentence imposed on him, or purge himself of it, by complying with the terms of the original order. [Quoting Hicks ex rel Feiock v Feiock, 485 US 624 , 635 n 7; 108 S Ct 1423 ; 99 L Ed 2d 721 (1988).] Defendant admits in his brief on appeal that his violations of the trial court’s orders all occurred and ended before the show-cause hearing began.

2018The critical feature that determines whether the remedy is civil or criminal in nature is not when or whether the contemnor is physically required to set foot in a jail but whether the contemnor can avoid the sentence imposed on him, or purge himself of it, by complying with the terms of the original order. [Quoting Hicks ex rel Feiock v Feiock, 485 US 624 , 635 n 7; 108 S Ct 1423 ; 99 L Ed 2d 721 (1988).] Defendant admits in his brief on appeal that his violations of the trial court’s orders all occurred and ended before the show-cause hearing began.

2018PRESENCE OF A VISITING JUDGE AT THE SHOW-CAUSE HEARING We also reject defendant’s argument that it was error for a visiting judge to preside over the show-cause hearing.3 Defendant relies on Cross Co v UAW Local No 155, 377 Mich 202, 212 ; 139 NW2d 694 (1966), for the proposition that “[t]he judge who presided over the proceedings in the context of which the indirect contumacious conduct occurred should preside over the contempt proceedings.” In Cross, the Michigan Supreme Court briefly discussed whether “there is an overriding element of public policy that would require trial of a contempt pr

2018PRESENCE OF A VISITING JUDGE AT THE SHOW-CAUSE HEARING We also reject defendant’s argument that it was error for a visiting judge to preside over the show-cause hearing.3 Defendant relies on Cross Co v UAW Local No 155, 377 Mich 202, 212 ; 139 NW2d 694 (1966), for the proposition that “[t]he judge who presided over the proceedings in the context of which the indirect contumacious conduct occurred should preside over the contempt proceedings.” In Cross, the Michigan Supreme Court briefly discussed whether “there is an overriding element of public policy that would require trial of a contempt pr

2017“In deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc, 316 Mich App at 136 .

2017“In deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc, 316 Mich App at 136 .

2017“A case is moot when it presents only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights.” B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

2017“A case is moot when it presents only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights.” B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

2017Further, without directly addressing plaintiff’s argument that he was denied due process because he never received a copy of the foreclosure judgment or notice of his appellate rights, the trial court determined that “[p]laintiff was given notice of the foreclosure and the show cause hearing, and the opportunity to present his objections.” -5- “A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if no factual dispute exists, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Harbor Watch Condo Ass’n v Emmett Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 380, 384 ; 863 NW2d 745 (2

2017Further, without directly addressing plaintiff’s argument that he was denied due process because he never received a copy of the foreclosure judgment or notice of his appellate rights, the trial court determined that “[p]laintiff was given notice of the foreclosure and the show cause hearing, and the opportunity to present his objections.” -5- “A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if no factual dispute exists, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Harbor Watch Condo Ass’n v Emmett Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 380, 384 ; 863 NW2d 745 (2

2017Generally, “ ‘[f]or an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided by the lower court.’ ” Mouzon v Achievable Visions, 308 Mich App 415, 419 ; 864 NW2d 606 (2014) (citation omitted).

2017Generally, “ ‘[f]or an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided by the lower court.’ ” Mouzon v Achievable Visions, 308 Mich App 415, 419 ; 864 NW2d 606 (2014) (citation omitted).

2007People v Person, 44 Mich App 630, 631 ; 205 NW2d 610 (1973).

2007People v Person, 44 Mich App 630, 631 ; 205 NW2d 610 (1973).

1995Evans, supra at 330-332 .

1995Evans, supra at 330-332 .

2025However, “[d]ue process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property.” Jones [v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 ; 126 S Ct 1708 ; 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006)]. [Id.] In 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 507 Mich 1 , 10; 967 NW2d 577 (2021), our Supreme Court further explained the GPTA’s procedural safeguards: Before the foreclosure judgment is entered, the GPTA provides various procedural safeguards to afford those with an interest in the property notice of the foreclosure by mail, by publication, and by a personal visit to the property,

2025However, “[d]ue process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property.” Jones [v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 ; 126 S Ct 1708 ; 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006)]. [Id.] In 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 507 Mich 1 , 10; 967 NW2d 577 (2021), our Supreme Court further explained the GPTA’s procedural safeguards: Before the foreclosure judgment is entered, the GPTA provides various procedural safeguards to afford those with an interest in the property notice of the foreclosure by mail, by publication, and by a personal visit to the property,

2025Finally, MCL 211.78i(10) provides that the failure of the foreclosing governmental unit to comply with any provision of this section does not invalidate any proceeding under this act if the person with a property interest is notified of the show cause hearing under section 78j and the foreclosure hearing under section 78k consistent with the minimum due process required under the state constitution of 1963 and the Constitution of the United States. [Emphasis added.] Our Supreme Court has held that the Legislature cannot create a statutory scheme in the GPTA that allows a property owner to be d

2025Finally, MCL 211.78i(10) provides that the failure of the foreclosing governmental unit to comply with any provision of this section does not invalidate any proceeding under this act if the person with a property interest is notified of the show cause hearing under section 78j and the foreclosure hearing under section 78k consistent with the minimum due process required under the state constitution of 1963 and the Constitution of the United States. [Emphasis added.] Our Supreme Court has held that the Legislature cannot create a statutory scheme in the GPTA that allows a property owner to be d

2023Baynesan v Wayne State Univ, 316 Mich App 643, 651 ; 894 NW2d 102 (2016).2 1 Jurisdiction to order specific physicians to comply with the Management Services Agreement likely would prove difficult, as the physicians were not parties to the complaint, nor served with the complaint.

2023Baynesan v Wayne State Univ, 316 Mich App 643, 651 ; 894 NW2d 102 (2016).2 1 Jurisdiction to order specific physicians to comply with the Management Services Agreement likely would prove difficult, as the physicians were not parties to the complaint, nor served with the complaint.

2022The following factors guide a reviewing court’s determination of whether remand to a different judge is required: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich A

2022The following factors guide a reviewing court’s determination of whether remand to a different judge is required: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich A

2022The following factors guide a reviewing court’s determination of whether remand to a different judge is required: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich A

2022The following factors guide a reviewing court’s determination of whether remand to a different judge is required: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. [People v Hill, 221 Mich A

2020The trial court therefore found that the managing director was not an individual who was possessed of “information and authority adequate for responsible and effective participation in the conference for all purposes including settlement,” nor was he a person who had “unlimited authority and unfettered discretion to settle the case.” In support of its conclusion that the managing director was required to have “unlimited authority and unfettered discretion,” to be an appropriate substitute, the trial court relied on this -3- Court’s opinion in Kornak v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 416 ; 53

2020The trial court therefore found that the managing director was not an individual who was possessed of “information and authority adequate for responsible and effective participation in the conference for all purposes including settlement,” nor was he a person who had “unlimited authority and unfettered discretion to settle the case.” In support of its conclusion that the managing director was required to have “unlimited authority and unfettered discretion,” to be an appropriate substitute, the trial court relied on this -3- Court’s opinion in Kornak v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 416 ; 53

2020Id.

2016We review for an abuse of discretion a lower court’s decision whether to hold a party in contempt, In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 671 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009), as well as its decision whether to convene a show-cause hearing, Davis v Detroit Fin Review Team, 296 Mich App 568, 624 ; 821 NW2d 896 (2012).

2016The statutory language at issue in this matter relates to the show-cause hearing and provides: At the hearing on the complaint and order and before entering any order on behalf of the state against the defendant, the court shall take into consideration any legal obligation of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents and any moral obligation to support dependents to whom the defendant is providing or has in fact provided support. [MCL 800.404(5).] “The word ‘shall’ is unambiguous and is used to denote mandatory, rather than discretionary, action.” STC, Inc v Dep’t

2016The statutory language at issue in this matter relates to the show-cause hearing and provides: At the hearing on the complaint and order and before entering any order on behalf of the state against the defendant, the court shall take into consideration any legal obligation of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents and any moral obligation to support dependents to whom the defendant is providing or has in fact provided support. [MCL 800.404(5).] “The word ‘shall’ is unambiguous and is used to denote mandatory, rather than discretionary, action.” STC, Inc v Dep’t

2016In State Treasurer v Downer, 199 Mich App 447, 448 ; 502 NW2d 704 (1993), this Court reversed a trial court’s reimbursement order because it was revealed during the show cause hearing that the defendant had a wife, daughter, and several stepchildren that he had supported or wished to support.

2016In State Treasurer v Downer, 199 Mich App 447, 448 ; 502 NW2d 704 (1993), this Court reversed a trial court’s reimbursement order because it was revealed during the show cause hearing that the defendant had a wife, daughter, and several stepchildren that he had supported or wished to support.

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a

2014To date, demolition has not occurred. 6 Specifically, this ordinance provides that “[a]n owner aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may appeal the decision to the county circuit court by filing a complaint within 20 calendar days from the date of the decision.” 7 Though plaintiffs clearly alleged a substantive due process violation under Count II of their complaint, they did not expressly state a procedural due process claim given that Count I simply alleges a violation of “due process rights.” However, because the Court of Appeals addressed the procedural due process component, a