show cause hearing in Connecticut

2025We cannot conclude, given the distinguishing facts underlying the alleged rule violations vis-à-vis Pattis and Reynal, and given the broad discretion afforded to the court in determining an appropriate disciplinary sanction, that Judge Wilson’s two week suspension order as to Pattis was arbitrary. 16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Lafferty v. Jones 329 A.3d 240 (2025).

2025Finally, the court reasoned that, even if Drapp ‘‘had failed to notify the petitioner about the potential ramifications of § 52-470 prior to the withdrawal [of the second habeas petition], that would not constitute forces outside of the representation establishing ‘good cause’ to excuse the petitioner’s delay.’’ The petitioner argues that this reasoning conflicts with the precedent of our Supreme Court in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333 , 304 A.3d 431 (2023).3 In Rose, which was decided after the habeas court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s third habeas petition in the presen

2025Finally, the court reasoned that, even if Drapp ‘‘had failed to notify the petitioner about the potential ramifications of § 52-470 prior to the withdrawal [of the second habeas petition], that would not constitute forces outside of the representation establishing ‘good cause’ to excuse the petitioner’s delay.’’ The petitioner argues that this reasoning conflicts with the precedent of our Supreme Court in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333 , 304 A.3d 431 (2023).3 In Rose, which was decided after the habeas court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s third habeas petition in the presen

2022Given that the petitioner did not raise the argument during the show cause hearing and the court did not address it in its memorandum of decision, we agree with the respondent that the issue is not reviewable. 8 The respondent also asserts that we should apply the principle that ‘‘everyone is presumed to know the law’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 271 , 20 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

2022Given that the petitioner did not raise the argument during the show cause hearing and the court did not address it in its memorandum of decision, we agree with the respondent that the issue is not reviewable. 8 The respondent also asserts that we should apply the principle that ‘‘everyone is presumed to know the law’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 271 , 20 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

2022Given that the petitioner did not raise the argument during the show cause hearing and the court did not address it in its memorandum of decision, we agree with the respondent that the issue is not reviewable. 8 The respondent also asserts that we should apply the principle that ‘‘everyone is presumed to know the law’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 271 , 20 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

2022Given that the petitioner did not raise the argument during the show cause hearing and the court did not address it in its memorandum of decision, we agree with the respondent that the issue is not reviewable. 8 The respondent also asserts that we should apply the principle that ‘‘everyone is presumed to know the law’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Legrand, 129 Conn. App. 239, 271 , 20 A.3d 52 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912 , 27 A.3d 371 (2011).

2017As Judge Sferrazza indicated at the show cause hearing in the present case, a habeas court may dismiss the petition in whole or in part if it determines on the basis of the parties' submissions that "there is no good cause either in law or there's no factual basis for any claim." In Parker v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn. App. 300 , 149 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016), we set forth the following general standard for reviewing a habeas court's dismissal of a portion of a petition pursuant to § 52-470 (b) : "The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in

2017As Judge Sferrazza indicated at the show cause hearing in the present case, a habeas court may dismiss the petition in whole or in part if it determines on the basis of the parties' submissions that "there is no good cause either in law or there's no factual basis for any claim." In Parker v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn. App. 300 , 149 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016), we set forth the following general standard for reviewing a habeas court's dismissal of a portion of a petition pursuant to § 52-470 (b) : "The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in

2017As Judge Sferrazza indicated at the show cause hearing in the present case, a habeas court may dismiss the petition in whole or in part if it determines on the basis of the parties' submissions that "there is no good cause either in law or there's no factual basis for any claim." In Parker v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn. App. 300 , 149 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016), we set forth the following general standard for reviewing a habeas court's dismissal of a portion of a petition pursuant to § 52-470 (b) : "The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in

2017As Judge Sferrazza indicated at the show cause hearing in the present case, a habeas court may dismiss the petition in whole or in part if it determines on the basis of the parties' submissions that "there is no good cause either in law or there's no factual basis for any claim." In Parker v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn. App. 300 , 149 A.3d 174 , cert. denied, 324 Conn. 903 , 151 A.3d 1289 (2016), we set forth the following general standard for reviewing a habeas court's dismissal of a portion of a petition pursuant to § 52-470 (b) : "The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in

2009Analysis, rather than abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 112 Conn. App. 160 , 165 n.2, 962 A.2d 842 , cert. granted on other grounds, 290 Conn. 920 , 966 A.2d 237 (2009). 16 The letter stated: “Dear Mr. Deojay: At the show cause hearing on Thursday, February 2, 2006 of the Inland Wetland & Watercourses Commission the following motion passed unanimously: ‘The cease and desist order for Map 38, Lots 9 and 9A be upheld with the conditions that a letter is sent to the B

2009Analysis, rather than abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 112 Conn. App. 160 , 165 n.2, 962 A.2d 842 , cert. granted on other grounds, 290 Conn. 920 , 966 A.2d 237 (2009). 16 The letter stated: “Dear Mr. Deojay: At the show cause hearing on Thursday, February 2, 2006 of the Inland Wetland & Watercourses Commission the following motion passed unanimously: ‘The cease and desist order for Map 38, Lots 9 and 9A be upheld with the conditions that a letter is sent to the B

2009Analysis, rather than abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 112 Conn. App. 160 , 165 n.2, 962 A.2d 842 , cert. granted on other grounds, 290 Conn. 920 , 966 A.2d 237 (2009). 16 The letter stated: “Dear Mr. Deojay: At the show cause hearing on Thursday, February 2, 2006 of the Inland Wetland & Watercourses Commission the following motion passed unanimously: ‘The cease and desist order for Map 38, Lots 9 and 9A be upheld with the conditions that a letter is sent to the B

2009Analysis, rather than abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 112 Conn. App. 160 , 165 n.2, 962 A.2d 842 , cert. granted on other grounds, 290 Conn. 920 , 966 A.2d 237 (2009). 16 The letter stated: “Dear Mr. Deojay: At the show cause hearing on Thursday, February 2, 2006 of the Inland Wetland & Watercourses Commission the following motion passed unanimously: ‘The cease and desist order for Map 38, Lots 9 and 9A be upheld with the conditions that a letter is sent to the B

2009Sincerely, John Tetreault, Chairman 17 General Statutes § 8-8 (r) provides: “In any case in which a board fails to comply with a requirement of a general or special law, ordinance or regulation governing the content, giving, mailing, publishing, filing or recording of any notice either of a hearing or of an action taken by the board, any appeal or action by an aggrieved person to set aside the decision or action taken by the board on the grounds of such noncompliance shall be taken not more than one year after the date of that decision or action.” 18 “The obvious purpose of . . . requiring the

2009Sincerely, John Tetreault, Chairman 17 General Statutes § 8-8 (r) provides: “In any case in which a board fails to comply with a requirement of a general or special law, ordinance or regulation governing the content, giving, mailing, publishing, filing or recording of any notice either of a hearing or of an action taken by the board, any appeal or action by an aggrieved person to set aside the decision or action taken by the board on the grounds of such noncompliance shall be taken not more than one year after the date of that decision or action.” 18 “The obvious purpose of . . . requiring the

2002We certified the following issue for appeal: “Are ‘specific steps’ ordered by a court, following a hearing at which the parent is present and represented by counsel, court orders from which a finding of contempt may issue?” In re Jeffrey C., 258 Conn. 924 , 783 A.2d 1027 (2001).

2002We certified the following issue for appeal: “Are ‘specific steps’ ordered by a court, following a hearing at which the parent is present and represented by counsel, court orders from which a finding of contempt may issue?” In re Jeffrey C., 258 Conn. 924 , 783 A.2d 1027 (2001).

1997Quintana v. Warden, 220 Conn. 1 (1991).

1996"The state's countervailing interest in the welfare of a child justifies appropriately bounded state intervention." Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232 , 237 (1990). (cf Pollard v. Pollard, Docket No. 532463, Superior Court, New London, Judicial District, (Teller, J.) In Lehrer, the Court, in helpful dicta, indicated that in an action in which a grandparent is seeking visitation with a grandchild over the objections of the child's married parents, some safeguards for the parents seeking to maintain family autonomy could include the placement of the burden of proof on the party seeking visitation in

1990Shapiro v. Carothers, supra 191 .

1989The prior order of this court that was the basis of the show cause hearing was that Presnick, the pro se defendant in the case of Esposito v. Presnick,. 15 Conn. App. 654 , 546 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 819 , 551 A.2d 755 (1988), should pay the sum of $500 as a sanction for his failure to attend a preargument settlement conference in that case. 1 Presnick was ordered to pay that sum to the chief clerk of the Appellate Court who, in turn, was directed to make payment of the same sum to the opposing counsel in the case. 2 The money has never been paid.

1989The prior order of this court that was the basis of the show cause hearing was that Presnick, the pro se defendant in the case of Esposito v. Presnick,. 15 Conn. App. 654 , 546 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 819 , 551 A.2d 755 (1988), should pay the sum of $500 as a sanction for his failure to attend a preargument settlement conference in that case. 1 Presnick was ordered to pay that sum to the chief clerk of the Appellate Court who, in turn, was directed to make payment of the same sum to the opposing counsel in the case. 2 The money has never been paid.

1989The prior order of this court that was the basis of the show cause hearing was that Presnick, the pro se defendant in the case of Esposito v. Presnick,. 15 Conn. App. 654 , 546 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 819 , 551 A.2d 755 (1988), should pay the sum of $500 as a sanction for his failure to attend a preargument settlement conference in that case. 1 Presnick was ordered to pay that sum to the chief clerk of the Appellate Court who, in turn, was directed to make payment of the same sum to the opposing counsel in the case. 2 The money has never been paid.

1989The prior order of this court that was the basis of the show cause hearing was that Presnick, the pro se defendant in the case of Esposito v. Presnick,. 15 Conn. App. 654 , 546 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 819 , 551 A.2d 755 (1988), should pay the sum of $500 as a sanction for his failure to attend a preargument settlement conference in that case. 1 Presnick was ordered to pay that sum to the chief clerk of the Appellate Court who, in turn, was directed to make payment of the same sum to the opposing counsel in the case. 2 The money has never been paid.

1980“Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it.” Mazzei v. Cantales, 142 Conn. 173, 175 , 112 A.2d 205 (1955). “‘To constitute this there are three essentials: first, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.’ ” Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 553 , 106 A. 822 (1919).

1980“Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it.” Mazzei v. Cantales, 142 Conn. 173, 175 , 112 A.2d 205 (1955). “‘To constitute this there are three essentials: first, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.’ ” Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 553 , 106 A. 822 (1919).

1980“Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it.” Mazzei v. Cantales, 142 Conn. 173, 175 , 112 A.2d 205 (1955). “‘To constitute this there are three essentials: first, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.’ ” Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 553 , 106 A. 822 (1919).

1980“Jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it.” Mazzei v. Cantales, 142 Conn. 173, 175 , 112 A.2d 205 (1955). “‘To constitute this there are three essentials: first, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.’ ” Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 553 , 106 A. 822 (1919).

1971There is no question that the court can recognize counsel in any case without the necessity of a formal appearance (Hill v. Hill, 135 Conn. 566, 569 ), and, in fact, in the instant case the defendants’ counsel was so recognized when he requested a continuance of hearing and agreed to the extension of the temporary injunction to the date of the hearing.