show cause hearing in California

2008“Although the state and federal Constitutions differ somewhat in determining when due process rights are triggered, once it has been concluded that a due process right exists we balance similar factors under both approaches to decide what process is due.” (In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 383 , fn. omitted; see also Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19 [“While we recognize our power and authority to construe the state Constitution independently [citation], we find no pressing need to do so here.”].) 15 To the extent Proposition 83 has increased the burden upon liberty interest

2001Statutory Framework The SVP law provides for the involuntary commitment of certain sexually violent offenders for the purpose of treatment. (§§ 6600-6604.1; People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1469 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 ].) A commitment generally lasts two years, but the law contains several provisions allowing an interim review of the SVP’s condition in the event it materially improves before the expiration of that period. (§§ 6604-6608; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1147 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ].) One safeguard afforded SVP’s is an annual mental examina

2025(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957 .) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing they “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189” the petitioner is entitled to “a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder . . . conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(3), (c), (d)(1).) At the show cause hearing, the prosecution must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

2022(Ibid.; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 .) At the show cause hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under amended sections 188 and 189. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) Both the prosecution and the petitioner are permitted to “offer new or additional evidence.” (Ibid.) The trial court acts as an independent factfinder and determines whether the prosecution has met its burden.

2022As the court said in Cooley: “ ‘[A] word or phrase will be given the same meaning each time it appears in a statute . . . .’ ” (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 255 ; see also People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 899-901 [noting resemblance between sections 6602 and 6605 because they use “parallel language” and finding nothing to suggest that a “probable cause” hearing in section 6605 should differ from section 6602].) We therefore conclude that the probable cause standard under section 6605 is the inverse of the probable cause standard under section 6602; it “entails a decision whether a rea

2021That section provides that when a committed SVP defendant petitions for unconditional release, the court must order “a show cause hearing.” (§ 6605, subd. (a)(1).) In Cheek, we explained that section 6605 “resembles” section 6602 because the provisions use “parallel language” and both provide hearings that are pretrial in nature and afford a defendant the right to be present and represented by an attorney. ( Cheek, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 899–900.) After Cheek, Proposition 83 amended section 6605 to provide that “the court . . . can consider the petition and any accompanying documentation pro

2001As the Attorney General now recognizes (see fn. 5, ante), there is no anomaly in permitting a superior court to dismiss a section 6608 petition as frivolous while not permitting it to avoid a mandated annual review on that ground. *903 In view of the differences in language and function between section 6605 and section 6608, the Court of Appeal in People v. Herrera, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 1149, erred in holding that a superior court at a show cause hearing under section 6605 could, by analogy to the court’s power under section 6608, dismiss the proceeding as frivolous without a hearing at which

1999He checked a box on the form indicating that he wanted "`a show cause hearing to determine whether my condition has so changed that I would no longer be a danger to the health and safety of others if discharged.'" (Id. at p. 1151, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 531 .) The trial court treated the request for a show cause hearing under section 6605 as a petition for conditional release under section 6608 and summarily denied it without a hearing, finding that the defendant's condition had "`"not so changed that he would not be a danger to others in that it is not likely that he will engage in sexually violent

2024(See A.G. v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1282 (A.G.) [settled statement is “ ‘a condensed narrative of the oral proceedings that the appellant believes necessary for the appeal’ ” and may not capture judge’s complete analysis of issues of fact or law].) In closing, we note some trial courts have ceased providing court reporters in certain civil proceedings, leaving litigants to bear the burden and expense of hiring a private court reporter or else relying on a settled statement to provide an adequate record for appeal.

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2013(Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ]; see Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].) “A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court ‘can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’ [Citation.]” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 ] (MHC).) Petitioners c

2008“Although the state and federal Constitutions differ somewhat in determining when due process rights are triggered, once it has been concluded that a due process right exists we balance similar factors under both approaches to decide what process is due.” (In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 383 , fn. omitted; see also Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19 [“While we recognize our power and authority to construe the state Constitution independently [citation], we find no pressing need to do so here.”].) 15 To the extent Proposition 83 has increased the burden upon liberty interest

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001(See People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 465-466 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [standard of review for sufficiency of evidence on SVP finding same as in criminal cases].) The question, then, is whether the evidentiary record of the show cause hearing disclosed a rational basis for believing that Hardacre was no longer a danger to others, accepting any factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they were supported by substantial evidence.

2001(See People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 465-466 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [standard of review for sufficiency of evidence on SVP finding same as in criminal cases].) The question, then, is whether the evidentiary record of the show cause hearing disclosed a rational basis for believing that Hardacre was no longer a danger to others, accepting any factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they were supported by substantial evidence.

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001Hardacre has not established that the court’s ruling was “ ‘irrational or arbitrary’ ” or that it fell “ ‘ “outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (See People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 659 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ].) Due Process Hardacre claims that by requiring him to proceed with the show cause hearing without an expert, the court violated his right to due process under the state and federal Constitutions.

2001Hardacre has not established that the court’s ruling was “ ‘irrational or arbitrary’ ” or that it fell “ ‘ “outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (See People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 659 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ].) Due Process Hardacre claims that by requiring him to proceed with the show cause hearing without an expert, the court violated his right to due process under the state and federal Constitutions.

2001(See Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 485 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 356 ].) In equity practice, a hearing to show cause may or may not include oral testimony.

2001(See Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 485 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 356 ].) In equity practice, a hearing to show cause may or may not include oral testimony.

2001Statutory Framework The SVP law provides for the involuntary commitment of certain sexually violent offenders for the purpose of treatment. (§§ 6600-6604.1; People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1469 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 ].) A commitment generally lasts two years, but the law contains several provisions allowing an interim review of the SVP’s condition in the event it materially improves before the expiration of that period. (§§ 6604-6608; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1147 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ].) One safeguard afforded SVP’s is an annual mental examina

2001Statutory Framework The SVP law provides for the involuntary commitment of certain sexually violent offenders for the purpose of treatment. (§§ 6600-6604.1; People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1469 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 ].) A commitment generally lasts two years, but the law contains several provisions allowing an interim review of the SVP’s condition in the event it materially improves before the expiration of that period. (§§ 6604-6608; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1147 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 , 969 P.2d 584 ].) One safeguard afforded SVP’s is an annual mental examina

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m

2001“The applicable principles of statutory construction are well settled. ‘In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent.’ (Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ].) ‘To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes’ (ibid.), ‘giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 828 P.2d 140 ].)” (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563 , 885 P.2d 976 ].) “ ‘ “ ‘In analyzing statutory language, we seek to give m