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12 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
bsp/port Orange v. Water Mill Propertiesgreen2 sentences2018P. 1.110(d) ("[A] party shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."); BSP/Port Orange, LLC v. Water Mill Props., Inc. , 969 So.2d 1077 , 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that an alleged modification to an oral commission agreement was an affirmative defense that had to be pled); F.M.W. 2018P. 1.110(d) “[A] party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”; BSP/Port Orange, LLC v. Water Mill Props., Inc., 969 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that an alleged modification to an oral commission agreement was an affirmative defense that had to be pled). | 1 | 2 |
CORAL RIDGE PROP., INC. v. Playa Del Mar Ass'n, Inc.green1 sentence2015Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(d) provides, in relevant part: “In pleading to a preceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” See also Coral Ridge Props., Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Ass’n, Inc., 505 So.2d 414, 416-17 (Fla.1987) (discussing the requirement for a party to' plead an avoidance of the affirmative defense); Congress Park Office Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 105 So.3d 602, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that Rule 1.110(d) requires a party to include any affirmative defense or av | 1 | 1 |
Kitchen v. Kitchengreen1 sentence2015Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(d) provides, in relevant part: “In pleading to a preceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” See also Coral Ridge Props., Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Ass’n, Inc., 505 So.2d 414, 416-17 (Fla.1987) (discussing the requirement for a party to' plead an avoidance of the affirmative defense); Congress Park Office Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 105 So.3d 602, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that Rule 1.110(d) requires a party to include any affirmative defense or av | 1 | 1 |
Lazar v. Allengreen1 sentence2015“Where a party files no reply to an affirmative defense, this merely denies (as opposed to avoids) the affirmative defense.” Lazar v. Allen, 347 So.2d 457, 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (citing Fla. R. | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(d) provides, in relevant part: “In pleading to a preceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” See also Coral Ridge Props., Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Ass’n, Inc., 505 So.2d 414, 416-17 (Fla.1987) (discussing the requirement for a party to' plead an avoidance of the affirmative defense); Congress Park Office Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 105 So.3d 602, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that Rule 1.110(d) requires a party to include any affirmative defense or av | 1 | 1 |
Kersey v. City of Riviera Beachgreen1 sentence2013Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(d) provides that “a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any ... matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Application of this rule means “that affirmative defenses must be pleaded or they are considered waived.” Kersey v. City of Riviera Beach, 337 So.2d 995, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (citations omitted); see also Fla. R. | 1 | 1 |
Pike v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co.green1 sentence1984Rule 1.190(b), Fla.R.Civ.P.; Vanguard Construction Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Pike v. National Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 377 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1 |
VANGUARD CONST. CO. v. Lewis State Bankgreen1 sentence1984Rule 1.190(b), Fla.R.Civ.P.; Vanguard Construction Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Pike v. National Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 377 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1 |
National Industrial Bank of Miami v. Forbesgreen1 sentence1975See also Nat’l Industrial Bank of Miami v. Forbes, 270 So.2d 426 (4th DCA Fla.1972). | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Stonegreen1 sentence1958When a party has mistakenly designated a defense *232 as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." (Emphasis supplied.) A similar question was before the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida, in the case of Braz v. Professional Insurance Corporation, Fla.App. 1958, 101 So.2d 594, 595 , in which that court said: "The first and second grounds of the motion to dismiss, i.e., that the action is barred by laches and/or res judicata, can, we feel, be disposed o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hough v. Menses
green
2 sentences1963The subject defense of splitting a cause of action clearly comes within that category and should have been raised in the answer, just as any other affirmative defense must be raised, as we so held in Hough v. Menses, 95 So.2d 410 , supra. The effect of the decision of the district court of appeal must be said to be that the defendant should have raised the affirmative defense against the splitting of the cause of action prior to filing their answer, i.e., by motion. 1958When a party has mistakenly designated a defense *232 as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." (Emphasis supplied.) A similar question was before the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida, in the case of Braz v. Professional Insurance Corporation, Fla.App. 1958, 101 So.2d 594, 595 , in which that court said: "The first and second grounds of the motion to dismiss, i.e., that the action is barred by laches and/or res judicata, can, we feel, be disposed o | 2 | 1958–1963 |
Dee v. Southern Brewing Co.
green
2 sentences1978E.g., Dee v. Southern Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588 , 1 So.2d 562 (1941). [2] Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(d) requires that any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense must be affirmatively set forth in pleading to a preceding pleading. 1978E.g., Dee v. Southern Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588 , 1 So.2d 562 (1941). [2] Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(d) requires that any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense must be affirmatively set forth in pleading to a preceding pleading. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Con-Dev of Vero Beach, Inc. v. Casano
green
1 sentence1975The defense of impossibility in this instance would constitute an avoidance or affirmative defense to specific performance under F.R.C.P. 1.140, and therefore should not have been stricken.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 206 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
GORDON INTERNAT'L ADV., INC. v. Charlotte County L. & T. Co.
green
1 sentence1973Gordon International Advertising, Inc. v. Charlotte County Land & Title Co., Fla.App. 1964, 170 So.2d 59 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Cook v. CENTRAL & SOUTHERN FLORIDA FLOOD CON. DIST.
green
1 sentence1966As an example, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corporation, 85 So.2d 874 (1956): "Estoppel is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded or is waived if not pleaded." Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, in Cook v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 114 So.2d 691 (1959), pointed out that "* * * a statute of limitations and laches are affirmative defenses which should be raised through an answer and not by motion to dismiss." Resolving the question before us in this appeal requires a consideration of th | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corporation
green
1 sentence1966As an example, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corporation, 85 So.2d 874 (1956): "Estoppel is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded or is waived if not pleaded." Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, in Cook v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 114 So.2d 691 (1959), pointed out that "* * * a statute of limitations and laches are affirmative defenses which should be raised through an answer and not by motion to dismiss." Resolving the question before us in this appeal requires a consideration of th | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
green
2 sentences1963Accordingly it stated nineteen matters as affirmative defenses, and then concluded with the residual clause `and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.'" Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 , 114 A.L.R. 1487 , a federal court as to a non-federal matter is required to follow the substantive statute and common law of the state in which it is sitting. 1963Accordingly it stated nineteen matters as affirmative defenses, and then concluded with the residual clause `and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.'" Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 , 114 A.L.R. 1487 , a federal court as to a non-federal matter is required to follow the substantive statute and common law of the state in which it is sitting. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Braz v. Professional Insurance Corporation
green
1 sentence1958When a party has mistakenly designated a defense *232 as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." (Emphasis supplied.) A similar question was before the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida, in the case of Braz v. Professional Insurance Corporation, Fla.App. 1958, 101 So.2d 594, 595 , in which that court said: "The first and second grounds of the motion to dismiss, i.e., that the action is barred by laches and/or res judicata, can, we feel, be disposed o | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.