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95 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1945–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reid v. Associated Employers Lloydsgreen2 sentences2009"The purpose of Rule 94 . . . is to require the defendant to announce in his pleadings what his defense will be . . . and to give plaintiff the opportunity of knowing what character of proof he may need to meet the defenses pleaded." Reid v. Associated Employers Lloyds , 164 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex.Civ.App.- Fort Worth 1942, writ ref'd); see also Davis v. City of San Antonio , 752 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex. 1988). 2009Reid v. Associated Employers Lloyds, 164 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ ref'd); see Gorman v. Life Ins. | 7 | 10 |
Davis v. City of San Antoniogreen2 sentences1992Although the defense is not among the affirmative defenses listed in Tex. R.Civ.P. 94, I agree with the Court that it is, in the language of the rule, “a matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” See also Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 519-520 (Tex. 1988) (governmental immunity is an affirmative defense). 1992Although the defense is not among the affirmative defenses listed in Tex. R.Civ.P. 94, I agree with the Court that it is, in the language of the rule, "a matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." See also Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 519-520 (Tex. 1988) (governmental immunity is an affirmative defense). | 6 | 6 |
The STATE BAR OF TEXAS v. Dolenzgreen2 sentences2018Id. at 262-64, 270 (“[W]hether Vail’s consent to his business transaction with Dolenz was made after he received full disclosure . . . is in the nature of an avoidance or affirmative defense to professional misconduct. . . . 2011See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R . 1.06(b), (c); State Bar of Tex. v. Dolenz , 3 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1999, no pet.) (“[T]he exception [Rule 1.06(c)] to the rule [Rule 1.06(b)] is in the nature of an avoidance or affirmative defense to professional misconduct.”). | 4 | 5 |
Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.green2 sentences2013P. 94 (requiring the affirmative pleading of any matter “constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense”); Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 518 (holding that the discovery rule must be affirmatively pleaded); Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (stating that a plaintiff must affirmatively plead the Hughes tolling rule); John H. 2013P. 94 (requiring the affirmative pleading of any matter ―constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense‖); Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 518 (holding that the discovery rule must be affirmatively pleaded); Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (stating that a plaintiff must affirmatively plead the Hughes tolling rule); John H. | 4 | 5 |
Brantley v. Ettergreen2 sentences2010Brantley v. Etter, 662 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983), writ ref’d n.r.e., 677 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984) (citing Mid-Tex Constr. 2010Brantley v. Etter, 662 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1983), writ ref`d n.r.e., 677 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.1984) (citing Mid-Tex Constr. | 4 | 4 |
Robinson v. Granite Equipment Leasing Corp.green2 sentences2015Leasing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Walter E. 2015Leasing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Walter E. | 3 | 3 |
Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Greengreen2 sentences2015P. 94 (requiring that a party plead various affirmative defenses, including “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense’’); Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 212 (Tex. 1996) (noting that affirmative defenses seek to establish independent reasons why the plaintiff should not recover). 2010See Rodgers v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 151 S.W.3d 602, 615-16 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (concluding attorney’s argument that he was not required to submit his advertisement for review because it fit one of the exceptions to Disciplinary Rule 7.07(b) constituted an affirmative defense); State Bar of Tex. v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) (concluding *319 attorney’s assertion that the client had consented after full disclosure was a matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense to the allegation that he had entered into an improper busines | 3 | 3 |
Fitzgerald v. Stategreen2 sentences2010P. 94 ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver , 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2008); Woods v. State , 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). 23. 157 Tex. Crim. at 440 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State , 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. 2010P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense”); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2008); Woods v. State, 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). 23 157 Tex. Crim. at 440 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State, 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Unifund CCR Partners v. Weavergreen2 sentences2010P. 94 ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense”); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex.2008); Woods v. William M. 2010P. 94 ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver , 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2008); Woods v. State , 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). 23. 157 Tex. Crim. at 440 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State , 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reedgreen2 sentences2005See Jim Walter Homes , 711 S.W.2d at 617-18 . 2005See Jim Walter Homes, 711 S.W.2d at 617-18 . | 3 | 3 |
Parks v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2022Co., 302 S.W.3d 920 , 923-24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); see also Phil. 2010Co. , 302 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). | 2 | 3 |
Oetting v. Flake Uniform & Linen Service, Inc.green2 sentences2015Penalty is, in the language of the rule, a “matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Johnson, 582 S.W.2d at 557 ; Oetting, 553 S.W.2d at 795-796; Robinson v. Granite Equip. 2015Penalty is, in the language of the rule, a “matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Johnson, 582 S.W.2d at 557 ; Oetting, 553 S.W.2d at 795-796; Robinson v. Granite Equip. | 2 | 3 |
City of Houston v. Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okongreen2 sentences2025P. 94 (requiring that any matter “constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” “shall [be] set forth affirmatively” in responsive pleading). “[A] governmental employer bears the burden to assert and prove its employee’s official immunity, in a manner analogous to an affirmative defense, to preclude enforcement of the [TTCA’s] waiver of governmental immunity on that ground.” Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d at 469. 2025P. 94 (requiring that any matter “constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” “shall [be] set forth affirmatively” in responsive pleading). “[A] governmental employer bears the burden to assert and prove its employee’s official immunity, in a manner analogous to an affirmative defense, to preclude enforcement of the [TTCA’s] waiver of governmental immunity on that ground.” Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d at 469. | 2 | 2 |
Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd.green2 sentences2025However, “Rule 94’s requirement of pleading is not absolute,” including where a defense “is apparent on the face of the petition and established as a matter of law.” Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. 1992). 2010P. 94 (noting a party must affirmatively plead any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense); Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd,., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex.1992); Posey v. Sw. | 2 | 2 |
Swinehart v. Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc.green2 sentences2024P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute of frauds . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”); Ramji, 2019 WL 2455620 , at *7; Swinehart v. Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). 13 Here, as the trial court noted, Louison did not plead the affirmative defense of statute of frauds. 2023P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute of frauds . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”); Ramji, 2019 WL 2455620 , at *7; Swinehart v. Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Glashgreen2 sentences2023To establish the affirmative defense of release, the party asserting it must “prove the existence of an effective and valid release.” Raider Ranch, LP v. Lugano, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.); Barras v. Barras, 396 S.W.3d 154 , 170 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990)). 2009Civ. P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... fraud ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”); Williams v. Glash , 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990); see also DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp ., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990) (noting fraudulent inducement is type of fraud claim and shares same elements as simple fraud claim). | 2 | 2 |
Brazos River Authority v. City of Grahamgreen2 sentences2015P. 94 (in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively fraud, illegality, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense); Brazos River Authority v. Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tex. 1961) (affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded); Oilwell Div., United States Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1973) (fraud is an affirmative defense); Williams v. Walker, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3034 , *11, 2004 WL 691637 (Tex.App.–Waco 2004, pet. 22 den.) (forgery is an affirmative defense). 2015P. 94 (in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively fraud, illegality, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense); Brazos River Authority v. Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tex. 1961) (affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded); Oilwell Div., United States Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1973) (fraud is an affirmative defense); Williams v. Walker, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3034 , *11, 2004 WL 691637 (Tex.App.–Waco 2004, pet. 22 den.) (forgery is an affirmative defense). | 2 | 2 |
Oilwell Division, United States Steel Corp. v. Fryergreen2 sentences2015P. 94 (in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively fraud, illegality, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense); Brazos River Authority v. Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tex. 1961) (affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded); Oilwell Div., United States Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1973) (fraud is an affirmative defense); Williams v. Walker, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3034 , *11, 2004 WL 691637 (Tex.App.–Waco 2004, pet. 22 den.) (forgery is an affirmative defense). 2015P. 94 (in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively fraud, illegality, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense); Brazos River Authority v. Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tex. 1961) (affirmative defense is waived if not pleaded); Oilwell Div., United States Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1973) (fraud is an affirmative defense); Williams v. Walker, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3034 , *11, 2004 WL 691637 (Tex.App.–Waco 2004, pet. 22 den.) (forgery is an affirmative defense). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Bahngreen2 sentences2013Civ. P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . laches . . . and any 9 other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”); In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). 2013Civ. P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . laches . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”); In re Bahn , 13 S.W.3d 865, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toenniesgreen2 sentences2012Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex. 2001) (“It is the defendant’s burden to plead and request instructions on an affirmative defense.”). 2012Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex.2001) (“It is the de fendant’s burden to plead and request instructions on an affirmative defense.”). | 2 | 2 |
Rodgers v. Commission for Lawyer Disciplinegreen2 sentences2010See Rodgers v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 151 S.W.3d 602 , 615- -9- 04-10-00121-CV 16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (concluding attorney’s argument that he was not required to submit his advertisement for review because it fit one of the exceptions to Disciplinary Rule 7.07(b) constituted an affirmative defense); State Bar of Tex. v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (concluding attorney’s assertion that the client had consented after full disclosure was a matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense to the allegation that he had entered into a 2010See Rodgers v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 151 S.W.3d 602, 615-16 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (concluding attorney’s argument that he was not required to submit his advertisement for review because it fit one of the exceptions to Disciplinary Rule 7.07(b) constituted an affirmative defense); State Bar of Tex. v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) (concluding *319 attorney’s assertion that the client had consented after full disclosure was a matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense to the allegation that he had entered into an improper busines | 2 | 2 |
Decker v. Urrutiagreen2 sentences2008Decker v. Urrutia , 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev'd on other grounds , 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co ., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also Centerpoint Energy Houston Elec. 2008Decker v. Urrutia, 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec. | 2 | 2 |
Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co.green2 sentences2008Decker v. Urrutia , 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev'd on other grounds , 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co ., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also Centerpoint Energy Houston Elec. 2008Decker v. Urrutia, 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec. | 2 | 2 |
| Cole v. Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bracton Corp. v. Evans Construction Co.green | 2 | 2 |
Mirta Zorrilla v. Aypco Construction II, LLC and Jose Luis Munozgreen2 sentences2021II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015) (quoting TEX. 2019II, LLC , 469 S.W.3d 143 , 155-56 (Tex. 2015) (quoting affirmative defense , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009)). | 1 | 4 |
Kimbro v. Stategreen2 sentences2010P. 94 ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver , 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2008); Woods v. State , 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). 23. 157 Tex. Crim. at 440 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State , 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. 2010P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense”); see e.g., Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2008); Woods v. State, 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). 23 157 Tex. Crim. at 440 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State, 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 3 |
Carter v. Eighth Ward Bankgreen2 sentences2010Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1988). [23] 157 Tex.Crim. at 440 , 249 S.W.2d 919 ; see also Fitzgerald v. State, 782 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) ("Necessity is a traditional defense at common law, and is now included in most revised penal codes."). [24] Kimbro, 157 Tex.Crim. at 440 , 249 S.W.2d 919 . [25] Id. (citing Carter v. The Eighth Ward Bank, 33 Misc. 128 , 67 N.Y.S. 300 (N.Y.S.Ct.1900)) (emphasis in original). [26] Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 659 ; Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d at 132-33 ; Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245, 249-50 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Sanders v. State, 707 S.W 2010App. 1990) (“Necessity is a traditional defense at common law, and is now included in most revised penal codes.”). 24 Kimbro, 157 Tex. Crim. 440 . 25 Id. (citing Carter v. The Eighth Ward Bank, 67 N.Y.S. 300 (N.Y. | 1 | 2 |
| Raider Ranch, LP and Raider Ranch, GP, LLC v. Lugano, Ltd., A&L Sharif Family, LP, and Mamoush, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rice Food Markets, Inc. v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kinnear v. Texas Commission on Human Rights Ex Rel. Halegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heblen Kanan, Pharr Plantation Inc. and Pharr Plantation Management Co., Ltd. v. Plantation Homeowner's Association, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| New York Party Shuttle, LLC v. John Bilellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramsey v. Grizzlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carl Storck and Vicki Storck v. Tres Lagos Property Owners Association, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hewitt v. Biscarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Rieckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stephensongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Genesis Tax Loan Services, Inc. v. Kothmanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Arnold v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brantley v. Etter
green
2 sentences2010Brantley v. Etter, 662 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983), writ ref’d n.r.e., 677 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984) (citing Mid-Tex Constr. 2010Brantley v. Etter, 662 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1983), writ ref`d n.r.e., 677 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.1984) (citing Mid-Tex Constr. | 4 | 2008–2010 |
Johnson Engineers, Inc. v. Tri-Water Supply Corp.
green
2 sentences2015Penalty is, in the language of the rule, a “matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Johnson, 582 S.W.2d at 557 ; Oetting, 553 S.W.2d at 795-796; Robinson v. Granite Equip. 2015Penalty is, in the language of the rule, a “matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Johnson, 582 S.W.2d at 557 ; Oetting, 553 S.W.2d at 795-796; Robinson v. Granite Equip. | 3 | 1992–2015 |
Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences2009“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 requires that matters constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense must be set forth affirmatively.” Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 546 n. 8. 2009"Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 requires that matters constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense must be set forth affirmatively." Gorman , 811 S.W.2d at 546 n.8. | 3 | 2009–2009 |
Urrutia v. Decker
green
2 sentences2008Decker v. Urrutia , 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev'd on other grounds , 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co ., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also Centerpoint Energy Houston Elec. 2008Decker v. Urrutia, 965 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.1999); see Durham v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 599 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ); see also CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Johnston v. McKinney American, Inc. green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Mohammed T. Jamshed v. McLane Express, INC. D/B/A the C. D. Hartnett Company green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Gerald Byron Barras v. Leslea Loring Barras green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Cincinnati Life Insurance Co. v. Cates green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Honeycutt v. Billingsley green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| 950 Corbindale, L.P. v. Kotts Capital Holdings Ltd. Partnership green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Roark v. STALLWORTH OIL AND GAS, INC green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Man Engines & Components, Inc. and Man Nutzfahrzeuge Aktiengesellschaft v. Doug Shows green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wackenhut Corrections Corp. v. De La Rosa green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Ex Parte Nailor green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| TCI Cablevision of Dallas, Inc. v. Owens green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Tacon Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Grant Sheet Metal, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Wilson v. Remmel Cattle Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| First National Bank in Dallas v. Zimmerman green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Blount v. Windley green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.