general legal principle in Georgia

2022See Ct. App. R. 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”) See also Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 570, 575 (2) ( 531 SE2d 743 ) (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned where the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single conclusory sentence). 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LEd.2d 674) (1984). 15 erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.

2022See Ct. App. R. 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”) See also Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 570, 575 (2) ( 531 SE2d 743 ) (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned where the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single conclusory sentence). 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LEd.2d 674) (1984). 15 erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.

2019See Atkinson v. State , 243 Ga. App. 570 , 574 (2), 531 S.E.2d 743 (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned when the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single sentence making a conclusory allegation that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction); Green v. State , 208 Ga. App. 1 , 2-3 (2), 429 S.E.2d 694 (1993) ("The principal purpose of argument is to provide guidance to this [C]ourt on the basis for a claim of error and for citations of authority which tend to support appellant's allegation of error.

2019See Atkinson v. State , 243 Ga. App. 570 , 574 (2), 531 S.E.2d 743 (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned when the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single sentence making a conclusory allegation that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction); Green v. State , 208 Ga. App. 1 , 2-3 (2), 429 S.E.2d 694 (1993) ("The principal purpose of argument is to provide guidance to this [C]ourt on the basis for a claim of error and for citations of authority which tend to support appellant's allegation of error.

2024See Ritter, 272 Ga. at 553 (2) n.3.

2024See Ritter, 272 Ga. at 553 (2) n.3.

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2023See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 103-104 (1) (657 SE2d 213) (2008) (distinguishing between a “defect . . . in complying with the statutory directives governing how the jury commission should select grand jurors” and a defect “[w]here th[e] role of the jury commission ha[d] been entirely circumvented by the service of a grand juror it never selected for service, [which was] an ‘essential and substantial’ violation of the law” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 515, 516-517 (2) (304 SE2d 570) (1983) (holding that a grand juror did not illegal

2022See Ct. App. R. 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”) See also Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 570, 575 (2) ( 531 SE2d 743 ) (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned where the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single conclusory sentence). 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LEd.2d 674) (1984). 15 erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.

2022See Ct. App. R. 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”) See also Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 570, 575 (2) ( 531 SE2d 743 ) (2000) (deeming an argument abandoned where the appellant cited to the general legal standard and presented a single conclusory sentence). 5 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LEd.2d 674) (1984). 15 erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.

2013Harrell filed two separate motions to suppress, which were consolidated in the trial court. 6 (Punctuation omitted.) North v. State, 250 Ga. App. 622, 623 (1) ( 552 SE2d 554 ) (2001). 4 regardless of the good faith of the government agents.”7 Thus, no evidence obtained in a manner that violates the wiretapping statutes is admissible to show guilt.8 Georgia’s wiretap statute provides as follows, at OCGA § 16-11-64 (c): Upon written application, under oath, of the prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime under investigation, or the Attorney General, made before a ju

2013Harrell filed two separate motions to suppress, which were consolidated in the trial court. 6 (Punctuation omitted.) North v. State, 250 Ga. App. 622, 623 (1) ( 552 SE2d 554 ) (2001). 4 regardless of the good faith of the government agents.”7 Thus, no evidence obtained in a manner that violates the wiretapping statutes is admissible to show guilt.8 Georgia’s wiretap statute provides as follows, at OCGA § 16-11-64 (c): Upon written application, under oath, of the prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime under investigation, or the Attorney General, made before a ju

2013In other words, if the wiretap were not conducted, the police would have had no evidence of his illegal use of the communication device nor any suspicion justifying the stop of his vehicle which led to the drug possession charges.5 The general legal framework governing wiretap authority involves both federal and state law: “Wiretapping and surveillance are the subjects of federal and state law[,] and both must be complied with where applicable.” 6 “When a state or federal agent has improperly procured a wiretap order, or there has been any failure to precisely comply with [applicable] requirem

2013In other words, if the wiretap were not conducted, the police would have had no evidence of his illegal use of the communication device nor any suspicion justifying the stop of his vehicle which led to the drug possession charges.5 The general legal framework governing wiretap authority involves both federal and state law: “Wiretapping and surveillance are the subjects of federal and state law[,] and both must be complied with where applicable.” 6 “When a state or federal agent has improperly procured a wiretap order, or there has been any failure to precisely comply with [applicable] requirem

1990Compare American Plan Corp. v. Beckham, 125 Ga. App. 416 (4) ( 188 SE2d 151 ) (applying the codal principles now found in OCGA §§ 51-7-43 and 51-7-44 in determining the existence of malice in an action for malicious use of civil process).

1990Compare American Plan Corp. v. Beckham, 125 Ga. App. 416 (4) ( 188 SE2d 151 ) (applying the codal principles now found in OCGA §§ 51-7-43 and 51-7-44 in determining the existence of malice in an action for malicious use of civil process).

1987Smith v. Harrison, 92 Ga. App. 576, 582 (5) ( 89 SE2d 273 ) (1955).

1987Smith v. Harrison, 92 Ga. App. 576, 582 (5) ( 89 SE2d 273 ) (1955).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1960See also the following decisions of this court dealing with the same general legal principle in cases involving the construction of statutes, restrictive covenants in contracts, and other invalid covenants in contracts: Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 ; Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 ( 15 S. E. 2d 210 ), and citations contained therein; Love v. Fulton National Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 893 ( 102 S. E. 2d 488 ); Aladdin v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519, 520 ( 105 S. E. 2d 730 ).

1922Walker v. City of Rome, 6 Ga. App. 59, 61 ( 64 S. E. 310 ); Elliott v. Bell, 37 W.

1922Walker v. City of Rome, 6 Ga. App. 59, 61 ( 64 S. E. 310 ); Elliott v. Bell, 37 W.