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27 California opinions name it 3 courts 1900–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Simongreen2 sentences2013Indeed, in People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1086 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 ], we held that “pursuant to the general legal doctrine that a party may forfeit a right by failing to assert it in a timely fashion, a defendant in a felony proceeding forfeits a claim of improper venue when he or she fails specifically to raise such an objection prior to the commencement of *598 trial.” In Simon , although we agreed with the defendant “that under [Penal Code] section 1019 a not guilty plea generally puts in issue every material allegation of the accusatory pleading—including any alleg 2013Indeed, in People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1086 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 ], we held that “pursuant to the general legal doctrine that a party may forfeit a right by failing to assert it in a timely fashion, a defendant in a felony proceeding forfeits a claim of improper venue when he or she fails specifically to raise such an objection prior to the commencement of *598 trial.” In Simon , although we agreed with the defendant “that under [Penal Code] section 1019 a not guilty plea generally puts in issue every material allegation of the accusatory pleading—including any alleg | 2 | 2 |
People v. Prettymanred2 sentences2013(People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 265 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 926 P.2d 1013 ].) We also conclude the error was harmless. 2013(People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 265 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 926 P.2d 1013 ].) We also conclude the error was harmless. | 1 | 2 |
Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water Districtgreen2 sentences2017In a footnote, Niles states it was "undisputed that the district owns the ground water in the Niles Basin as trustee for all the overlying surface owners located within its boundaries." ( Niles, supra , 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 929, fn. 5 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) Niles did not examine that proposition, and, as noted, the water district did not rely on a property interest to bring its claims against the landowner. ( Id. at pp. 936-937, 112 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) To the extent this footnote articulates a general legal principle regarding ownership of groundwater, we disagree for the reasons we have already s 2017In a footnote, Niles states it was "undisputed that the district owns the ground water in the Niles Basin as trustee for all the overlying surface owners located within its boundaries." ( Niles, supra , 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 929, fn. 5 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) Niles did not examine that proposition, and, as noted, the water district did not rely on a property interest to bring its claims against the landowner. ( Id. at pp. 936-937, 112 Cal.Rptr. 846 .) To the extent this footnote articulates a general legal principle regarding ownership of groundwater, we disagree for the reasons we have already s | 1 | 1 |
Flynt v. California Gambling Control Commissiongreen2 sentences2016(See Flynt v. California Gambling Control Com. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132-1137 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ] [outlining the history of Indian gaming in California].) Indeed, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst for Proposition 1A preceded its explanation of how the changes proposed by Proposition 1A would affect gaming in California with a detailed explanation of how gaming regulations under the IGRA worked. 2016(See Flynt v. California Gambling Control Com. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132-1137 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ] [outlining the history of Indian gaming in California].) Indeed, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst for Proposition 1A preceded its explanation of how the changes proposed by Proposition 1A would affect gaming in California with a detailed explanation of how gaming regulations under the IGRA worked. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence1991In light of that statement, the Court of Appeal in Smith indicated in a footnote that its discussion of the issue of duress as an imperfect defense to robbery gave rise to a sua sponte obligation for courts in future cases to give such an instruction. ( People v. Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App.3d at p. 679, fn. 8 .) Smith was also wrong in this regard; Flannel does not suggest that evaluation and acceptance of a legal rule in one intermediate appellate decision transforms it into a general principle of law. ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 682.) [5] (1) CALJIC No. 2.52: "The flight of a | 1 | 1 |
People v. Flannelred2 sentences1991In People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 682, we stated that our adoption of the rule, that a genuine but unreasonably held belief in the need to defend would provide an “imperfect” defense to murder, should be considered a general legal principle for purposes of jury instruction in cases tried after the opinion. 1991In People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 682, we stated that our adoption of the rule, that a genuine but unreasonably held belief in the need to defend would provide an "imperfect" defense to murder, should be considered a general legal principle for purposes of jury instruction in cases tried after the opinion. | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1988(See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 395 [Lab. 1988(See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 395 [Lab. | 1 | 1 |
Bermite Powder Co. v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1952There is, therefore, no occasion for the application here of the general legal principle, relied upon by the Controller, that “a statute may not be construed as creating a right without a remedy.’’ (See Bermite Powder Co. v. Franchise Tax Board (1952), 38 Cal.2d 700, 703 [ 242 P.2d 9 ].) The judgment is affirmed. 1952There is, therefore, no occasion for the application here of the general legal principle, relied upon by the Controller, that “a statute may not be construed as creating a right without a remedy.’’ (See Bermite Powder Co. v. Franchise Tax Board (1952), 38 Cal.2d 700, 703 [ 242 P.2d 9 ].) The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSN. v. Maxwell-Jolly
green
2 sentences2019With respect to the existence of an enforceable duty to act and a beneficial interest in the completion of that duty, we find this case analogous to California Hospital Assn. v. Maxwell-Jolly (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 559 (Maxwell-Jolly). 2019With respect to the existence of an enforceable duty to act and a beneficial interest in the completion of that duty, we find this case analogous to California Hospital Assn. v. Maxwell-Jolly (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 559 (Maxwell-Jolly). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Board
green
2 sentences2018And any residual confusion is dispelled by the general legal principle that the more recently enacted ordinance trumps. ( Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 942, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 .) Fourth, Grill Concepts points out that plaintiffs' lawyer, in its March 2014 demand letter, cited a living wage scale inapplicable to plaintiffs. 2018And any residual confusion is dispelled by the general legal principle that the more recently enacted ordinance trumps. ( Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 942, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 .) Fourth, Grill Concepts points out that plaintiffs' lawyer, in its March 2014 demand letter, cited a living wage scale inapplicable to plaintiffs. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Tavaglione v. Billings
green
1 sentence2024As explained by our Supreme Court in caselaw both parties cite, “Regardless of the nature or number of legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. [Citation.] Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited.” (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150 , 1158- 1159.) Jenkins recites this general legal principle but does not explain how it applies here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jong v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023That framework shows that for off-the-clock work claims, certain general principles articulated in federal cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ( 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)) are applicable to claims made under California law. ( Jong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395–396.) Relevant to this case, these principles state that an employer may not escape liability for off-the-clock work by “negligently maintaining records … or by deliberately turning its back on a situation,” but neither can an employee “prevent an employer from acquiring knowledge” of off-the- clock work by hiding their effor | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2019Lexis 409 at p. *2]; Kelly, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017–1018.) Further, the general legal principle that changes in the law are deemed incorporated into a plea bargain does not apply here, because the change in the law created by Senate Bill 1393 (allowing the court to exercise its sentencing discretion) does not affect defendant’s plea, which stated a specific, agreed-upon sentence that had already been accepted and imposed by the trial court, not a sentence which granted the trial court discretion to select the sentence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Perry v. New Hampshire
green
1 sentence2015He contends there is a “growing trend” in other state courts “to find that privately conducted suggestive identifications, such as the one allowed here, are subject to exclusion under the general legal principle that unreliable evidence should not be admitted at trial.” As the Attorney General points out, all of the out-of-state cases defendant cites predated Perry, supra, 565 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 716 ], including State v. Chen (2011) 208 N.J. 307 , upon which defendant primarily relies. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
1 sentence2015(See, e.g., §§ 1286.2, subd. (a), 1286.6; Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 & fn. 2; Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 669, 675- 680.) In this regard, the sentence at issue begins with the phrase, “You also understand,” and then correctly sets forth the general legal principle concerning limited review of an arbitrator’s award even if there is legal or factual error (see Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Berglund v. Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P.
green
2 sentences2015(See, e.g., §§ 1286.2, subd. (a), 1286.6; Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 & fn. 2; Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 669, 675- 680.) In this regard, the sentence at issue begins with the phrase, “You also understand,” and then correctly sets forth the general legal principle concerning limited review of an arbitrator’s award even if there is legal or factual error (see Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 ). 2015(See, e.g., §§ 1286.2, subd. (a), 1286.6; Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 & fn. 2; Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 669, 675- 680.) In this regard, the sentence at issue begins with the phrase, “You also understand,” and then correctly sets forth the general legal principle concerning limited review of an arbitrator’s award even if there is legal or factual error (see Berglund, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 534 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Chen
green
1 sentence2015He contends there is a “growing trend” in other state courts “to find that privately conducted suggestive identifications, such as the one allowed here, are subject to exclusion under the general legal principle that unreliable evidence should not be admitted at trial.” As the Attorney General points out, all of the out-of-state cases defendant cites predated Perry, supra, 565 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 716 ], including State v. Chen (2011) 208 N.J. 307 , upon which defendant primarily relies. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Santamaria
green
1 sentence2013There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct perpetrator, and a similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no such doubt that he was one or the other.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) In the present case, the evidence adduced at trial unambiguously imposed on the trial court a sua sponte duty “to instruct on aiding and abetting liability as a general legal principle raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. [Citation.]” (People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 483 .) “Even without a request, a trial court i | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Delgado
green
1 sentence2013There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct perpetrator, and a similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no such doubt that he was one or the other.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 919 .) In the present case, the evidence adduced at trial unambiguously imposed on the trial court a sua sponte duty “to instruct on aiding and abetting liability as a general legal principle raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. [Citation.]” (People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 483 .) “Even without a request, a trial court i | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Evangelatos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997Reflecting the commonsense notion that it may be unfair to change ‘the rules of the game’ in the middle of a contest, these authorities persuasively demonstrate that the general legal presumption of prospectivity applies with full force to a measure, like the initiative at issue here, which substantially modifies a legal doctrine on which many persons may have reasonably relied in conducting their legal affairs prior to the new enactment.” (Eva ngelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1194 , italics added.) In response to the contention of the defendants in Evangelatos that the remedial purpose of Pro 1997Reflecting the commonsense notion that it may be unfair to change `the rules of the game' in the middle of a contest, these authorities persuasively demonstrate that the general legal presumption of prospectivity applies with full force to a measure, like the initiative at issue here, which substantially modifies a legal doctrine on which many persons may have reasonably relied in conducting their legal affairs prior to the new enactment. " ( Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1194 , italics added.) In response to the contention of the defendants in Evangelatos that the remedial purpose of Pr | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim
green
1 sentence1996(Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 .) But because the outcome is not affected by the approach used, we will review the option agreement de novo. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Marriage of Bouquet
green
2 sentences1988While the general propriety of such damages is, of course, firmly imbedded in our common law jurisprudence [citation], no California case of which we are aware has ever suggested that the right to recover for such noneconomic injuries is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revision.” (Footnote omitted.) (38 Cal.3d at pp. 159-160.) In In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 , footnote 3 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 546 P.2d 1371 ], the court specifically recognized that “[sjection 3 of the Civil Code embodies the common law presumption against retroactivity,” and numerou 1988While the general propriety of such damages is, of course, firmly imbedded in our common law jurisprudence [citation], no California case of which we are aware has ever suggested that the right to recover for such noneconomic injuries is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revision.” (Footnote omitted.) (38 Cal.3d at pp. 159-160.) In In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 , footnote 3 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 546 P.2d 1371 ], the court specifically recognized that “[sjection 3 of the Civil Code embodies the common law presumption against retroactivity,” and numerou | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1982As we explained in Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d 917 , 946: “Although ‘it is a built-in consequence of [the Anglo-American principle of] stare decisis that “a legal doctrine established in a case involving a single litigant characteristically benefits all others similarly situated’” [citations], the doctrine of stare decisis has never been viewed as sufficient justification for permitting an attorney to obtain fees from all those who may, in future cases, utilize a precedent he has helped to secure. [Citations.] As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in rejecting a plea for attorney 1982As we explained in Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d 917 , 946: "Although `it is a built-in consequence of [the Anglo-American principle of] stare decisis that "a legal doctrine established in a case involving a single litigant characteristically benefits all others similarly situated"' [citations], the doctrine of stare decisis has never been viewed as sufficient justification for permitting an attorney to obtain fees from all those who may, in future cases, utilize a precedent he has helped to secure. [Citations.] As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in rejecting a plea for attorney | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Serrano v. Priest
green
2 sentences1982As we explained in Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d 917 , 946: “Although ‘it is a built-in consequence of [the Anglo-American principle of] stare decisis that “a legal doctrine established in a case involving a single litigant characteristically benefits all others similarly situated’” [citations], the doctrine of stare decisis has never been viewed as sufficient justification for permitting an attorney to obtain fees from all those who may, in future cases, utilize a precedent he has helped to secure. [Citations.] As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in rejecting a plea for attorney 1982As we explained in Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d 917 , 946: "Although `it is a built-in consequence of [the Anglo-American principle of] stare decisis that "a legal doctrine established in a case involving a single litigant characteristically benefits all others similarly situated"' [citations], the doctrine of stare decisis has never been viewed as sufficient justification for permitting an attorney to obtain fees from all those who may, in future cases, utilize a precedent he has helped to secure. [Citations.] As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in rejecting a plea for attorney | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Clarke v. Horany
green
2 sentences1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b 1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Milana v. Credit Discount Co.
green
2 sentences1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b 1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Golden State Lanes v. Fox
green
2 sentences1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b 1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky
green
2 sentences1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b 1977(Milana v. Credit Discount Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 335 [ 163 P.2d 869 , 165 A.L.R. 621 ]; Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428 [ 292 P. 474 ]; Golden State Lanes v. Fox (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 135 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 ]; Clarke v. Horany (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 4 A.L.R.3d 643 ].) Defendants attempt to justify payments on the second note as exempt from the usury law on two grounds: (1) the second note was given in connection with the purchase of a business and hence was not interest but part of the purchase price; (2) the second note constituted a prepayment bonus b | 1 | 1977–1977 |
In re Estate of Clos
green
2 sentences1968(See 31 C.J.S., Estates, § 45, pp. 88-91.) However, plaintiff asserts that an exception to the general rule has been recognized and applied by courts in a variety of situations, for example, where the improvements are made' under compulsion of statute or ordinance; or where the improvements are necessitated by reason of changed conditions in order to insure reasonable income from unproductive or low-income property (see In re Clos, 110 Cal. 494 [ 42 P. 971 ] )— all, of course, on the assumption that the improvement will benefit the future estate as well as the life estate and does not violate 1968(See 31 C.J.S., Estates, § 45, pp. 88-91.) However, plaintiff asserts that an exception to the general rule has been recognized and applied by courts in a variety of situations, for example, where the improvements are made' under compulsion of statute or ordinance; or where the improvements are necessitated by reason of changed conditions in order to insure reasonable income from unproductive or low-income property (see In re Clos, 110 Cal. 494 [ 42 P. 971 ] )— all, of course, on the assumption that the improvement will benefit the future estate as well as the life estate and does not violate | 1 | 1968–1968 |
People Ex Rel. Department of Public Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders, Inc.
green
2 sentences1960Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 298 P.2d 53 ] at page 107: “ ‘The general legal doctrine as stated by the courts is that compensation must be paid for the land that is taken, regardless of the separate interests in the land, and that the sum of the separate values of the divided interests may not exceed the value of the whole. . . .’ (Citation.) In other words, the property to be taken is valued as if owned by a single person, regardless of the separate interests therein.” (Emphasis added.) But, the case which is before us is not the usual situation. 1960Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 298 P.2d 53 ] at page 107: “ ‘The general legal doctrine as stated by the courts is that compensation must be paid for the land that is taken, regardless of the separate interests in the land, and that the sum of the separate values of the divided interests may not exceed the value of the whole. . . .’ (Citation.) In other words, the property to be taken is valued as if owned by a single person, regardless of the separate interests therein.” (Emphasis added.) But, the case which is before us is not the usual situation. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Neary v. Godfrey green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.