12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pearson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See Pyne, 319 Ga. at 784, 786 (prosecutor’s comment that “if there had been” evidence connecting an alternate suspect to the crime, “you would have seen it,” was not improper burden-shifting but rather a response to the defense’s argument); Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (2004) (prosecutor’s question during closing argu- ment about why the defendant did not produce the gun he claimed he had fired in self-defense was not a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent, but rather a “valid attack on the credibility of [the defendant’s] claim that the homicide was justified”). 2026See Pyne, 319 Ga. at 784, 786 (prosecutor’s comment that “if there had been” evidence connecting an alternate suspect to the crime, “you would have seen it,” was not improper burden-shifting but rather a response to the defense’s argument); Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (2004) (prosecutor’s question during closing argu- ment about why the defendant did not produce the gun he claimed he had fired in self-defense was not a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent, but rather a “valid attack on the credibility of [the defendant’s] claim that the homicide was justified”). | 2 | 2 |
Pyne v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See Pyne, 319 Ga. at 784, 786 (prosecutor’s comment that “if there had been” evidence connecting an alternate suspect to the crime, “you would have seen it,” was not improper burden-shifting but rather a response to the defense’s argument); Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (2004) (prosecutor’s question during closing argu- ment about why the defendant did not produce the gun he claimed he had fired in self-defense was not a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent, but rather a “valid attack on the credibility of [the defendant’s] claim that the homicide was justified”). 2026See Pyne, 319 Ga. at 784, 786 (prosecutor’s comment that “if there had been” evidence connecting an alternate suspect to the crime, “you would have seen it,” was not improper burden-shifting but rather a response to the defense’s argument); Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (2004) (prosecutor’s question during closing argu- ment about why the defendant did not produce the gun he claimed he had fired in self-defense was not a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent, but rather a “valid attack on the credibility of [the defendant’s] claim that the homicide was justified”). | 2 | 2 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Martin, 298 Ga. at 279 (6) (d). 95 Jail Officer Ricardo Rucker. 2023See Martin, 298 Ga. at 279 (6) (d). | 1 | 1 |
Goen v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2021This is so because “the failure to give such notice cannot be waived. . . .” Goen v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) ( 481 SE2d 244 ) (1997) (finding that the city had not waived ante litem notice even where it had failed to raise the issue of insufficient notice at the pretrial order stage, and even though it had offered to buy the plaintiff’s property). 2021This is so because “the failure to give such notice cannot be waived. . . .” Goen v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) ( 481 SE2d 244 ) (1997) (finding that the city had not waived ante litem notice even where it had failed to raise the issue of insufficient notice at the pretrial order stage, and even though it had offered to buy the plaintiff’s property). | 1 | 1 |
Romine v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521 (1) (b) ( 350 SE2d 446 ) (1986) (jury not charged on the consequences of its failure to reach a verdict). 22. 1999See Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521 (1) (b) ( 350 SE2d 446 ) (1986) (jury not charged on the consequences of its failure to reach a verdict). 22. | 1 | 1 |
Fortson v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (1), 239 S.E.2d 335 (1977). c) Lowe urges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge. 1996See Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (1), 239 S.E.2d 335 (1977). c) Lowe urges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge. | 1 | 1 |
Momon v. Stategreen2 sentences1991Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 ( 294 SE2d 482 ). 1991Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 ( 294 SE2d 482 ). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 411, 412 (1) ( 268 SE2d 749 ); Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (2) ( 221 SE2d 28 ). 1986Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 411, 412 (1) ( 268 SE2d 749 ); Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (2) ( 221 SE2d 28 ). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 411, 412 (1) ( 268 SE2d 749 ); Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (2) ( 221 SE2d 28 ). 1986Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 411, 412 (1) ( 268 SE2d 749 ); Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (2) ( 221 SE2d 28 ). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. 1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. | 1 | 1 |
Sullens v. Stategreen2 sentences1981See also, Sullens v. State, 239 Ga. 766 (1) ( 238 SE2d 864 ). 1981See also, Sullens v. State, 239 Ga. 766 (1) ( 238 SE2d 864 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Turpin v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2000Turpin v. Bennett, 270 Ga. 584 , 513 S.E.2d 478 (1999). 2000Turpin v. Bennett, 270 Ga. 584 , 513 S.E.2d 478 (1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Askew v. Dupree
green
2 sentences1990The attaint of that term should be reserved, in proper cases, for parents. [4] Indeed, the first decision on common law marriage in this state, Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860), was a response to a challenge to the validity of a marriage performed by a minister who had been stripped of his ministerial functions and powers by his church: The conclusions to be deduced from the whole matter are these: That marriage is founded in the law of nature, and is anterior to all human law; that in society it is a civil contract; that if the contract is per verba de presenti that is, I take you to be m 1990Indeed, the first decision on common law marriage in this state, Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860), was a response to a challenge to the validity of a marriage performed by a minister who had been stripped of his ministerial functions and powers by his church: The conclusions to be deduced from the whole matter are these: That marriage is founded in the law of nature, and is anterior to all human law; that in society it is a civil contract; that if the contract is per verba de presentí — that is, I take you to be my wife, and I take you to be my husband — though it be not consummated by cohab | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lefkoff v. Sicro
green
2 sentences1990The attaint of that term should be reserved, in proper cases, for parents. [4] Indeed, the first decision on common law marriage in this state, Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860), was a response to a challenge to the validity of a marriage performed by a minister who had been stripped of his ministerial functions and powers by his church: The conclusions to be deduced from the whole matter are these: That marriage is founded in the law of nature, and is anterior to all human law; that in society it is a civil contract; that if the contract is per verba de presenti that is, I take you to be m 1990The attaint of that term should be reserved, in proper cases, for parents. [4] Indeed, the first decision on common law marriage in this state, Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860), was a response to a challenge to the validity of a marriage performed by a minister who had been stripped of his ministerial functions and powers by his church: The conclusions to be deduced from the whole matter are these: That marriage is founded in the law of nature, and is anterior to all human law; that in society it is a civil contract; that if the contract is per verba de presenti that is, I take you to be m | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Holloway v. State
green
2 sentences1981Although the juror’s response to defense counsel’s question indicated a possible bias or prejudice on her part, the juror’s opinion was not shown “to be so firm or fixed as to be unyielding.” Holloway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 124 (2) ( 222 SE2d 898 ). 1981Although the juror’s response to defense counsel’s question indicated a possible bias or prejudice on her part, the juror’s opinion was not shown “to be so firm or fixed as to be unyielding.” Holloway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 124 (2) ( 222 SE2d 898 ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Whitfield v. State
green
2 sentences1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. 1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Freeman v. State
green
2 sentences1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. 1981Nevertheless, despite whether the jury received the judge’s response to their inquiry, we find no merit in defense counsel’s argument that this constituted a failure to recharge the jury on a particular point regarding which they requested instructions, within the meaning of such cases as Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ); Freeman v. State, 142 Ga. App. 293 (4) ( 235 SE2d 560 ); Whitfield, v. State, 143 Ga. App. 779 (1) ( 240 SE2d 189 ) and others. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.