49 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2019See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 441 . ¶ 54 Moreover, the State’s response to defense counsel’s argument concerning defendant’s confession in no way minimized or shifted the State’s burden of proof. 2002See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 441 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (1993) (the prosecutor may respond to comments by defense counsel that clearly invite a response); People v. Smith, 154 Ill.App.3d 837, 849 , 107 Ill.Dec. 630 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor's comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a "smoke screen" was a proper response to defense counsel's closing argument). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Pryorgreen2 sentences2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun 2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun | 2 | 2 |
People v. Averettgreen2 sentences2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun 2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun | 2 | 2 |
People v. Halerewiczgreen2 sentences2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun 2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun | 2 | 2 |
People v. Evansgreen2 sentences2008See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 223, 225 (prosecutor’s reference to the O. 2008See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 223, 225 (prosecutor’s reference to the O.J. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2008See Garcia, 165 Ill.2d at 426 , 209 Ill.Dec. 172 , 651 N.E.2d 100 . 2008See Garcia, 165 Ill.2d at 426 , 209 Ill.Dec. 172 , 651 N.E.2d 100 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kiddgreen2 sentences2002In this case, the prosecutor described defense counsel’s attempt to focus on the minor inconsistencies in the case as a “smoke screen.” The prosecutor’s remark did not disparage the integrity of the defense as did the extensive remarks at issue in the two cases cited by defendant, People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 544 , 591 N.E.2d 431, 447 (1992) (in which “the assistant State’s Attorney did not make just one fleeting, inadvertent remark regarding this ‘smoke screen’ metaphor. 2002In this case, the prosecutor described defense counsel’s attempt to focus on the minor inconsistencies in the case as a “smoke screen.” The prosecutor’s remark did not disparage the integrity of the defense as did the extensive remarks at issue in the two cases cited by defendant, People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 544 , 591 N.E.2d 431, 447 (1992) (in which “the assistant State’s Attorney did not make just one fleeting, inadvertent remark regarding this ‘smoke screen’ metaphor. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2002See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 441 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (1993) (the prosecutor may respond to comments by defense counsel that clearly invite a response); People v. Smith, 154 Ill.App.3d 837, 849 , 107 Ill.Dec. 630 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor's comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a "smoke screen" was a proper response to defense counsel's closing argument). 2002App. 3d 837, 849 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a “smoke screen” was a proper response to defense counsel’s closing argument). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Christenberrygreen2 sentences2002Because of the possible collateral legal consequences to respondent father in the context of juvenile proceedings (see 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000) (prior neglect adjudication is admissible in subsequent proceedings); 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000) (a supplemental petition may be filed reinstating wardship and reopening the case)), we agree with respondent father that this appeal should not be dismissed for mootness (see In re Christenberry, 69 Ill.App.3d 565, 566-67 , 26 Ill.Dec. 93 , 387 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1979)). 2002Because of the possible collateral legal consequences to respondent father in the context of juvenile proceedings (see 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000) (prior neglect adjudication is admissible in subsequent proceedings); 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000) (a supplemental petition may be filed reinstating wardship and reopening the case)), we agree with respondent father that this appeal should not be dismissed for mootness (see In re Christenberry, 69 Ill.App.3d 565, 566-67 , 26 Ill.Dec. 93 , 387 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1979)). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Glaspergreen1 sentence2026See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993) (“The prosecutor may also respond to comments made by defense counsel - 12 - No. 1-24-0194 which clearly invite a response”); People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 207 (2009) (finding no error where the State’s argument was made in response to counsel’s attempt to convince the jury that portions of a witness’s testimony were not credible). ¶ 40 We find our supreme court’s decision in Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 instructive. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Frenchgreen1 sentence2025See French, 2017 IL App (1st) 141815, ¶ 48 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Atkinsongreen1 sentence2015See Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 462 (citing People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83 (1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to bar the State from impeaching the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated battery where the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated battery with a firearm)).Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to admit the UUWF amounted to an abuse of discretion, as it was not unreasonable for the court to find that the conviction was probative of defendant's credibility in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2015See Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 462 (citing People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83 (1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to bar the State from impeaching the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated battery where the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated battery with a firearm)).Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to admit the UUWF amounted to an abuse of discretion, as it was not unreasonable for the court to find that the conviction was probative of defendant's credibility in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Prestongreen2 sentences2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 283-84 (1979). 2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill.2d 324, 328 , 85 Ill.Dec. 502 , 473 N.E.2d 1307 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill.2d 274, 283-84 , 29 Ill.Dec. 96 , 391 N.E.2d 359 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cowangreen2 sentences2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 283-84 (1979). 2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill.2d 324, 328 , 85 Ill.Dec. 502 , 473 N.E.2d 1307 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill.2d 274, 283-84 , 29 Ill.Dec. 96 , 391 N.E.2d 359 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mahaffeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Robbinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Mound City v. Masongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Carruthers
neutral
2 sentences1983It has been held that where a prosecutor’s comments on defendant’s failure to testify are in the form of a response to defense counsel’s comments in closing argument, “defendant may not predicate error on a response by the prosecutor which he himself provoked.” (People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. 1978We agree with earlier cases holding that: “Where the prosecutor’s remarks concerning defendant’s failure to testify are in the form of a response to defense counsel’s comments in closing argument, ‘defendant may not predicate error on a response by the prosecutor which he himself provoked.’ People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. | 3 | 1976–1983 |
The Solid Waste Agency of Lake County v. Zion Landfill, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026He stated that the letter was a response to her inquiry regarding “whether contaminated soil that is used as an alternate daily cover material is subject to the solid waste tipping fees described in Sections 22.15 and 22.44 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.” He explained that contaminated soil that “meets the Act’s definition of ‘pollution control waste’ ” is “exempt from the tipping fees pursuant to Sections 22.15(k)(2) and 22.44(c)(2) of the Act, regardless of whether it is used as daily cover.” He clarified, “The pollution control waste exemption applies even if the contaminated 2026He stated that the letter was a response to her inquiry regarding “whether contaminated soil that is used as an alternate daily cover material is subject to the solid waste tipping fees described in Sections 22.15 and 22.44 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.” He explained that contaminated soil that “meets the Act’s definition of ‘pollution control waste’ ” is “exempt from the tipping fees pursuant to Sections 22.15(k)(2) and 22.44(c)(2) of the Act, regardless of whether it is used as daily cover.” He clarified, “The pollution control waste exemption applies even if the contaminated | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Krankel
green
2 sentences2021He continued to claim that the locked bedroom was not his and that he never allowed the police to search his residence. ¶ 25 Citing to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the trial court requested a response from defense counsel. 2020He continued to claim that the locked bedroom was not his and that he never allowed the police to search his residence. ¶ 25 Citing to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the trial court requested a response from defense counsel. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Childs
green
2 sentences1995"For many years, it was a strict rule that any ex parte communication whatsoever by the judge or a third person with the jury was plain error, despite that there was no improper motive or effect on the jury [citation], regardless of the correctness of the response or instruction to the jury, or whether actual prejudice was demonstrated [citations].” (People v. Childs (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 217, 227 , 636 N.E.2d 534 .) The modern and more flexible rule, however, is that a jury verdict need not be set aside where it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury e 1995"For many years, it was a strict rule that any ex parte communication whatsoever by the judge or a third person with the jury was plain error, despite that there was no improper motive or effect on the jury [citation], regardless of the correctness of the response or instruction to the jury, or whether actual prejudice was demonstrated [citations].” (People v. Childs (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 217, 227 , 636 N.E.2d 534 .) The modern and more flexible rule, however, is that a jury verdict need not be set aside where it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury e | 2 | 1994–1995 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences1988(See People v. Smith (1982), 111 Ill. 1984App. 3d 140 , 463 N.E.2d 929 ), his comments therein must be based upon evidence or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom (People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 508 , 460 N.E.2d 746 ); however, defense counsel cannot invite or provoke a response and then claim that defendant was prejudiced thereby (People v. Smith (1982), 111 Ill. | 2 | 1984–1988 |
People v. Conner
green
2 sentences1983App. 3d 255, 267 , 309 N.E.2d 659, 668 ; People v. Conner (1976), 42 Ill. 1978App. 3d 255, 267 , 309 N.E.2d 659, 668 .” People v. Conner (1st Dist. 1976), 42 Ill. | 2 | 1978–1983 |
People v. Kirchner
green
1 sentence2026Rather, as noted, the State’s comments were a response to defense counsel’s argument that the “right thing” to do in this case was find Mr. Truman not guilty - 13 - No. 1-24-0194 where, in the State’s view, there was adequate evidence to find him guilty where he failed to do the “right thing.” ¶ 42 We find Mr. Truman’s reliance on People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983) and People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317 (1977) unpersuasive where those cases “involved direct references to defense counsel and repeated accusations of deceit.” (Emphasis added.) Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 551 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Emerson
green
1 sentence2026Rather, as noted, the State’s comments were a response to defense counsel’s argument that the “right thing” to do in this case was find Mr. Truman not guilty - 13 - No. 1-24-0194 where, in the State’s view, there was adequate evidence to find him guilty where he failed to do the “right thing.” ¶ 42 We find Mr. Truman’s reliance on People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983) and People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317 (1977) unpersuasive where those cases “involved direct references to defense counsel and repeated accusations of deceit.” (Emphasis added.) Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 551 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Monroe
green
1 sentence2026Rather, as noted, the State’s comments were a response to defense counsel’s argument that the “right thing” to do in this case was find Mr. Truman not guilty - 13 - No. 1-24-0194 where, in the State’s view, there was adequate evidence to find him guilty where he failed to do the “right thing.” ¶ 42 We find Mr. Truman’s reliance on People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983) and People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317 (1977) unpersuasive where those cases “involved direct references to defense counsel and repeated accusations of deceit.” (Emphasis added.) Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 551 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Pendleton
green
1 sentence2025Neither postconviction counsel amended defendant’s successive petition or moved to withdraw from defendant’s case. ¶ 32 As pointed out by our supreme court in Pendleton, “ ‘post conviction counsel is only required to investigate and properly present the petitioner’s claims.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472 (quoting Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People Ex Rel. Devine v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2024Devine v. Murphy, 181 Ill. 2d 522 , 534 n.1 (1998). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Alexander
green
1 sentence2021Alexander, 2019 IL App (3d) 160709, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 On appeal, the defendant argued that the court’s response was error because it introduced a new theory—constructive possession—into the case, and we agreed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Aguirre
green
1 sentence2020Aguirre, 291 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Sebby
green
1 sentence2020However, “[t]he initial analytical step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is determining whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 . ¶ 83 When the complained-of comment is viewed in context, we find the comment was a proper response to defense counsel’s repeated arguments that Peak and Williams were untrustworthy because they had prior felony convictions as well as the specific reference to Williams as a “criminal.” The prosecutor’s comment, “This guy is the criminal. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hart
green
2 sentences2006Hart, 214 Ill. 2d at 511-12 . 2006Hart, 214 Ill.2d at 511-12 , 293 Ill.Dec. 290 , 828 N.E.2d 260 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Robinson neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| The People v. McGrane green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Morris green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People ex rel. Henderson v. Allen neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Beck green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Jennings green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Giangrande green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Harbold green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Ford green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Schmitt green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Cisewski green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Rockman green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Trass green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Cunningham green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Terry green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Clay green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Nash neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Dillard green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Benedik green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Fleming green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| The PEOPLE v. George green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.