response defense in Illinois

2019See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 441 . ¶ 54 Moreover, the State’s response to defense counsel’s argument concerning defendant’s confession in no way minimized or shifted the State’s burden of proof.

2002See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 441 , 193 Ill.Dec. 128 , 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (1993) (the prosecutor may respond to comments by defense counsel that clearly invite a response); People v. Smith, 154 Ill.App.3d 837, 849 , 107 Ill.Dec. 630 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor's comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a "smoke screen" was a proper response to defense counsel's closing argument).

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2017App. 3d 948, 951-52 (1992) (although the defendant initially proposed an answer of “ ‘no’ ” to a similar jury question, “[w]hen the judge finally proposed [his own] response, he asked both attorneys if it was satisfactory; they both agreed that it was”); see also People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (2010) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response to a jury question where defense counsel agreed with the trial court’s response); People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 23 (defendant could not challenge on appeal the trial court’s response where defense coun

2008See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 223, 225 (prosecutor’s reference to the O.

2008See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 223, 225 (prosecutor’s reference to the O.J.

2008See Garcia, 165 Ill.2d at 426 , 209 Ill.Dec. 172 , 651 N.E.2d 100 .

2008See Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d at 426 .

2002In this case, the prosecutor described defense counsel’s attempt to focus on the minor inconsistencies in the case as a “smoke screen.” The prosecutor’s remark did not disparage the integrity of the defense as did the extensive remarks at issue in the two cases cited by defendant, People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 544 , 591 N.E.2d 431, 447 (1992) (in which “the assistant State’s Attorney did not make just one fleeting, inadvertent remark regarding this ‘smoke screen’ metaphor.

2002In this case, the prosecutor described defense counsel’s attempt to focus on the minor inconsistencies in the case as a “smoke screen.” The prosecutor’s remark did not disparage the integrity of the defense as did the extensive remarks at issue in the two cases cited by defendant, People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 544 , 591 N.E.2d 431, 447 (1992) (in which “the assistant State’s Attorney did not make just one fleeting, inadvertent remark regarding this ‘smoke screen’ metaphor.

2002App. 3d 837, 849 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor's comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a "smoke screen" was a proper response to defense counsel's closing argument).

2002App. 3d 837, 849 , 507 N.E.2d 543, 552 (1987) (the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal that defense counsel was setting up a “smoke screen” was a proper response to defense counsel’s closing argument).

2002Because of the possible collateral legal consequences to respondent father in the context of juvenile proceedings (see 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000) (prior neglect adjudication is admissible in subsequent proceedings); 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000) (a supplemental petition may be filed reinstating wardship and reopening the case)), we agree with respondent father that this appeal should not be dismissed for mootness (see In re Christenberry, 69 Ill.App.3d 565, 566-67 , 26 Ill.Dec. 93 , 387 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1979)).

2002Because of the possible collateral legal consequences to respondent father in the context of juvenile proceedings (see 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000) (prior neglect adjudication is admissible in subsequent proceedings); 705 ILCS 405/2-33 (West 2000) (a supplemental petition may be filed reinstating wardship and reopening the case)), we agree with respondent father that this appeal should not be dismissed for mootness (see In re Christenberry, 69 Ill.App.3d 565, 566-67 , 26 Ill.Dec. 93 , 387 N.E.2d 923, 925 (1979)).

2026See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993) (“The prosecutor may also respond to comments made by defense counsel - 12 - which clearly invite a response”); People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 207 (2009) (finding no error where the State’s argument was made in response to counsel’s attempt to convince the jury that portions of a witness’s testimony were not credible). ¶ 40 We find our supreme court’s decision in Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 instructive.

2025See French, 2017 IL App (1st) 141815, ¶ 48 .

2015See Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 462 (citing People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83 (1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to bar the State from impeaching the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated battery where the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated battery with a firearm)).Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to admit the UUWF amounted to an abuse of discretion, as it was not unreasonable for the court to find that the conviction was probative of defendant's credibility in

2015See Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 462 (citing People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83 (1996) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to bar the State from impeaching the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior conviction for aggravated battery where the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated battery with a firearm)).Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to admit the UUWF amounted to an abuse of discretion, as it was not unreasonable for the court to find that the conviction was probative of defendant's credibility in

2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 283-84 (1979).

2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill.2d 324, 328 , 85 Ill.Dec. 502 , 473 N.E.2d 1307 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill.2d 274, 283-84 , 29 Ill.Dec. 96 , 391 N.E.2d 359 (1979).

2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 283-84 (1979).

2009People v. Cowan, 105 Ill.2d 324, 328 , 85 Ill.Dec. 502 , 473 N.E.2d 1307 (1985); People v. Preston, 76 Ill.2d 274, 283-84 , 29 Ill.Dec. 96 , 391 N.E.2d 359 (1979).

1995See People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, 425 .