response claim in Oklahoma

2004Oklahoma Bar Association v. Rennie, 1997 OK 108 , 945 P.2d 494 , wherein Rennie filed a false response to the bar complaint, misrepresented facts to a client about a summary judgment and told the client opposing counsel had “bought off’ the judge.

2004Oklahoma Bar Association v. Rennie, 1997 OK 108 , 945 P.2d 494 , wherein Rennie filed a false response to the bar complaint, misrepresented facts to a client about a summary judgment and told the client opposing counsel had “bought off’ the judge.

2011Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶ 135 , 164 P.3d 176, 203 . ¶ 72 Appellant finally argues that the prosecutor improperly aligned himself with the jury in closing argument.

2011Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶ 135 , 164 P.3d 176, 203 . ¶ 72 Appellant finally argues that the prosecutor improperly aligned himself with the jury in closing argument.

2007It might merely show she was a mean and uncaring person. [13] Harris, 84 P.3d at 753 ; [14] Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31 , 100 P.3d 1017, 1044 . [15] The State suggests this questioning was a response to the defense cross-examination of one State expert's credentials and work habits.

2007It might merely show she was a mean and uncaring person. [13] Harris, 84 P.3d at 753 ; [14] Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31 , 100 P.3d 1017, 1044 . [15] The State suggests this questioning was a response to the defense cross-examination of one State expert's credentials and work habits.

2007It might merely show she was a mean and uncaring person. [13] Harris, 84 P.3d at 753 ; [14] Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31 , 100 P.3d 1017, 1044 . [15] The State suggests this questioning was a response to the defense cross-examination of one State expert's credentials and work habits.

2006They claim they were denied due process which rendered the hearing on the motion to vacate fundamentally unfair. % It has long been recognized that "the jurisdiction of the [workers' compensation tribunal] to review its awards is not dependent upon the form or substance of the application for such review since, by statute, it may review its awards on its own motion." Noel, 1981 OK 156, ¶11 , 298 P. at 300 (citation omitted).

2003In Mistletoe Express Service v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1983 OK 27 , 674 P.2d 1 , the Court quoted from Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 222 , 542 P.2d 1316 , and said the following: In numerous cases the courts of this state have held that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of repugnant objects in one act and the inclusion of provisions not indicated by the title in order that those interested may not be misled or misinformed as to the contents of the statute.

2003In Mistletoe Express Service v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1983 OK 27 , 674 P.2d 1 , the Court quoted from Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 222 , 542 P.2d 1316 , and said the following: In numerous cases the courts of this state have held that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of repugnant objects in one act and the inclusion of provisions not indicated by the title in order that those interested may not be misled or misinformed as to the contents of the statute.

2003Assuming for the purpose of argument that this is correct, the same response to this claim could be made as that to the claim that § 301 violates Art. 10 § 15: Section 301 does not require state officials to use bond funds for a municipal purpose. ¶ 36 Section 301 is challenged with the argument that “SB 973 does not clearly express in its title the subjects of the Act.” Article 5 § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution 14 and John Deere Plow Co. v. Owens, 1943 OK 284 , 147 P.2d 149 are the authorities cited.

2003Assuming for the purpose of argument that this is correct, the same response to this claim could be made as that to the claim that § 301 violates Art. 10 § 15: Section 301 does not require state officials to use bond funds for a municipal purpose. ¶ 36 Section 301 is challenged with the argument that “SB 973 does not clearly express in its title the subjects of the Act.” Article 5 § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution 14 and John Deere Plow Co. v. Owens, 1943 OK 284 , 147 P.2d 149 are the authorities cited.

2003In Mistletoe Express Service v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1983 OK 27 , 674 P.2d 1 , the Court quoted from Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 222 , 542 P.2d 1316 , and said the following: In numerous cases the courts of this state have held that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of repugnant objects in one act and the inclusion of provisions not indicated by the title in order that those interested may not be misled or misinformed as to the contents of the statute.

2003In Mistletoe Express Service v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1983 OK 27 , 674 P.2d 1 , the Court quoted from Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 222 , 542 P.2d 1316 , and said the following: In numerous cases the courts of this state have held that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of repugnant objects in one act and the inclusion of provisions not indicated by the title in order that those interested may not be misled or misinformed as to the contents of the statute.

1998This Court found the trial court's response error as it was a misstatement of law, citing to Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288 (Okl.

1998This Court found the trial court’s response error as it was a misstatement of law, citing to Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288 (Okl.Cr.1994), that the law is clear, the jury must consider the distinctions between life, life without- parole and death as it reaches the sentencing decision.

1997The trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment relying on Adamson v. Dayton Hudson, 774 P.2d 478 (Okl.Ct.App.1989), which held that a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing precluded a plaintiff in a civil suit for false arrest from relitigating the issue of probable cause.

1997The trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment relying on Adamson v. Dayton Hudson, 774 P.2d 478 (Okl.Ct.App. 1989), which held that a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing precluded a plaintiff in a civil suit for false arrest from relitigating the issue of probable cause.

1994Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Thompson, 864 P.2d 339 (Okla.1993) (failure to promptly handle a client matter and giving a false response to the bar association warranted a 90-day suspension).

1986The court will rule on the reasonableness of the request for expert witnesses and other services by the defendant. ****** This statute is apparently the Legislature’s response to the rule stated by the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), petitioner’s other primary authority.

1986The court will rule on the reasonableness of the request for expert witnesses and other services by the defendant. ****** This statute is apparently the Legislature’s response to the rule stated by the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), petitioner’s other primary authority.

1975The last requirement of Smith, number six, is reflected as substantially complied with by the defendant’s admission at the hearing on the application to withdraw his plea of guilty at which time he testified that, prior to the entry of his pleas of guilty, the Court informed him of what the State’s recommendation of punishment would be. 8 Again this is allowed by Cobbler, supra, in that it can be established that the trial judge complied with the requirement mandated by Smith, supra. We further note this requirement is essential as we promote the concept of plea bargaining and we feel such pro

1975The last requirement of Smith, number six, is reflected as substantially complied with by the defendant’s admission at the hearing on the application to withdraw his plea of guilty at which time he testified that, prior to the entry of his pleas of guilty, the Court informed him of what the State’s recommendation of punishment would be. 8 Again this is allowed by Cobbler, supra, in that it can be established that the trial judge complied with the requirement mandated by Smith, supra. We further note this requirement is essential as we promote the concept of plea bargaining and we feel such pro

1975The last requirement of Smith, number six, is reflected as substantially complied with by the defendant’s admission at the hearing on the application to withdraw his plea of guilty at which time he testified that, prior to the entry of his pleas of guilty, the Court informed him of what the State’s recommendation of punishment would be. 8 Again this is allowed by Cobbler, supra, in that it can be established that the trial judge complied with the requirement mandated by Smith, supra. We further note this requirement is essential as we promote the concept of plea bargaining and we feel such pro

1975A similar situation is found in Norton v. State, Okl.Cr., 492 P.2d 359 (1972), wherein this Court held that in a prosecution for grand larceny, the officer’s testimony on cross-examination that he had received information prior to the burglary that defendant and companions were going to commit burglary was an improper response to defense counsel’s questions concerning the basis for officer’s functioning in an area when defendant was arrested but officer’s remarks did not constitute sufficient ground for reversal where evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and punishment imposed did no

1964Ex parte Berryhill, 87 Okl.Cr. 48 , 194 P.2d 214 ; Reference is made to that case for a statement of the facts.

1964Ex parte Berryhill, 87 Okl.Cr. 48 , 194 P.2d 214 ; Reference is made to that case for a statement of the facts.

1938In the early case of Ex parte Tyler, 2 Okla, Cr. 455, 102 Pac. 716, 718 , a similar question was before this court.

1938Cr. 195 , 290 Pac. 354 . *400 The response to the rule to show cause why the writ should not issue concludes: “Respondent denies that petitioner is entitled to credit for the time he served while said case was on appeal, and that petitioner will not have served his present sentence on a minimum basis until November 19, 1938.” The important question involved in the case on the uncontroverted facts is whether or not petitioner is entitled, under the law, to credit with the time he had served in the penitentiary before the reversal of the former judgment; in other words, to have the period of his