response defense in Texas

2023See Lange v. State, 57 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor did not improperly bolster complainant’s credibility by listing the people complainant would have had to fool if she were lying, in light of defense counsel’s attempts to attack complainant’s credibility by showing inconsistencies in her story and suggesting she had been manipulated into bringing allegations against defendant); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd) (because the defense strategy was to attack the complainant’s credibility by suggesting she tended to fa

2006As a response to the defense argument that sought to have the jury treat Lasher the same as his brother despite his brother’s guilty plea, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was not improper. 7 See Albiar v. State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (“If the defense counsel invites argument, as is the case here, then it is appropriate for the State to respond.”); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd); see also Lange v. State, 57 S.W.3d 458, 467-69 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, pet ref'd).

2023See Lange v. State, 57 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor did not improperly bolster complainant’s credibility by listing the people complainant would have had to fool if she were lying, in light of defense counsel’s attempts to attack complainant’s credibility by showing inconsistencies in her story and suggesting she had been manipulated into bringing allegations against defendant); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd) (because the defense strategy was to attack the complainant’s credibility by suggesting she tended to fa

2006As a response to the defense argument that sought to have the jury treat Lasher the same as his brother despite his brother’s guilty plea, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was not improper. 7 See Albiar v. State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (“If the defense counsel invites argument, as is the case here, then it is appropriate for the State to respond.”); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd); see also Lange v. State, 57 S.W.3d 458, 467-69 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, pet ref'd).

2025Even when a response to defense counsel is warranted, “a prosecutor may not stray beyond the scope of the invitation.”57 And when defense counsel injects matters outside the record, the 57 Id. at 572 (brackets removed).

2025Even when a response to defense counsel is warranted, “a prosecutor may not stray beyond the scope of the invitation.”57 And when defense counsel injects matters outside the record, the 57 Id. at 572 (brackets removed).

2022See Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (holding that a prosecutor’s statement that defense counsel’s arguments were “hogwash” was not improper because the comment was directed at defense counsel’s theories and arguments in the case); Acosta v. State, 411 S.W.3d 76, 93 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that a prosecutor’s argument that defense counsel’s argument “was just words from the defense attorney’s mouth” did not constitute an inappropriate strike at the defendant over counsel’s shoulders, but was rather a response to defense counsel’s argument

2015See Garcia, 126 S.W.3d at 924 . –4– The State argues the prosecutor’s argument was a proper response to defense counsel’s argument that G.A. was not credible.

2008As a response to the defense argument that sought to have the jury treat Lasher the same as his brother despite his brother’s guilty plea, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was not improper. [2] See Albiar v. State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Crim.

2006As a response to the defense argument that sought to have the jury treat Lasher the same as his brother despite his brother’s guilty plea, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was not improper. 7 See Albiar v. State, 739 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (“If the defense counsel invites argument, as is the case here, then it is appropriate for the State to respond.”); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd); see also Lange v. State, 57 S.W.3d 458, 467-69 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, pet ref'd).

2012Romo v. State , 315 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d).

2012Romo v. State , 315 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d).

2008See Roberson v. State, 100 S.W.3d 36, 40-41 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d); Hicks v. State, 815 S.W.2d 299, 302-04 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

2006See Roberson v. State, 100 S.W.3d 36, 40-41 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref’d); Hicks v. State, 815 S.W.2d 299, 302-04 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

2008See Roberson v. State, 100 S.W.3d 36, 40-41 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d); Hicks v. State, 815 S.W.2d 299, 302-04 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

2006See Roberson v. State, 100 S.W.3d 36, 40-41 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref’d); Hicks v. State, 815 S.W.2d 299, 302-04 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

2026In light of Houston’s defense and closing argument, his attorneys could have reasonably concluded that “[a]s a response to the defense argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was proper.” Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see id. at 275 (noting that State’s argument was that evidence did not support conclusion that victim lied); see also Canada v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that response to opposing counsel’s argument is proper jury argument).

2026In light of Houston’s defense and closing argument, his attorneys could have reasonably concluded that “[a]s a response to the defense argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was proper.” Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see id. at 275 (noting that State’s argument was that evidence did not support conclusion that victim lied); see also Canada v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that response to opposing counsel’s argument is proper jury argument).

2024See Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (“Because the prosecutor’s statement was essentially a response to defense arguments, we do not consider it as particularly offensive or flagrant.”) Remedial Measures With respect to the second factor, the record shows that the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the argument.

2015See Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (holding prosecutor’s remark regarding why appellant’s family members were brought before grand jury was “properly responsive” to defensive argument that the family members had been brought before the grand jury as an intimidation tactic).

2016See Smith v. State, 932 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted) (holding that prosecutor’s statement that victim was a “good guy too” was a proper response to the defense’s closing argument that the defendant was a “good guy”), aff'd, 965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Smith v. State, 932 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted) (holding that prosecutor’s statement that victim was a “good guy too” was a proper response to the defense’s closing argument that the defendant was a “good guy”), aff’d, 965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Smith v. State, 932 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted) (holding that prosecutor’s statement that victim was a “good guy too” was a proper response to the defense’s closing argument that the defendant was a “good guy”), aff'd, 965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Smith v. State, 932 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted) (holding that prosecutor’s statement that victim was a “good guy too” was a proper response to the defense’s closing argument that the defendant was a “good guy”), aff’d, 965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim.

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel), Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel); Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (holding “all thes

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel), Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel); Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (holding “all thes

2014Similar to the present case, in Beasley v. State, 864 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993), aff'd, 902 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), the prosecutor argued “but you can see through the clouds of the smoke screen by a very clever Defense attorney.” The Beasley remarks, like in this case, were also made in response to defense counsel’s attack of the victim.

2014Similar to the present case, in Beasley v. State, 864 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993), aff'd, 902 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), the prosecutor argued “but you can see through the clouds of the smoke screen by a very clever Defense attorney.” The Beasley remarks were also made in response to defense counsel’s attack of the victim.

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel), Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).

2014Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 260 (determining no harm in “[defense counsel] want[s] you to take a side road, a series of side roads, rabbit trails, and a rabbit trail that will lead you to a dead-end”); see also Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (holding “smoke and mirrors,” “red herrings or rabbit trails” were response to arguments of defense counsel); Cole, 194 S.W.3d at 547 (concluding “another trick” was not an improper response to defense argument); Banks v. State, 643 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (holding “all thes

2009See Strickland v. State, 193 S.W.3d 662 , 669–70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Martinez v. State, 851 S.W.2d 387 , 389–90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (noting that State may answer opposing counsel’s jury argument, even if it includes a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify) (citing Porter v. State, 601 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Strickland v. State , 193 S.W.3d 662 , 669–70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Martinez v. State , 851 S.W.2d 387 , 389–90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (noting that State may answer opposing counsel’s jury argument, even if it includes a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify) (citing Porter v. State , 601 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Strickland v. State, 193 S.W.3d 662 , 669–70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Martinez v. State, 851 S.W.2d 387 , 389–90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (noting that State may answer opposing counsel’s jury argument, even if it includes a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify) (citing Porter v. State, 601 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Strickland v. State , 193 S.W.3d 662 , 669–70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Martinez v. State , 851 S.W.2d 387 , 389–90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (noting that State may answer opposing counsel’s jury argument, even if it includes a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify) (citing Porter v. State , 601 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim.

2005See Wilson, 938 S.W.2d at 60 ; Drew, 76 S.W.3d at 462-63 .

2004See Wilson , 938 S.W.2d at 60 ; Drew , 76 S.W.3d at 462-63 .

2005See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 116 .

2004See Wesbrook , 29 S.W.3d at 116 .

2002As such, it was permissible under Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), which holds that, even if it requires the prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, the State may answer jury arguments made by the defense.

2002As such, it was permissible under Long v. State , 823 S.W.2d 259, 269 (Tex. Crim.

2020In re Monsanto Co., 998 S.W.2d 917, 928 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding); see also In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, orig. proceeding). “[I]n addition to the privilege log, the party resisting discovery must establish a prima facie case for the privilege by testimony or affidavit.” In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d at 868 (citing In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005)); see also In re E.I.

2019“The mere listing of a specific privilege in a response or a privilege log does not prove that privilege.” Monsanto Co., 998 S.W.2d at 926 .

2015Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 674 .

2009As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained, there are four areas of proper jury argument: "(1) summation of the evidence presented at trial, (2) reasonable deduction drawn from that evidence, (3) answer to the opposing counsel's argument, or (4) a plea for law enforcement." Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2026Greer also argues that the trial court erred in striking the response because no rule or case law allows a trial court to strike a timely summary-judgment response because of some perceived or actual substantive inadequacy, citing San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).