essential and fundamental requirement in Massachusetts

2010See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (“the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal”).

2006There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the United States Supreme] Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.” (Footnote omitted.) Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-405 (1965).

2006See Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71 (1995).

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. at 71 (“The right to confrontation and cross-examination ‘is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal’ ”). 15 Cf. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 639 (1997) (“art. 12 addresses a fundamental right of the accused”).

1987See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-295 (1973); Washington v. Texas, [ 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)].” Thus, as the Francis opinion continues (supra at 214), “rules which work arbitrarily to limit a defendant’s ability to call witnesses . . . have been found wanting.” We commented earlier that there is a largely but not a totally objective basis on which a jury may infer malice, thus making a defendant’s specific intention to kill or to injure irrelevant.

1978Sarro thus answered questions concerning his own activity in the break-in, but declined to answer questions with regard to his method of operations, and refused to disclose whether or not the defendant accompanied him. 1 In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), the United States Supreme Court stated that “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, . . . the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts,” “is in plain terms the right to present a defense . . . .” This right, embodied in the Sixth Amendment and applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendmen

1987See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-295 (1973); Washington v. Texas, [ 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)]." Thus, as the Francis opinion continues ( supra at 214), "rules which work arbitrarily to limit a defendant's ability to call witnesses ... have been found wanting." [4] We commented earlier that there is a largely but not a totally objective basis on which a jury may infer malice, thus making a defendant's specific intention to kill or to injure irrelevant.

1987See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-295 (1973); Washington v. Texas, [ 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)].” Thus, as the Francis opinion continues (supra at 214), “rules which work arbitrarily to limit a defendant’s ability to call witnesses . . . have been found wanting.” We commented earlier that there is a largely but not a totally objective basis on which a jury may infer malice, thus making a defendant’s specific intention to kill or to injure irrelevant.

2001See Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 Mass. 640, 650 , cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992) (“[T]he decisions of [the United States Supreme Court] and other courts throughout the years have constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-examination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases. . . . [T]he right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal”).

1995Indeed, the right to confrontation and cross-examination “is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.” Commonwealth v. Tanso, supra, quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. at 71 (“The right to confrontation and cross-examination ‘is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal’ ”). 15 Cf. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 639 (1997) (“art. 12 addresses a fundamental right of the accused”).

2001See also Commonwealth v. Kowalski, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 760 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Marcellino, 271 Mass. 325, 327 (1930) (“A defendant has the right to bring to the jury’s attention any ‘circumstance which may materially affect’ the testimony of an adverse witness which might lead the jury to find that the witness is under an ‘influence to prevaricate’ ”).

2001See also Commonwealth v. Kowalski, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 760 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Marcellino, 271 Mass. 325, 327 (1930) (“A defendant has the right to bring to the jury’s attention any ‘circumstance which may materially affect’ the testimony of an adverse witness which might lead the jury to find that the witness is under an ‘influence to prevaricate’ ”).

2001See also Commonwealth v. Kowalski, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 760 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Marcellino, 271 Mass. 325, 327 (1930) (“A defendant has the right to bring to the jury’s attention any ‘circumstance which may materially affect’ the testimony of an adverse witness which might lead the jury to find that the witness is under an ‘influence to prevaricate’ ”).

2001See Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 Mass. 640, 650 , cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992) (“[T]he decisions of [the United States Supreme Court] and other courts throughout the years have constantly emphasized the necessity for cross-examination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases. . . . [T]he right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal”).

1995“There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Supreme] Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.” United States v. Caudle, 606 F.2d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 1979), quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).

1978See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 543 (1974), and cases cited therein.