after hearing in Michigan

2016AFT Mich v Michigan, 303 Mich App 651 , 667 n 4; 846 NW2d 583 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2016AFT Mich v Mich, 303 Mich App 651, 657 , 657 n 4; 846 NW2d 583 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). -14- material, it would be impossible to tell what the law was. [Mahaney, 13 Mich at 496 .] In Mahaney, Justice COOLEY also explained that an “act complete in itself” was not anathema to art 4, § 25, stating: An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that for

2010In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 481 ; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), we held that whether the plaintiff has suffered a “serious impairment of body function” is “within the province of the trier of fact. . . .” However, in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483 ; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), noting that an advisory opinion “ ‘is not precedential^ binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits,’ ” id. at 495 (citation omitted), this Court held: [W]hen there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiffs injuries, the quest

2010In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 481 ; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), we held that whether the plaintiff has suffered a “serious impairment of body function” is “within the province of the trier of fact. . . .” However, in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483 ; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), noting that an advisory opinion “ ‘is not precedential^ binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits,’ ” id. at 495 (citation omitted), this Court held: [W]hen there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiffs injuries, the quest

2024See D’Angelo, 401 Mich at 183 . 3 People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 397 ; 648 NW2d 648 (2002), articulated the standard relied upon by Fyda, and in turn relied upon People v McGee, 247 Mich App 325, 344 ; 636 NW2d 531 (2001), vacated on other grounds by 469 Mich 956 (2003). -2- de novo.” Id.

2024See D’Angelo, 401 Mich at 183 . 3 People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 397 ; 648 NW2d 648 (2002), articulated the standard relied upon by Fyda, and in turn relied upon People v McGee, 247 Mich App 325, 344 ; 636 NW2d 531 (2001), vacated on other grounds by 469 Mich 956 (2003). -2- de novo.” Id.

2024See D’Angelo, 401 Mich at 183 . 3 People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 397 ; 648 NW2d 648 (2002), articulated the standard relied upon by Fyda, and in turn relied upon People v McGee, 247 Mich App 325, 344 ; 636 NW2d 531 (2001), vacated on other grounds by 469 Mich 956 (2003). -2- de novo.” Id.

2024See D’Angelo, 401 Mich at 183 . 3 People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 397 ; 648 NW2d 648 (2002), articulated the standard relied upon by Fyda, and in turn relied upon People v McGee, 247 Mich App 325, 344 ; 636 NW2d 531 (2001), vacated on other grounds by 469 Mich 956 (2003). -2- de novo.” Id.

2016AFT Mich v Mich, 303 Mich App 651, 657 , 657 n 4; 846 NW2d 583 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). -14- material, it would be impossible to tell what the law was. [Mahaney, 13 Mich at 496 .] In Mahaney, Justice COOLEY also explained that an “act complete in itself” was not anathema to art 4, § 25, stating: An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that for

2016“Of primary importance to the viability of our republican system of government is the ability of elected representatives to act on behalf of the people through the exercise of their power to enact, amend, or repeal legislation.” Studier, 472 Mich at 660 .

1986In Cassidy, supra, p 495 , the Court, in concluding that the question was to be decided by the Court, observed that the statements in In re Advisory Opinion did "not constitute a decision of the Court and [were] not precedentially binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits.” The Court said that "[although advisory opinions are not binding, they may be persuasive,” but the "validity” of what was said in In re Advisory Opinion would "have to find a basis other than stare decisis.” Id., p 498. ii Since Gusler is not precedentially binding, this Court might

1986In Cassidy, supra, p 495 , the Court, in concluding that the question was to be decided by the Court, observed that the statements in In re Advisory Opinion did "not constitute a decision of the Court and [were] not precedentially binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits.” The Court said that "[although advisory opinions are not binding, they may be persuasive,” but the "validity” of what was said in In re Advisory Opinion would "have to find a basis other than stare decisis.” Id., p 498. ii Since Gusler is not precedentially binding, this Court might

1973The Court said in the Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1970, No 100, 384 Mich 82 (1970), that legislation is "clothed with the presumption of constitutionality” and must be sustained if within constitutional limits.

1973The Court said in the Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1970, No 100, 384 Mich 82 (1970), that legislation is "clothed with the presumption of constitutionality" and must be sustained if within constitutional limits.

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914“The statement by the defendant that the plaintiff claims a judgment for the whole $700, is not shown by the record, and, if such was the case, it would be a matter for the jury to determine upon its submission to them by the court after hearing the proof as to the value of the property held by him and deducting the same from the loan.” The reply brief concludes: “The testimony as submitted in this case establishes a loan of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the plaintiff was entitled to his money, and when he discovered fraud, had a right to sue for the amount of damages that he is

1914Rep. 187 ); Wegner v. Herkimer, 167 Mich. 587 ( 133 N. W. 623 ); and various other cases bearing upon this question as cited in former brief.” And finally: “We submit that the plaintiff was entitled to submission of his right under the declaration to the jury, upon the question of how much defendant was owing him by reason of the money advanced, less the amount he had received towards the payment thereof.” In view of the facts (1) that plaintiff did not ask to amend his declaration, (2) that under the declaration as framed he cannot recover damages for fraud and deceit, but for that purpose mu

1914Rep. 187 ); Wegner v. Herkimer, 167 Mich. 587 ( 133 N. W. 623 ); and various other cases bearing upon this question as cited in former brief.” And finally: “We submit that the plaintiff was entitled to submission of his right under the declaration to the jury, upon the question of how much defendant was owing him by reason of the money advanced, less the amount he had received towards the payment thereof.” In view of the facts (1) that plaintiff did not ask to amend his declaration, (2) that under the declaration as framed he cannot recover damages for fraud and deceit, but for that purpose mu

1912In Torrey v. Cement Co., 150 Mich. 86 ( 113 N. W. 580 ), heard on demurrer to the bill, the court followed, upon the question of jurisdiction, Miner v. Ice Co. See, also, Avery v. Manufacturing Co., 27 N. J.

1912In Torrey v. Cement Co., 150 Mich. 86 ( 113 N. W. 580 ), heard on demurrer to the bill, the court followed, upon the question of jurisdiction, Miner v. Ice Co. See, also, Avery v. Manufacturing Co., 27 N. J.