after hearing in Illinois

2019In People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 55 , we specifically recognized that where the circuit clerk purported to assess a public defender fee, which could only be imposed by a court after a hearing, “there was no circuit court order” requiring the fee and “the appellate court could not remand for a hearing on an order that did not exist.” Thus, our decision in Hardman recognized the fundamental distinction between a court order and the ministerial action of a circuit clerk.

2018In People v. Hardman , 2017 IL 121453 , ¶ 55, 422 Ill.Dec. 805 , 104 N.E.3d 372 , we specifically recognized that where the circuit clerk purported to assess a public defender fee, which could only be imposed by a court after a hearing, "there was no circuit court order" requiring the fee and "the appellate court could not remand for a hearing on an order that did not exist." Thus, our decision in Hardman recognized the fundamental distinction between a court order and the ministerial action of a circuit clerk.

1975The trial court after hearing evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing found in its order that the admonitions required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , were not properly given to the defendant until just prior to his statement made on November 28 at 4:30 p.m.

1975The trial court after hearing evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing found in its order that the admonitions required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , were not properly given to the defendant until just prior to his statement made on November 28 at 4:30 p.m.

2010In People v. Purcell, 201 Ill. 2d 542 (2002), our supreme court upheld the validity of subsections (a) and (c), while placing the burden of proof under these two sections squarely on the State.

1998People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550 , 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997); People v. Matthews, 297 Ill.

1998People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550 , 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997); People v. Matthews, 297 Ill.

1998People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550 , 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997); People v. Matthews, 297 Ill.

1993Plaintiff also relies upon Panelle v. Chicago Transit Authority (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 560 , 202 N.E.2d 484 , in which the circuit court granted plaintiff a new trial after defense counsel argued to the jury that "there isn’t enough money collected in a year that we would have to pay out in claims in a month.” (Panelle, 31 Ill. 2d at 561 .) The appellate court reversed the ruling, but the supreme court disagreed, holding that nothing in the evidence or in plaintiff’s argument called for a discussion of other claims asserted against the defendant or the financial ability of the defendant to pay tho

1993Plaintiff also relies upon Panelle v. Chicago Transit Authority (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 560 , 202 N.E.2d 484 , in which the circuit court granted plaintiff a new trial after defense counsel argued to the jury that "there isn’t enough money collected in a year that we would have to pay out in claims in a month.” (Panelle, 31 Ill. 2d at 561 .) The appellate court reversed the ruling, but the supreme court disagreed, holding that nothing in the evidence or in plaintiff’s argument called for a discussion of other claims asserted against the defendant or the financial ability of the defendant to pay tho

1993(Department of Transportation v. Western National Bank (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 179, 185 .) In Barofsky’s opinion, the highest and best use of the western 50-acre remainder, in the after analysis, was for office research uses.

1992In re Marriage of Reeder (1986), 145 Ill.

1988In In re Marriage of Hunt (1979), 78 Ill.

1983App. 2d 12, 21-22 , 225 N.E.2d 707 .) We feel, however, that a determination of the propriety of attorney fees in this case is better left to the trial court after a hearing on remand.

1983(In re Marriage of Garde (1983), 118 Ill.

1983App. 3d 919, 921 ), his intervention is limited to protecting the lien in all orders of the court after hearing and judgment (Arnold Lies Co. v. Legler (1960), 26 Ill.

1975From our review of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse the discretion vested in it under the authority of People v. Meyers, 381 Ill. 156 , 44 N.E.2d 870 , and People v. Tillman, 4 Ill.App.3d 910 , 282 N.E.2d 231 .

1975From our review of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse the discretion vested in it under the authority of People v. Meyers, 381 Ill. 156 , 44 N.E.2d 870 , and People v. Tillman, 4 Ill.App.3d 910 , 282 N.E.2d 231 .

1975(Gregory v. Gregory, 52 Ill.

1975From our review of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse the discretion vested in it under the authority of People v. Meyers, 381 Ill. 156 , 44 N.E.2d 870 , and People v. Tillman, 4 Ill.App.3d 910 , 282 N.E.2d 231 .

1975From our review of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse the discretion vested in it under the authority of People v. Meyers, 381 Ill. 156 , 44 N.E.2d 870 , and People v. Tillman, 4 Ill.App.3d 910 , 282 N.E.2d 231 .

1971There are a lot of Oldsmobiles on the street, many." The prosecutor objected, saying: "And if counsel insists we could show that there is less than 100, if he is going to testify." The defendant argues that the former remark implied to the jury that he was trying to hide the truth and the latter remark indicated to the jury that the prosecution could in fact produce such evidence concerning the car and hence was an argument not based on any evidence produced at trial. • 11 Regarding the admissibility of alleged improper remarks, the Illinois Supreme Court has said: "Where it appears that impro

1971There are a lot of Oldsmobiles on the street, many." The prosecutor objected, saying: "And if counsel insists we could show that there is less than 100, if he is going to testify." The defendant argues that the former remark implied to the jury that he was trying to hide the truth and the latter remark indicated to the jury that the prosecution could in fact produce such evidence concerning the car and hence was an argument not based on any evidence produced at trial. • 11 Regarding the admissibility of alleged improper remarks, the Illinois Supreme Court has said: "Where it appears that impro

1969Since it could not be determined what sentence might otherwise have been imposed, we vacated the sentence of death and remanded the cause for resentencing. ( 38 Ill.2d at 339 .) The trial court after a hearing resentenced the appellant to death, and she has appealed to this court for a review of the punishment again imposed.

1969People v. Husser, 94 Ill App2d 33, 236 NE2d 735 .

1964But here, unlike Peirce v. Conant, supra, the court after hearing evidence found among other things that defendants took possession “after the nonpayment of rent for October 1962, and after M & S Motels Co., Inc., and Leonard Y.

1961(Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502 ; People v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79 ; Ephraim v. People, 13 Ill.2d 456 .) It is not available where, as here, the court after hearing in open court expressly found that no redemption had in fact occurred.

1961(Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502 ; People v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79 ; Ephraim v. People, 13 Ill.2d 456 .) It is not available where, as here, the court after hearing in open court expressly found that no redemption had in fact occurred.

1961(Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502 ; People v. Sheppard, 405 Ill. 79 ; Ephraim v. People, 13 Ill.2d 456 .) It is not available where, as here, the court after hearing in open court expressly found that no redemption had in fact occurred.

1961Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis, 15 Ill.2d 388 .

1940In People v. White, 364 Ill. 574 , defendant filed a plea of former jeopardy, alleging that he had been formerly acquitted of the offence with which he was charged in the indictment; to this plea a replication was filed which by stipulation was allowed to stand as a demurrer to the plea; the trial court after hearing entered an order overruling the demurrer, sustained the plea and ordered the indictment quashed.

1940The People sued out a writ of error seeking a reversal of the action of the trial judge, not only because he sustained the plea but quashed the indictment; the Supreme Court held that the hearing was solely as to the plea of former acquittal and when that plea was sustained defendant was entitled to an order of discharge and the additional order quashing the indictment should be rejected as surplus-age; that the amendment of 1933 to the criminal code did not apply, and the motion to dismiss the writ was allowed. ' In People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589 , the People attempted by writ of error to bri

1869We have looked at the case of Wilborn v. Blackstone, 41 Ill. 264 , to which we have been referred, and find that we did not determine whether the practice act applied to cases of tort on appeal, but expressly reserved the question.