9 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cave v. Wetzelgreen1 sentence1997If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” We most recently summarized the operation of this statute in Cave v. Wetzel, 545 N.W.2d 149,150 (N.D.1996): “Under section 12.1-31.2-01, NDCC, the district court is authorized to grant a ‘no contact’ order if the court finds ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has *881 engaged in disorderly conduct.’ See Williams v. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d 383 (N.D.1995). ‘Disorderly con | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Krenzgreen1 sentence1996As we explained in Wood v. Krenz, 392 N.W.2d 395, 398 (N.D.1986): One of the fundamental precepts of our judicial system is that the finder of fact must rely only on the evidence presented in court. | 1 | 1 |
Hultberg v. Hultberggreen1 sentence1996The only basis for the trial court’s finding was the copy of the federal magistrate’s Report and Recommendation that had been sent to the court after the hearing. 3 A trial court must decide factual matters only upon the evidentiary record of testimony and exhibits in that court. •See Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d 770, 773 (N.D.1990); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksengreen1 sentence1996The only basis for the trial court’s finding was the copy of the federal magistrate’s Report and Recommendation that had been sent to the court after the hearing. 3 A trial court must decide factual matters only upon the evidentiary record of testimony and exhibits in that court. •See Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d 770, 773 (N.D.1990); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D.1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. LaMoriegreen2 sentences2007But see State v. LaMorie, 558 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D.1996) (holding the district court erred by relying solely on a federal magistrate’s report sent to the court after the hearing and not admitted into the record). 2007But see State v. LaMorie , 558 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1996) (holding the district court erred by relying solely on a federal magistrate’s report sent to the court after the hearing and not admitted into the record). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoggarth v. Kropp
green
2 sentences2018If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” “A court imposing a disorderly conduct restraining order must address a respondent’s constitutional claims, because constitutionally protected conduct cannot be a basis for the order.” Hoggarth v. Kropp , 2010 ND 197, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 22 . [¶10] Aron Williams’ major argument during the hearing was that his actions and words were constitutionally protected activities. 2017If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” “A court imposing a disorderly conduct restraining order must address a respondent’s constitutional claims, because constitutionally protected conduct cannot be a basis for the order.” Hoggarth v. Kropp, 2010 ND 197, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 22 . [¶ 9] The district court considered Karen Keller’s constitutional argument, stating: “I know Mr. Mclntee is quoting the law right in regards to s | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Hoggarth v. Kropp
green
2 sentences2018If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” “A court imposing a disorderly conduct restraining order must address a respondent’s constitutional claims, because constitutionally protected conduct cannot be a basis for the order.” Hoggarth v. Kropp , 2010 ND 197, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 22 . [¶10] Aron Williams’ major argument during the hearing was that his actions and words were constitutionally protected activities. 2017If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” “A court imposing a disorderly conduct restraining order must address a respondent’s constitutional claims, because constitutionally protected conduct cannot be a basis for the order.” Hoggarth v. Kropp, 2010 ND 197, ¶ 10 , 790 N.W.2d 22 . [¶ 9] The district court considered Karen Keller’s constitutional argument, stating: “I know Mr. Mclntee is quoting the law right in regards to s | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Wetzel v. Schlenvogt
green
2 sentences2012If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity. [¶ 16] We conclude the procedural requirements of that statute were met because Gonzalez “file[d] a petition under subsection 3” on June 23, 2011, a sheriffs deputy served Witzke that day “with a copy of the temporary restraining order issued under subsection 4 and with notice of the time and place of the hearing,” and the district court set a hearing date of June 30, 2011, less than 2012If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity. [¶ 16] We conclude the procedural requirements of that statute were met because Gonzalez “file[d] a petition under subsection 3” on June 23, 2011, a sheriffs deputy served Witzke that day “with a copy of the temporary restraining order issued under subsection 4 and with notice of the time and place of the hearing,” and the district court set a hearing date of June 30, 2011, less than | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Syvertson
green
2 sentences2007In any event, a district court “is presumed to have done its duty.” State v. Syvertson, 1999 ND 134 , ¶ 21 n. 3, 597 N.W.2d 652 . 2007In any event, a district court “is presumed to have done its duty.” State v. Syvertson, 1999 ND 134 , ¶ 21 n. 3, 597 N.W.2d 652 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Minot Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hjelle
green
1 sentence2006Minot Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hjelle, supra. [¶ 19] Dr. Belanger’s testimony was given in the rebuttal phase of the trial after the defense had presented its case. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Williams v. Spilovoy
green
1 sentence1997If a person claims to have been engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.” We most recently summarized the operation of this statute in Cave v. Wetzel, 545 N.W.2d 149,150 (N.D.1996): “Under section 12.1-31.2-01, NDCC, the district court is authorized to grant a ‘no contact’ order if the court finds ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has *881 engaged in disorderly conduct.’ See Williams v. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d 383 (N.D.1995). ‘Disorderly con | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.