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18 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brosseitgreen2 sentences2025If any witness is to testify and the prosecuting attorney believes the witness who has provided information is in danger of intimidation or retaliation, the prosecuting attorney may delay identifying such informant witness until such informant witness actually testifies but in no event shall identification of a witness be delayed beyond arraignment without further order of the court after hearing and an opportunity of the defendant to be heard." 8 The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this statutory language to allow the State to endorse witnesses at any time unless "it will re 2025If any witness is to testify and the prosecuting attorney believes the witness who has provided information is in danger of intimidation or retaliation, the prosecuting attorney may delay identifying such informant witness until such informant witness actually testifies but in no event shall identification of a witness be delayed beyond arraignment without further order of the court after hearing and an opportunity of the defendant to be heard." 8 The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this statutory language to allow the State to endorse witnesses at any time unless "it will re | 2 | 2 |
State v. Pricegreen2 sentences2025If any witness is to testify and the prosecuting attorney believes the witness who has provided information is in danger of intimidation or retaliation, the prosecuting attorney may delay identifying such informant witness until such informant witness actually testifies but in no event shall identification of a witness be delayed beyond arraignment without further order of the court after hearing and an opportunity of the defendant to be heard." 8 The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this statutory language to allow the State to endorse witnesses at any time unless "it will re 2025If any witness is to testify and the prosecuting attorney believes the witness who has provided information is in danger of intimidation or retaliation, the prosecuting attorney may delay identifying such informant witness until such informant witness actually testifies but in no event shall identification of a witness be delayed beyond arraignment without further order of the court after hearing and an opportunity of the defendant to be heard." 8 The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this statutory language to allow the State to endorse witnesses at any time unless "it will re | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smith-Parkergreen2 sentences2024Accord State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 166 , 340 P.3d 485 (2014) ("'Jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after a hearing on a request to recall the jury.'"). 2024Accord State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 166 , 340 P.3d 485 (2014) ("'Jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after a hearing on a request to recall the jury.'"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Donaldsongreen2 sentences2018See State v. Donaldson , 279 Kan. 694 , 704, 112 P.3d 99 (2005). 2018See State v. Donaldson , 279 Kan. 694 , 704, 112 P.3d 99 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ruebke
green
2 sentences2021In State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 513 , 731 P.2d 842 (1987), our Supreme Court warned that jury recalls should not be undertaken lightly, stating the following: "Jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after a hearing on a request to recall the jury. 2021In State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 513 , 731 P.2d 842 (1987), our Supreme Court warned that jury recalls should not be undertaken lightly, stating the following: "Jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after a hearing on a request to recall the jury. | 3 | 2008–2021 |
In Re Estate of Keimig
green
2 sentences2026We simply cannot say there was no substantial evidence in support thereof and the finding must be approved." 215 Kan. at 873-74 . 2026We simply cannot say there was no substantial evidence in support thereof and the finding must be approved." 215 Kan. at 873-74 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. JH
green
1 sentence2013The court interpreted the statute to require that “[i]f the trial court after hearing revokes the juvenile sentence, the court is specifically directed to enforce imposition of the adult sentence previously ordered.” 40 Kan. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Martens
green
2 sentences2004State v. Martens, 274 Kan. 459, 471 , 54 P.3d 960 (2002). 2004State v. Martens, 274 Kan. 459, 471 , 54 P.3d 960 (2002). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Eastern Distributing Co., Inc. v. Flynn
green
2 sentences1996As authority for his position, he cites Eastern Distributing Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 673 , 567 P.2d 1371 (1977), where this court stated: ‘While the ultimate determination whether a legitimate interest subject to protection is shown may be a matter of law, the underlying facts are to be determined by the trial court after hearing the testimony presented.” Dr. Weber stresses that this court’s review of findings of fact made by a trial court is limited to whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, drawing all inferences in favor of the trial court’s findings, 1996As authority for his position, he cites Eastern Distributing Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 673 , 567 P.2d 1371 (1977), where this court stated: ‘While the ultimate determination whether a legitimate interest subject to protection is shown may be a matter of law, the underlying facts are to be determined by the trial court after hearing the testimony presented.” Dr. Weber stresses that this court’s review of findings of fact made by a trial court is limited to whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, drawing all inferences in favor of the trial court’s findings, | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Walters v. Hitchcock
green
2 sentences1985As we noted in Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31 , 697 P.2d 847 (1985): “Under this rule, jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after hearing on the need therefor. 1985As we noted in Walters v. Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31 , 697 P.2d 847 (1985): “Under this rule, jurors may be recalled for post-trial hearings only by order of the court after hearing on the need therefor. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Nobles
green
2 sentences1979The State in its brief relies upon United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 45 L.Ed.2d 141 , 95 S.Ct. 2160 (1975). 1979The State in its brief relies upon United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 45 L.Ed.2d 141 , 95 S.Ct. 2160 (1975). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Webb v. Globe Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1976In Webb v. Globe Construction Company, 213 Kan. 681 , 518 P. 2d 419 , the claimant’s principal contention on appeal was that the district court’s 32/2% award was based solely on testimony of functional disability when there was other testimony of permanent partial disability ranging from 25% to 75%. 1976In Webb v. Globe Construction Company, 213 Kan. 681 , 518 P. 2d 419 , the claimant’s principal contention on appeal was that the district court’s 32/2% award was based solely on testimony of functional disability when there was other testimony of permanent partial disability ranging from 25% to 75%. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Alseike v. Miller
green
2 sentences1969S. A. 60-214 (a) and Alseike v. Miller, 196 Kan. 547 , 412 P. 2d 1007 . 1969S. A. 60-214 (a) and Alseike v. Miller, 196 Kan. 547 , 412 P. 2d 1007 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State v. Nagle
neutral
2 sentences1969The rights of a state are not lost through laches, estoppel or inaction of public officials. ( In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 ; Kucera v. State, 160 Kan. 624 , 164 P.2d 115 ; and Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 Kan. 88 , 453 P.2d 46 .) The issue presented herein must be resolved by a construction of the various statutes touching the subject. 1969The rights of a state are not lost through laches, estoppel or inaction of public officials. ( In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 ; Kucera v. State, 160 Kan. 624 , 164 P.2d 115 ; and Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 Kan. 88 , 453 P.2d 46 .) The issue presented herein must be resolved by a construction of the various statutes touching the subject. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Kucera v. State
green
2 sentences1969The rights of a state are not lost through laches, estoppel or inaction of public officials. ( In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 ; Kucera v. State, 160 Kan. 624 , 164 P.2d 115 ; and Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 Kan. 88 , 453 P.2d 46 .) The issue presented herein must be resolved by a construction of the various statutes touching the subject. 1969The rights of a state are not lost through laches, estoppel or inaction of public officials. ( In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 ; Kucera v. State, 160 Kan. 624 , 164 P.2d 115 ; and Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 Kan. 88 , 453 P.2d 46 .) The issue presented herein must be resolved by a construction of the various statutes touching the subject. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1969The rights of a state are not lost through laches, estoppel or inaction of public officials. ( In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 ; Kucera v. State, 160 Kan. 624 , 164 P.2d 115 ; and Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 Kan. 88 , 453 P.2d 46 .) The issue presented herein must be resolved by a construction of the various statutes touching the subject. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Federal Land Bank v. Richardson
neutral
1 sentence1938(See Federal Land Bank v. Richardson, 146 Kan. 803 , 73 Pac. 1005 .) Such a hearing is not a trial such as requires the filing of a motion for a new trial in order to enable this court to consider the correctness of the result reached. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1930Plaintiff then employed his present counsel and from this decision appeal was taken to the supreme court and the appeal was decided in Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 126 Kan. 554 , 268 Pac. 810 . 1930Plaintiff then employed his present counsel and from this decision appeal was taken to the supreme court and the appeal was decided in Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 126 Kan. 554 , 268 Pac. 810 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.