pollution exclusion clause in Minnesota

1994Co., 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.App.1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992), in which this court held the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous.

1994Co., 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.App. 1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992), in which this court held the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous.

1994See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Servs.

1994See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Servs.

1993Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn.App.1988) (without exception, the cases which construe the pollution exclusion clause to preclude coverage involve: (1) deliberate disposition of potentially hazardous waste or produced substances; (2) widespread pollution; (3) multiple claimants; (4) damaging actions over an extended *798 period of time, usually in the regular course of business; and (5) discovery of the damage years after the polluting conduct), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1989). [1] In such situations, a pollution exclusion clause like that contained in the insurers' polici

1993Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn.App.1988) (without exception, the cases which construe the pollution exclusion clause to preclude coverage involve: (1) deliberate disposition of potentially hazardous waste or produced substances; (2) widespread pollution; (3) multiple claimants; (4) damaging actions over an extend ed period of time, usually in the regular course of business; and (5) discovery of the damage years after the polluting conduct), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1989). 1 In such situations, a pollution exclusion clause like that contained in the insurers’ policies app

1995See Anderson, 520 N.W.2d at 166 (Holtan, J., dissenting) (stating “[e]ven if there were misrepresentations, if the application of the pollution exclusion clause is clear * * * how can it be said that the Commissioner reasonably relied on the IRB explanation?

1995Co. of America, this court interpreted the word “sudden” within the pollution exclusion clause. 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn.1994).

1995Thus, in Board of Regents we concluded that the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous and barred coverage for any discharge that was not both sudden, meaning abrupt, 4 and accidental, meaning unexpected or unintended. 517 N.W.2d at 892 .

1993We do not decide whether the release of the contaminants from the landfill to the groundwater was "accidental." See Rosenkranz, supra, at 1268 (discussing cases disposed of upon determination that discharge was not sudden); see also Bureau of Engraving, 793 F.Supp. at 213 (absence of one or more of the factors listed in Grinnell does not mean that the pollution exclusion is inapplicable).

1993We do not decide whether the release of the contaminants from the landfill to the groundwater was "accidental." See Rosenkranz, supra, at 1268 (discussing cases disposed of upon determination that discharge was not sudden); see also Bureau of Engraving, 793 F.Supp. at 213 (absence of one or more of the factors listed in Grinnell does not mean that the pollution exclusion is inapplicable).

1993Co., 263 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn.1978). [5] This argument was accepted by the New York Court of Appeals in Rapid-American as one basis for finding the pollution exclusion clause inapplicable.

1993See Rathbun, 300 Minn. at 229 , 219 N.W.2d at 646 (defining material facts).

1993See Rathbun, 300 Minn, at 229, 219 N.W.2d at 646 (defining material facts).

1992See Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn.1978) (parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written agreement absent ambiguity or incompleteness); Pedersen v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 383 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn.App.1986) (extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to construe an insurance policy absent ambiguity in the policy language).

1992See, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solv. & Chem., 17 Ohio App.3d 127, 132 , 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1984) (the mere fact that the terms "sudden and accidental” are not defined in the insurance policy is itself enough to establish that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 745 , 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1990) ("The very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition of ‘sudden’ is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous.').

1992See, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solv. & Chem., 17 Ohio App.3d 127, 132 , 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1984) (the mere fact that the terms "sudden and accidental” are not defined in the insurance policy is itself enough to establish that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 745 , 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1990) ("The very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition of ‘sudden’ is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous.').

1992See, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solv. & Chem., 17 Ohio App.3d 127, 132 , 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1984) (the mere fact that the terms "sudden and accidental” are not defined in the insurance policy is itself enough to establish that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 745 , 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1990) ("The very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition of ‘sudden’ is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous.').

1992See, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solv. & Chem., 17 Ohio App.3d 127, 132 , 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1984) (the mere fact that the terms "sudden and accidental” are not defined in the insurance policy is itself enough to establish that the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 745 , 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1990) ("The very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition of ‘sudden’ is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous.').

1988See International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill.

1988See International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill.