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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Smithgreen2 sentences2017The Georgia Farm court determined that the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous and held that the “policy contains an absolute pollution exclusion clause which precludes recovery for bodily injury or property damage resulting from exposure to any pollutant.” Id. at 719 , 784 S.E.2d at 425 . 2017The Georgia Farm court determined that the pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous and held that the “policy contains an absolute pollution exclusion clause which precludes recovery for bodily injury or property damage resulting from exposure to any pollutant.” Id. at 719 , 784 S.E.2d at 425 . | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Feinberggreen2 sentences2017Liberty Mutual has moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Maryland courts follow the doctrine of lex loci contractus in choosing the applicable law, Cunningham v. Feinberg, 441 Md. 310, 326 , 107 A.3d 1194, 1204 (2015); Allstate Ins. 2017Liberty Mutual has moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Maryland courts follow the doctrine of lex loci contractus in choosing the applicable law, Cunningham v. Feinberg, 441 Md. 310, 326 , 107 A.3d 1194, 1204 (2015); Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Stoney Run Company v. Prudential-Lmi Commercial Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2006For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted: “[m]any courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that a pollution exclusion clause in a CGL insurance policy applies only to injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.” Kelliman, 197 F.3d at 1181 (citing over twenty state and federal cases to support its view); see also Stoney Run Company v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance Company, 47 F.3d 34 , 37 (2nd Cir.1995) (stating that “we believe that it is appropriate to construe the standard pollution exclusion clause in light of its general purpose, which is | 1 | 1 |
Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2006Conceding that carbon monoxide is a pollutant within the plain language of the pollution exclusion clause, the insured argued that “notwithstanding the literal language of the exclusion, the parties intended that it apply only to persistent industrial pollution of the environment, and not to an accident of the kind generally covered by a comprehensive business liability policy.” Bernhardt, 102 Md.App. at 50 , 648 A.2d at 1049 . 2006Conceding that carbon monoxide is a pollutant within the plain language of the pollution exclusion clause, the insured argued that “notwithstanding the literal language of the exclusion, the parties intended that it apply only to persistent industrial pollution of the environment, and not to an accident of the kind generally covered by a comprehensive business liability policy.” Bernhardt, 102 Md.App. at 50 , 648 A.2d at 1049 . | 1 | 1 |
Meridian Mutual Insurance Company v. Roslyn E. Kellman, Skender Bajrami, Individually and Doing Business as Kopliku Painting Companygreen2 sentences2006For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted: “[m]any courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that a pollution exclusion clause in a CGL insurance policy applies only to injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.” Kelliman, 197 F.3d at 1181 (citing over twenty state and federal cases to support its view); see also Stoney Run Company v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance Company, 47 F.3d 34 , 37 (2nd Cir.1995) (stating that “we believe that it is appropriate to construe the standard pollution exclusion clause in light of its general purpose, which is 2006The court concluded that “the total pollution exclusion clause at bar does not shield the insurer from liability for injuries caused by toxic substances that are still confined within the general area of their intended use.” Kellman, 197 F.3d at 1184. | 1 | 1 |
Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.green1 sentence2006See Meridian Mutual Insurance Company v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1999) (“State and federal courts are split on the issue of whether an insurance policy’s total pollution exclusion bars coverage for all injuries caused by contaminants, or whether the exclusion applies only to injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.”); Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Casualty Company, 871 F.Supp. 941, 943 (E.D.Mich.1994) (quoting Jeffrey W. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sullins v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2017In Sullins, we reviewed an insurance policy’s pollution exclusion clause. 340 Md. at 509 , 667 A.2d at 620 . 2017In Sullins, we reviewed an insurance policy’s pollution exclusion clause. 340 Md. at 509 , 667 A.2d at 620 . | 2 | 2006–2017 |
American Motorists Insurance v. ARTRA Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015In ARTRA Group, Inc., we turned to lex loci contractus when considering the validity and interpretation of a pollution exclusion clause in an insurance contract. 338 Md. at 565-66, 659 A.2d at 1297 . 2015In ARTRA Group, Inc., we turned to lex loci contractus when considering the validity and interpretation of a pollution exclusion clause in an insurance contract. 338 Md. at 565– 66, 659 A.2d at 1297 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ward v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2015In Ward , we relied on the doctrine to interpret a personal injury protection benefits provision of an automobile insurance contract. 328 Md. at 242 , 614 A.2d at 85 . 2015In Ward , we relied on the doctrine to interpret a personal injury protection benefits provision of an automobile insurance contract. 328 Md. at 242 , 614 A.2d at 85 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
National Electrical Manufacturers Association v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2006In National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance Company, 162 F.3d 821 (4th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the scope of a pollution exclusion in the specific context of manganese welding fumes. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Sylvester Bros. Development Co. v. Great Central Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1995The court held that “[u]nder the [insured’s] suggested approach, the ‘sudden and accidental’ exception essentially would swallow the ‘rule’ of the pollution exclusion clause that pollution is not covered.” Sylvester, 503 N.W.2d at 797 . 1995The court further held that “[t]here is no reason to engage in a release-by-release ‘microanalysis’ of whether each release was sudden when there has been a continuous pattern of pollution.” Sylvester, 503 N.W.2d at 798 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Artra Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance
green
2 sentences1995ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 740 , 642 A.2d at 902 . 1995ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 740 , 642 A.2d at 902 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1995Fund v. Westchester Fire, 976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.1992), said that: The terms “irritant” and “contaminant,” when viewed in isolation, are virtually boundless, for “there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some person or property.” Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
American Motorists Insurance v. General Host Corp.
green
1 sentence1995Both American Motorists and amicus curiae, Insurance Environmental Litigation Association (“IELA”), argue that the Court of Special Appeals’s approach to the duty to defend constitutes a “microanalysis” of “a long-term pattern of polluting activity in the ordinary course of business in search of a potentially ‘sudden’ discharge.” They further argue that such a microanalysis renders a pollution exclusion meaningless because “in every pollution case one can always isolate a specific and discrete moment in time when a release of a pollutant occurs or when a pollutant actually enters the environme | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1994ARTRA refers us to the case of Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois, construing a liability insurance contract containing a pollution exclusion unless the cause of the pollution was “sudden and accidental,” held that the term “sudden,” as used in that exclusion exception, is ambiguous. 1994ARTRA refers us to the case of Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois, construing a liability insurance contract containing a pollution exclusion unless the cause of the pollution was “sudden and accidental,” held that the term “sudden,” as used in that exclusion exception, is ambiguous. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance
green
2 sentences1994Relying on this Court’s decision in Bentz v. Mutual Fire, 83 Md.App. 524 , 575 A.2d 795 (1990), the lower court also ruled that the language of the contract, specifically the “sudden and acciden *740 tal” language of the pollution exclusion clause, was clear and unambiguous. 1994Relying on this Court’s decision in Bentz v. Mutual Fire, 83 Md.App. 524 , 575 A.2d 795 (1990), the lower court also ruled that the language of the contract, specifically the “sudden and acciden *740 tal” language of the pollution exclusion clause, was clear and unambiguous. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.