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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1994–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tri County Service Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence1998Co., 873 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.App. 1993) ("[V]irtually all courts in other jurisdictions which have considered such an exclusion have found that it precludes all coverage of any liability arising out of the release of pollutants."). *1138 We, too, agree that the pollution exclusion clause is clear and unambiguous. | 1 | 1 |
Protective National Insurance Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhavengreen2 sentences1995Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhaven, 438 Mich. 154 , 476 N.W.2d 374, 377 (1991) (emphasis added). 1995Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhaven, 438 Mich. 154 , 476 N.W.2d 374, 377 (1991) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Star Fire Coals, Inc.green1 sentence1994As expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the word sudden means abrupt and unexpected. [5] We reject Dimmitt's suggestion that the policy is ambiguous because the term accident is included both within the definition of occurrence and in the pollution exclusion provision. [6] We concur with the response to this *705 argument stated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1988): We do not find the pollution clause to be riddled with ambiguities despite the best efforts of Star Fire to create them. | 1 | 1 |
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurancegreen1 sentence1994The memorandum utterly obscures that distinction, and the conclusion is virtually inescapable that the memorandum's lack of clarity was deliberate. 629 A.2d at 851-53 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity
green
2 sentences1995This court affirmed the lower court's order granting partial summary judgment and relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp., 636 So.2d 700 (Fla.) [ Dimmitt I ], reversed on rehearing, 636 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1993), that found the term "sudden and accidental," as contained in the pollution exclusion clause, to be ambiguous as a matter of law. 1995This court affirmed the lower court's order granting partial summary judgment and relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp., 636 So.2d 700 (Fla.) [ Dimmitt I ], reversed on rehearing, 636 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1993), that found the term "sudden and accidental," as contained in the pollution exclusion clause, to be ambiguous as a matter of law. | 2 | 1994–1995 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen
green
1 sentence1998In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1986), this Court announced the rule to be followed in the interpretation of exclusionary clauses in insurance policies: [E]xclusionary provisions which are ambiguous or otherwise susceptible to more than one meaning must be construed in favor of the insured, since it is the insurer who usually drafts the policy. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Meehan v. Crowder
neutral
2 sentences1994Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1962); Meehan v. Crowder, 158 Fla. 361 , 28 So.2d 435 (1946). [6] Likewise, we also reject the dissenters' argument that the term "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause should be given the same interpretation as certain courts have construed the term in boiler and machinery policies. 1994Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1962); Meehan v. Crowder, 158 Fla. 361 , 28 So.2d 435 (1946). [6] Likewise, we also reject the dissenters' argument that the term "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause should be given the same interpretation as certain courts have construed the term in boiler and machinery policies. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd.
green
1 sentence1994CGL policies have been revised in pertinent part on three separate occasions: first in 1966, then again in the early 1970s and mid-1980s. [8] Just, 456 N.W.2d at 573-74 ; Brooke Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claims: Avoiding a Litigation Wasteland, 26 Tulsa L.J. 209 , 224 (1990). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sterling v. City of West Palm Beach
green
1 sentence1994The trial court relied upon Sterling v. City of West Palm Beach, 595 So.2d 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), in denying Farm Bureau's motion for directed verdict. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1994Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 689 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences1994In Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 412 Mass. 807 , 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992), the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed a case in which the damage at issue under the pollution exclusion clause was caused by a gradual leak. 1994In Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 412 Mass. 807 , 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992), the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed a case in which the damage at issue under the pollution exclusion clause was caused by a gradual leak. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Company
green
1 sentence1994Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1962); Meehan v. Crowder, 158 Fla. 361 , 28 So.2d 435 (1946). [6] Likewise, we also reject the dissenters' argument that the term "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause should be given the same interpretation as certain courts have construed the term in boiler and machinery policies. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.