pollution exclusion clause in Wisconsin

2014See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232-33 ; Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶30 ("everyday incidents [should not] be characterized as pollution."). ¶47 For example, a pollution exclusion clause would not bar coverage for harm that results from slipping on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano.

2014See, e.g., Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 235 (the insurance policy's definition of "pollutant" was ambiguous; thus, the landlord insured could recover for damage caused by carbon dioxide). (continued) 6 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa language of a standard pollution exclusion clause is "virtually boundless, for there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some person or property."6 Thus, this court has concluded that "[w]ithout some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd res

2014We concluded once the previously contained pollutant, lead, "begins to disperse, discharge, or escape from the containment of the painted surface, it falls within the plain language of the pollution exclusion clause." Id. at 130 . ¶ 38.

2014We concluded once the previously contained pollutant, lead, "begins to disperse, discharge, or escape from the containment of the painted surface, it falls within the plain language of the pollution exclusion clause." Id. at 130 . ¶38 Before coming to our conclusion, we consulted a non- legal dictionary to define contaminant and irritant.

2015A second case defining "pollutant," this time for purposes of a pollution exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy, is Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2012 WI 20 , 338 Wis. 2d 761 , 809 N.W.2d 529 . ¶ 53.

2015A second case defining "pollutant," this time for purposes of a pollution exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy, is Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2012 WI 20 , 338 Wis. 2d 761 , 809 N.W.2d 529 . ¶ 53.

1999Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1992), where the court said: Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results .

1999Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1992), where the court said: Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results.

2014See Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451 , 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (appellate courts need not consider issues not specifically raised on appeal). 6 No. 2012AP2521 ¶14 The insurers moved for summary and declaratory judgment.6 The circuit court agreed that the pollution exclusion clause applies to preclude coverage for alleged losses arising out of storage of septage and application of septage to farm fields that is alleged to have caused contamination of the water supply resulting in harm to the Preislers.

2014See Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451 , 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (appellate courts need not consider issues not specifically raised on appeal). 6 No. 2012AP2521 ¶14 The insurers moved for summary and declaratory judgment.6 The circuit court agreed that the pollution exclusion clause applies to preclude coverage for alleged losses arising out of storage of septage and application of septage to farm fields that is alleged to have caused contamination of the water supply resulting in harm to the Preislers.

1997See Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 Wis. 2d 64 , 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990).

1997See Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 158 Wis. 2d 64 , 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990).

2018Id. ¶ 85 After extensively canvassing persuasive case law authority and commentators, the court explained that the term "sudden and accidental" in an exception to a pollution exclusion clause in a liability insurance policy has been the subject of "substantial conflicting authority," with some authorities favoring the "abrupt or immediate" definition and others favoring the "unexpected and unintended" definition.

1996Fink concluded that "the accumulation of excessive concentrations of carbon dioxide provide sufficient factual foundation to conclude that the ventilation was inadequate and, as a result a variety of other air contaminants likely accumulated as well." (Emphasis added.) [5] In addition, the court held that the pollution exclusion clause was inapplicable despite the coverage preclusion for discharge, dispersal, release or escape which was "sudden and accidental." Citing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's definition of "sudden and accidental" to mean "unexpected and unintended," Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 7

2015Ins. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶ 37 , 360 Wis. 2d 67 , 857 N.W.2d 156 ; see also Preisler, 360 Wis. 2d 129, ¶¶ 4, 13 (reviewing "a pollution exclusion clause commonly found in commercial general liability (CGL) policies" that excludes from coverage "harm 'arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollutants"....'" and defines "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.

2014The majority opinion determines that there were "five unique occurrences" in this case: "[E]ach time there was 'property damage' to a unique well, there was an occurrence."2 In discussing the number of occurrences, the majority opinion contradicts itself and assumes facts not established in the summary judgment record. ¶82 Furthermore, the majority opinion's discussions of what constitutes an occurrence and of whether a substance is a pollutant are inconsistent with the court's approach to those issues in Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2014 WI 135 , ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___

2015Ins. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶ 37 , 360 Wis. 2d 67 , 857 N.W.2d 156 ; see also Preisler, 360 Wis. 2d 129, ¶¶ 4, 13 (reviewing "a pollution exclusion clause commonly found in commercial general liability (CGL) policies" that excludes from coverage "harm 'arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollutants"....'" and defines "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.

2015Ins. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶ 37 , 360 Wis. 2d 67 , 857 N.W.2d 156 ; see also Preisler, 360 Wis. 2d 129, ¶¶ 4, 13 (reviewing "a pollution exclusion clause commonly found in commercial general liability (CGL) policies" that excludes from coverage "harm 'arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollutants"....'" and defines "pollutants" as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.

1996Recently, we held that one form of a pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous because there were two reasonable interpretations of the clause. [1] In Beahm v. Pautsch, 180 Wis. 2d 574, 584 , 510 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Ct. App. 1993), we held that the clause could be read to exclude coverage for liability that accrues from the discharge of smoke into the atmosphere or it could be read to exclude coverage for liability where the discharged substance caused harm because of its toxic *420 nature.

1996Recently, we held that one form of a pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous because there were two reasonable interpretations of the clause. [1] In Beahm v. Pautsch, 180 Wis. 2d 574, 584 , 510 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Ct. App. 1993), we held that the clause could be read to exclude coverage for liability that accrues from the discharge of smoke into the atmosphere or it could be read to exclude coverage for liability where the discharged substance caused harm because of its toxic *420 nature.

1997Significantly, McFadden , which was also cited by Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 234 , 564 N.W.2d at 733 , limited the pollution-exclusion clause at issue both there and here to "industrial pollution." McFadden, 595 N.E.2d at 764 (emphasis added).

1997Significantly, McFadden , which was also cited by Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 234 , 564 N.W.2d at 733 , limited the pollution-exclusion clause at issue both there and here to "industrial pollution." McFadden, 595 N.E.2d at 764 (emphasis added).

1997Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 205 Wis. 2d 404, 410-12 , 556 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1996).

1997Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 205 Wis. 2d 404, 410-12 , 556 N.W.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1996).

2015See, e.g., id. at 875-76 ("Had the insurance industry candidly revealed the extent of the contraction in coverage intended by the pollution-exclusion clause, regulatory officials could have made informed judgments concerning the rate and coverage issues implicated by the clause, and both commercial and governmental insureds would have been aware that insurance coverage for environmental pollution would be sharply restricted ....

1999Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Oates, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 554. [8] Several state supreme courts have held that lead in paint does not fit unambiguously within the definition of "pollutant" in the pollution exclusion clause.

1993The Purpose of the Pollution Exclusion) (1991) (hereinafter Abraham). 2 Professor Abraham states that the insurance industry became aware, during the period following a Santa Barbara, California oil spill and passage by Congress of the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the Clean Water Act in 1972, of the exposure it might face under Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies. 3 Id. at 156.

1993In response to this concern, predecessors to the Insurance Services Office — the Insurance Rating Board and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau — drafted what became the pollution exclusion clause. 4 7&.The 1986 revision of the CGL pollution *583 exclusion clause was intended to clarify that the policy did not cover liability incurred by the insured for pollution damage, whether intended or accidental. 5 Id. at 160-63.