11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1997–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2006In Madison Construction Company v. The Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 557 Pa. 595 , 735 A.2d 100 (1999), the issue was whether a pollution exclusion clause in a policy of commercial general liability insurance relieved Harleysville of its duty to defend in a personal injury action. 2006In Madison Construction Company v. The Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 557 Pa. 595 , 735 A.2d 100 (1999), the issue was whether a pollution exclusion clause in a policy of commercial general liability insurance relieved Harleysville of its duty to defend in a personal injury action. | 3 | 6 |
Lower Paxon Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green2 sentences1999In Lower Paxton, our Court interpreted the phrase "sudden and accidental" in a pollution exclusion clause identical to that at issue in this case and determined that, because that clause was unambiguous on its face, the Court would not consider extrinsic evidence, such as the historical context in which that clause was approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. 557 A.2d at 402 n. 5. ¶ 12 Sunbeam argues that, even if the phrase "sudden and accidental" is patently unambiguous, as the trial court determined, extrinsic evidence nevertheless should have been considered to determine if any l 1999Sunbeam bases its arguments on certain principles of contract interpretation and the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions, which have interpreted the same pollution exclusion clause as that at issue in this case and have interpreted "sudden" to mean only "unexpected." ¶ 23 Rejecting Sunbeam's definition of "sudden," the trial court in this case was bound by this Court's decision in Lower Paxton, in which we determined that the natural, plain, and ordinary meaning of the word "sudden" included a "temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected." 557 A.2d | 2 | 2 |
Lititz Mutual Insurance v. Steelygreen2 sentences2001Co. v. *13 Steely, 746 A.2d 607 (Pa.Super.1999). [3] In Lititz, our Court found that the pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous and that lead-based paint is a pollutant. 2001Co. v. Steely, 746 A.2d 607 (Pa.Super.1999). 3 In Lititz, our Court found that the pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous and that lead-based paint is a pollutant. | 1 | 3 |
Lititz Mutual Insurance v. Steelygreen2 sentences2002See id. ¶ 13 We conclude accordingly, that Northside’s claim for defense and indemnity does not fall within the scope of the pollution exclusion clause in Northwestern’s policy. 2002The supreme court in Lititz agreed with this court that "the definition of pollutant’ in the pollution exclusion clause unambiguously encompasses lead-based paint.” Lititz, supra at -, 785 A.2d at 980 . | 1 | 2 |
Washington v. Baxtergreen2 sentences2001Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 441 , 719 A.2d 733, 737 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶ 6 HRIE presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether lead-based paint is a pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause; and (2) whether lead-based paint separating from a painted surface falls within the pollution exclusion clause meaning of discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants. 2001Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 441 , 719 A.2d 733, 737 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶ 6 HRIE presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether lead-based paint is a pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause; and (2) whether lead-based paint separating from a painted surface falls within the pollution exclusion clause meaning of discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants. | 1 | 1 |
Byrd Ex Rel. Byrd v. Blumenreichgreen2 sentences2001See Byrd v. Blumenreich, 317 N.J.Super. 496 , 722 A.2d 598, 600 (1999) (collecting cases); Danbury Ins. 2001See Byrd v. Blumenreich, 317 N.J.Super. 496 , 722 A.2d 598, 600 (1999) (collecting cases); Danbury Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1999See Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249 , 256 n. 6, 721 A.2d 43 , 46 n. 6 (1998) (finding that concept of standing is that person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not `aggrieved' thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge). [3] We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court's discussion and analysis of the issues in Madison. [4] We note that the question before us is whether the pollution exclusion clause, contained in the insurance contract en | 1 | 1 |
Milne v. Crossettgreen1 sentence1999See Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249 , 256 n. 6, 721 A.2d 43 , 46 n. 6 (1998) (finding that concept of standing is that person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not `aggrieved' thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge). [3] We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court's discussion and analysis of the issues in Madison. [4] We note that the question before us is whether the pollution exclusion clause, contained in the insurance contract en | 1 | 1 |
West American Insurance Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Incgreen2 sentences1999Id. at 324 , 409 S.E.2d at 699 (footnote excluded). 1999Id. at 324 , 409 S.E.2d at 699 (footnote excluded). | 1 | 1 |
O'Brien Energy Systems, Inc. v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS'INS. CO.green2 sentences1997Plaintiffs recognize that at this time they cannot recover in this court by arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the pollution exclusion clause permits an interpretation which excludes coverage only in cases of intentional pollution — i.e., where the property damage was either expected or intended by the insured. 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently ruled that this standard pollution exclusion bars coverage for “any unintentional release or dispersal of pollution that occurs gradually over time”; there is coverage only where a discharge is “both sudden, mea 1997Plaintiffs recognize that at this time they cannot recover in this court by arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the pollution exclusion clause permits an interpretation which excludes coverage only in cases of intentional pollution — i.e., where the property damage was either expected or intended by the insured. 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently ruled that this standard pollution exclusion bars coverage for “any unintentional release or dispersal of pollution that occurs gradually over time”; there is coverage only where a discharge is “both sudden, mea | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riccio v. American Republic Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Id. ¶ 14 Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting certain words in a pollution exclusion clause similar to that involved in this case, emphasized that the “polestar” of insurance contract interpretation “is the language of the ... policy.” Madison Constr. 1999Id. ¶ 14 Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting certain words in a pollution exclusion clause similar to that involved in this case, emphasized that the "polestar" of insurance contract interpretation "is the language of the ... policy." Madison Constr. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass'n
green
2 sentences1999The court’s only aim, as noted earlier, must be “to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument....” 7 Gene & Harvey, 512 Pa. at 426 , 517 A.2d at 913 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind, 503 Pa. at 305 , 469 A.2d at 566 ) (emphasis added). 1999The court’s only aim, as noted earlier, must be “to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument....” 7 Gene & Harvey, 512 Pa. at 426 , 517 A.2d at 913 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind, 503 Pa. at 305 , 469 A.2d at 566 ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1999We conclude, as did the en banc Superior Court, 451 Pa.Super. 136 , 678 A.2d 802 , that the pollution exclusion clause operates to bar coverage in the present case, and therefore affirm. 1999We conclude, as did the en banc Superior Court, 451 Pa.Super. 136 , 678 A.2d 802 , that the pollution exclusion clause operates to bar coverage in the present case, and therefore affirm. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Id. 1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance
green
2 sentences1999The court’s only aim, as noted earlier, must be “to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument....” 7 Gene & Harvey, 512 Pa. at 426 , 517 A.2d at 913 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind, 503 Pa. at 305 , 469 A.2d at 566 ) (emphasis added). 1999The court’s only aim, as noted earlier, must be “to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument....” 7 Gene & Harvey, 512 Pa. at 426 , 517 A.2d at 913 (quoting Standard Venetian Blind, 503 Pa. at 305 , 469 A.2d at 566 ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance
green
2 sentences1997Plaintiffs recognize that at this time they cannot recover in this court by arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the pollution exclusion clause permits an interpretation which excludes coverage only in cases of intentional pollution — i.e., where the property damage was either expected or intended by the insured. 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently ruled that this standard pollution exclusion bars coverage for “any unintentional release or dispersal of pollution that occurs gradually over time”; there is coverage only where a discharge is “both sudden, mea 1997Plaintiffs recognize that at this time they cannot recover in this court by arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the pollution exclusion clause permits an interpretation which excludes coverage only in cases of intentional pollution — i.e., where the property damage was either expected or intended by the insured. 2 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently ruled that this standard pollution exclusion bars coverage for “any unintentional release or dispersal of pollution that occurs gradually over time”; there is coverage only where a discharge is “both sudden, mea | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings Inc., supra at 67, 563 A.2d at 1187 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.