pollution exclusion clause in Connecticut

2017To answer this question, the court began by reviewing the plain language of each policy provision and looked to three sources to construe its meaning: (1) dictionary definitions of the ordinary meaning of "pollutant" and related contract terms; id., at 772 , 653 A.2d 122 ; (2) statutory definitions of these terms; id., at 773 , 653 A.2d 122 ; and (3) decisions from courts in other jurisdictions that addressed the question of whether a fuel oil spill constitutes pollution for purposes of a pollution exclusion clause.

2017To answer this question, the court began by reviewing the plain language of each policy provision and looked to three sources to construe its meaning: (1) dictionary definitions of the ordinary meaning of "pollutant" and related contract terms; id., at 772 , 653 A.2d 122 ; (2) statutory definitions of these terms; id., at 773 , 653 A.2d 122 ; and (3) decisions from courts in other jurisdictions that addressed the question of whether a fuel oil spill constitutes pollution for purposes of a pollution exclusion clause.

1998“The reach of the pollution exclusion clause must be circumscribed by reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of coverage be reduced to a dead letter.” Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 233 , 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 6 *556 Many courts have concluded that lead paint on the surfaces of a residence is not unambiguously a pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses.

1998“The reach of the pollution exclusion clause must be circumscribed by reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of coverage be reduced to a dead letter.” Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 233 , 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997). 6 *556 Many courts have concluded that lead paint on the surfaces of a residence is not unambiguously a pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses.

2017Co. , 351 N.C. 293 , 303, 524 S.E.2d 558 (2000). 75 Even if we were to conclude that asbestos is an irritant within the scope of the policy exclusion, we still hold that the pollution exclusion does not bar coverage pursuant to the dispersal clause.

2017Co. , 351 N.C. 293 , 303, 524 S.E.2d 558 (2000). 75 Even if we were to conclude that asbestos is an irritant within the scope of the policy exclusion, we still hold that the pollution exclusion does not bar coverage pursuant to the dispersal clause.

2017Conn. 2002) ( Yale ), the federal District Court interpreted Heyman more broadly to mean that a pollution exclusion clause bars coverage for any harm arising from the inhalation of any substance that satisfies the general dictionary definition of a "pollutant," "irritant," or "contaminant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 421-22 .

2017Id., at 422-23 .

2002In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 252 Conn. 774 , 750 A.2d 1051 (2000), our decision was limited to whether New York or Washington law should apply in the trial court’s interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause.

2002In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 252 Conn. 774 , 750 A.2d 1051 (2000), our decision was limited to whether New York or Washington law should apply in the trial court’s interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause.

1998That interest at heart reflects a view that contracting parties are in the best position to ascertain their own needs and wants and that Pennsylvania will encourage a secure commercial environment if it enforces commercial agreements entered into between private parties as written but stays neutral on the substance of those agreements. 66 F.3d at 657 .

1998Co. v. Bourbeau , 49 F.3d 786 , 789 (1st Cir. 1995), adopted a similar rationale when it distinguished the circumstances of McFadden — "personal injury caused by the presence of lead paint in a household" — from the case before it — "injury to property caused by the alleged negligent discharge of lead paint onto property" — stating: "The latter is a classic example of pollution — the discharging of a harmful substance onto land — while the former is demonstrably not.

1998As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals of New York in Northville Industries , "[a]pplying the temporal element of sudden — as an abrupt happenstance — in the pollution exclusion clause exception also conforms to the common sense meaning of the term and the reasonable expectations of a business person." Northville Industries Corp. , 679 N.E.2d at 1048 . (emphasis in original).

1995It is true that courts have found summary judgment inappropriate where the pollution exclusion clause is before a court, Outboard Marine v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 607 N.E.2d 1204 , 1222 (Ill, 1992), Joy Technologies v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 421 S.E.2d 493 , 500 (W.Va, 1992), Mapco Alaska Petroleum v. Central National Insurance Co., 795 F. Sup. 941 , 947 (D.Alaska, 1991).

1995Since I believe such an interpretation CT Page 8617 emasculates the pollution exclusion clause and makes it mere surplusage to the occurrence based right to coverage, I conclude that based on the facts presented here summary judgment can be rendered. (5) The plaintiff argues that Aetna assumed a duty to defend Linemaster against personal injury claims sustained by a person or organization and arising out of Linemaster's "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy." Linemaster argues that EPA and DEP allegations that Linemaster contaminated the groundwater an

1995Since I believe such an interpretation CT Page 8617 emasculates the pollution exclusion clause and makes it mere surplusage to the occurrence based right to coverage, I conclude that based on the facts presented here summary judgment can be rendered. (5) The plaintiff argues that Aetna assumed a duty to defend Linemaster against personal injury claims sustained by a person or organization and arising out of Linemaster's "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy." Linemaster argues that EPA and DEP allegations that Linemaster contaminated the groundwater an

1995Reliance on the personal injury clause or endorsement would also have an added advantage for Linemaster since Titan Holdings, supra at page 270 also held the pollution exclusion clause does not affect coverage under the personal injury clause and Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 915 F.2d 306 , 312 (CA7, 1990) held that there is no "occurrence" requirement under this clause.

1995Reliance on the personal injury clause or endorsement would also have an added advantage for Linemaster since Titan Holdings, supra at page 270 also held the pollution exclusion clause does not affect coverage under the personal injury clause and Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 915 F.2d 306 , 312 (CA7, 1990) held that there is no "occurrence" requirement under this clause.

1995It relies heavily on New Castle County v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162 , 1192-1199 (CA3, 1991) notes that court defined "sudden" to mean "unexpected" then goes on to say that "to avoid rendering the term `accidental' mere surplusage by virtue of the court's interpretation of the word `sudden' as meaning `unexpected', the third circuit further held the term accidental meant `unintended'", p. 1411.

1995Linemaster is certainly correct in asserting that under New York law an insurer "is deemed as a matter of law to have intended to waive a defense to coverage where other defenses are asserted and where the insurer possesses sufficient knowledge (actual or constructive) of the circumstances CT Page 8623 regarding the unasserted defense," State of N.Y. v. Amro Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 , 1431 (CA2, 1991) (waiver of late notice defense).

1995West v. Board of Commissioners, supra, 591 So. 2d 1361 .

1995It is true that courts have found summary judgment inappropriate where the pollution exclusion clause is before a court, Outboard Marine v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 607 N.E.2d 1204 , 1222 (Ill, 1992), Joy Technologies v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 421 S.E.2d 493 , 500 (W.Va, 1992), Mapco Alaska Petroleum v. Central National Insurance Co., 795 F. Sup. 941 , 947 (D.Alaska, 1991).