mode analysis in Missouri

1914If, however, the legal propositions they contain are correct (and this is not disputed), and defendant’s theory was properly presented to the jury in their own instructions, this mode of instruction would not furnish cause for reversal. [Owens v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 169 ; Burlington First Nat.

1890Owen v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 169 ; Burlington First Nat.

1906Such a mode of inquiry was improper, because it furnished no accurate standard for estimating the defendant’s damages, and was likely to lead to the introduction of many collateral issues. [Mayor of Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369 .]” After a most careful consideration of the rule announced by Mr. Lewis in his treatise upon the law of Eminent Domain, that testimony as to what was paid by the party who seeks to condemn property to other parties for lands to be used in connection with the same purpose for which the land sought to he appropriated was to he used, Is inadmissible in the ascertainment

1878Mayor of Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369 . 3 __. _. evidence.

2020The majority’s review of K.C.’s testimony has left “‘the mind of the court clouded with doubt.’” Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 211 (quoting Tevis, 136 S.W. at 341 ).

2020The majority’s review of K.C.’s testimony has left “‘the mind of the court clouded with doubt.’” Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 211 (quoting Tevis, 136 S.W. at 341 ).

1992In determining whether discrimination can be justified, courts should not rely “solely on the mode of analysis developed in ... equal protection cases_ ‘[Those decisions] are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved’ because ‘the [federal] Government’s interests must be weighed in the balance.’ ” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. at 1508 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 905 , quoting Phillips Chemical, 361 U.S. at 385 , 80 S.Ct. at 480 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 390-91 . 1 Rather than applying an equal protection mode of analysis to an intergovernmental tax immunity case,

1992In determining whether discrimination can be justified, courts should not rely “solely on the mode of analysis developed in ... equal protection cases_ ‘[Those decisions] are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved’ because ‘the [federal] Government’s interests must be weighed in the balance.’ ” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. at 1508 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 905 , quoting Phillips Chemical, 361 U.S. at 385 , 80 S.Ct. at 480 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 390-91 . 1 Rather than applying an equal protection mode of analysis to an intergovernmental tax immunity case,

1992In determining whether discrimination can be justified, courts should not rely “solely on the mode of analysis developed in ... equal protection cases_ ‘[Those decisions] are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved’ because ‘the [federal] Government’s interests must be weighed in the balance.’ ” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. at 1508 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 905 , quoting Phillips Chemical, 361 U.S. at 385 , 80 S.Ct. at 480 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 390-91 . 1 Rather than applying an equal protection mode of analysis to an intergovernmental tax immunity case,

1992In determining whether discrimination can be justified, courts should not rely “solely on the mode of analysis developed in ... equal protection cases_ ‘[Those decisions] are not necessarily controlling where problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved’ because ‘the [federal] Government’s interests must be weighed in the balance.’ ” Davis, 489 U.S. at 816 , 109 S.Ct. at 1508 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 905 , quoting Phillips Chemical, 361 U.S. at 385 , 80 S.Ct. at 480 , 4 L.Ed.2d at 390-91 . 1 Rather than applying an equal protection mode of analysis to an intergovernmental tax immunity case,

1992However, as the Kansas Supreme Court observed in Barker v. State, 249 Kan. 186 , 815 P.2d 46 (1991), neither Davis nor Phillips Chemical provides further guidance about how to determine whether the inconsistent tax treatment is “directly related to, and justified by, ‘significant differences between the two classes.’ ” 815 P.2d at 52 .

1992However, as the Kansas Supreme Court observed in Barker v. State, 249 Kan. 186 , 815 P.2d 46 (1991), neither Davis nor Phillips Chemical provides further guidance about how to determine whether the inconsistent tax treatment is “directly related to, and justified by, ‘significant differences between the two classes.’ ” 815 P.2d at 52 .

1986In the instant case, in assessing the evidence on the issue whether the crossing was unusually dangerous, we are guided by what we perceive to be the mode of analysis employed in Jenkins, 322 S.W.2d 788 .

1986In the instant case, in assessing the evidence on the issue whether the crossing was unusually dangerous, we are guided by what we perceive to be the mode of analysis employed in Jenkins, 322 S.W.2d 788 .

1974In a concurring opinion filed in Flood, supra, 476 S.W.2d at 535-537 , and in the first Colbert case, Colbert v. State, 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo.1972), Judge Donnelly suggested a mode of inquiry into the vol-untariness of a plea of guilty, noting that the procedure suggested would probably insulate the guilty plea against collateral attack.

1974In a concurring opinion filed in Flood, supra, 476 S.W.2d at 535-537 , and in the first Colbert case, Colbert v. State, 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo.1972), Judge Donnelly suggested a mode of inquiry into the vol-untariness of a plea of guilty, noting that the procedure suggested would probably insulate the guilty plea against collateral attack.

1974In a concurring opinion filed in Flood, supra, 476 S.W.2d at 535-537 , and in the first Colbert case, Colbert v. State, 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo.1972), Judge Donnelly suggested a mode of inquiry into the vol-untariness of a plea of guilty, noting that the procedure suggested would probably insulate the guilty plea against collateral attack.

1967By way of analogy, see State v. McClinton, Banc, Mo., 418 S.W.2d 55 , where, in a misdemeanor case, the Court recognized the legislative control over the mode of waiver in the absence of constitutional restrictions; and the Court held invalid a part of Rule 26.01 of this Court insofar as applicable to misdemeanors, because it was contrary to Sections 546.050 and 543.200.

1914Bank v. Hatch, 98 Mo. 376 ; Dougherty v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 647 .] ” And in Dougherty v. Railroad Co., 97 Mo. 647 , l. c. 661, this court said: “The fifth given for plaintiff is complained of for the reason that it ignores the contributory negligence of plaintiff, and authorizes and directs a verdict for plaintiff, without regard thereto.

1914Bank v. Hatch, 98 Mo. 376 ; Dougherty v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 647 .] ” And in Dougherty v. Railroad Co., 97 Mo. 647 , l. c. 661, this court said: “The fifth given for plaintiff is complained of for the reason that it ignores the contributory negligence of plaintiff, and authorizes and directs a verdict for plaintiff, without regard thereto.

1914Bank v. Hatch, 98 Mo. 376 ; Dougherty v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 647 .] ” And in Dougherty v. Railroad Co., 97 Mo. 647 , l. c. 661, this court said: “The fifth given for plaintiff is complained of for the reason that it ignores the contributory negligence of plaintiff, and authorizes and directs a verdict for plaintiff, without regard thereto.

1902Stephens v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 207 ; Flynt v. Railway, 38 Mo. App. (K.

1899Co., 132 Mo. 583 .] In treating of this subject in 1 Joyce on Insurance, sec. 439, it is said: “We deduce, however, the rale, that the tendency of the weight of -authority at the present day is against making restrictions in the policy upon an agent’s authority conclusive upon the assured and that the company, or any agent with general or unlimited powers, clothed with an actual or apparent authorization, may either orally, or in writing, waive any written or printed condition in the policy, notwithstanding such restrictions, and many oases apply this rule, even though the policy provides that

1889Owens v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 170 ; Reilly v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 600 ; Hoenschen v. O' Bannon, 56 Mo. 289 .

1889Owens v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 170 ; Reilly v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 600 ; Hoenschen v. O' Bannon, 56 Mo. 289 .