98 California opinions name it 3 courts 1899–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Comm. v. CTY OF LOS ANGELESgreen2 sentences2024(Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 , 514–515 (Topanga).) This findings requirement “serves to conduce the administrative body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions.” (Id. at p. 516.) Further, the “findings enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.” (Ibid.; see also Oduyale v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy (2019) 41 Cal.App. 2023Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 .) Rather, the findings need only “‘enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’” (Midstate Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 888 ; see also Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515-516 .) California courts have consistently recognized that in reviewing administrative findings, a court is not limited to the four corners of the findings themselves and may supplement these findings with relevant references or oral statements on the record. | 9 | 22 |
Swars v. Council of City of Vallejogreen2 sentences1992(See California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 274 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 868 , 379 P.2d 324 ]; Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 871 [ 206 P.2d 355 ].)” (11 Cal.3d at pp. 515-516, fn. omitted.) Because the action of the City Council was adjudicatory in nature, it was required to make specific findings within the meaning of section 21676, and *1393 those findings were further required to meet the standards set forth in Topanga. 1992(See California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 274 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 868 , 379 P.2d 324 ]; Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 871 [ 206 P.2d 355 ].)” (11 Cal.3d at pp. 515-516, fn. omitted.) Because the action of the City Council was adjudicatory in nature, it was required to make specific findings within the meaning of section 21676, and *1393 those findings were further required to meet the standards set forth in Topanga. | 4 | 5 |
California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen2 sentences1992(See California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 274 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 868 , 379 P.2d 324 ]; Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 871 [ 206 P.2d 355 ].)” (11 Cal.3d at pp. 515-516, fn. omitted.) Because the action of the City Council was adjudicatory in nature, it was required to make specific findings within the meaning of section 21676, and *1393 those findings were further required to meet the standards set forth in Topanga. 1992(See California Motor Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 270, 274 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 868 , 379 P.2d 324 ]; Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 871 [ 206 P.2d 355 ].)” (11 Cal.3d at pp. 515-516, fn. omitted.) Because the action of the City Council was adjudicatory in nature, it was required to make specific findings within the meaning of section 21676, and *1393 those findings were further required to meet the standards set forth in Topanga. | 4 | 5 |
Midstate Theatres, Inc. v. County of Stanislausgreen2 sentences2023Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 .) Rather, the findings need only “‘enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’” (Midstate Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 888 ; see also Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515-516 .) California courts have consistently recognized that in reviewing administrative findings, a court is not limited to the four corners of the findings themselves and may supplement these findings with relevant references or oral statements on the record. 2023Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 .) Rather, the findings need only “‘enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’” (Midstate Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 888 ; see also Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515-516 .) California courts have consistently recognized that in reviewing administrative findings, a court is not limited to the four corners of the findings themselves and may supplement these findings with relevant references or oral statements on the record. | 3 | 6 |
Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co.green2 sentences1977We do not approve of the language in Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 626, 639 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 354 ], and Ames v. City of Pasadena (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [ 334 P.2d 653 ], which endorses the practice of setting forth findings solely in the language of the applicable legislation.” 3 As stated in 56 Cal.Jur.2d, Zoning, section 188, page 70: “A variance, within the meaning of zoning and planning laws and ordinances, is a type of exception from the terms or application of such enactments, authorizing the owner to use his property in a manner different from the use or use 1977We do not approve of the language in Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 626, 639 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 354 ], and Ames v. City of Pasadena (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [ 334 P.2d 653 ], which endorses the practice of setting forth findings solely in the language of the applicable legislation.” 3 As stated in 56 Cal.Jur.2d, Zoning, section 188, page 70: “A variance, within the meaning of zoning and planning laws and ordinances, is a type of exception from the terms or application of such enactments, authorizing the owner to use his property in a manner different from the use or use | 3 | 3 |
Ames v. City of Pasadenagreen2 sentences1977We do not approve of the language in Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 626, 639 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 354 ], and Ames v. City of Pasadena (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [ 334 P.2d 653 ], which endorses the practice of setting forth findings solely in the language of the applicable legislation.” 3 As stated in 56 Cal.Jur.2d, Zoning, section 188, page 70: “A variance, within the meaning of zoning and planning laws and ordinances, is a type of exception from the terms or application of such enactments, authorizing the owner to use his property in a manner different from the use or use 1977We do not approve of the language in Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 626, 639 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 354 ], and Ames v. City of Pasadena (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [ 334 P.2d 653 ], which endorses the practice of setting forth findings solely in the language of the applicable legislation.” 3 As stated in 56 Cal.Jur.2d, Zoning, section 188, page 70: “A variance, within the meaning of zoning and planning laws and ordinances, is a type of exception from the terms or application of such enactments, authorizing the owner to use his property in a manner different from the use or use | 3 | 3 |
Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protectiongreen2 sentences2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, | 2 | 3 |
Mark v. Spencergreen2 sentences2015Government Code section 68081, however, only requires rehearing when an appellate court “renders a decision in a proceeding . . . based upon an issue which was not proposed or briefed by any party to the proceeding.” “The parties do not ‘have a right under section 68081 to submit supplemental briefs or be granted a rehearing each time an appellate court relies upon authority or employs a mode of analysis that was not briefed by the parties.’” (Mark v. 6 Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 228, fn. 4 .) Public Law 280’s application to this case is not an issue on which we based the opinion. 2015Government Code section 68081, however, only requires rehearing when an appellate court “renders a decision in a proceeding . . . based upon an issue which was not proposed or briefed by any party to the proceeding.” “The parties do not ‘have a right under section 68081 to submit supplemental briefs or be granted a rehearing each time an appellate court relies upon authority or employs a mode of analysis that was not briefed by the parties.’” (Mark v. 6 Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 228, fn. 4 .) Public Law 280’s application to this case is not an issue on which we based the opinion. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Hamiltongreen2 sentences2004(E.g., In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 ( Hamilton ).) [13] As the Court of Appeal dissent suggested, the trial court's mode of analysis, and particularly its use of terms, did not precisely adhere to the two-pronged test we set forth in Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 , for determining whether a juror's improper receipt of extraneous material gives rise to a substantial likelihood of actual bias. 2004(E.g., In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 ( Hamilton ).) [13] As the Court of Appeal dissent suggested, the trial court's mode of analysis, and particularly its use of terms, did not precisely adhere to the two-pronged test we set forth in Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 , for determining whether a juror's improper receipt of extraneous material gives rise to a substantial likelihood of actual bias. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Alicegreen2 sentences2026The parties need only have been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the fact that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the protections of section 68081.” (People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 679 , italics added.) The theory highlighted by Platinum Entities was fairly included within the issues raised by their opening brief. 2025The parties need only have been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the fact that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the protections of section 68081.” (People v. Alice, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 679 .) 5 This oral acknowledgment complies with a lawyer’s duty “to correct a false statement of material fact … previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” (Cal. Rules Prof. | 1 | 5 |
Filmon.Com. Inc. v. Doubleverify Inc.green2 sentences2026Both were decided before FilmOn, and the Supreme Court cited them in that case as examples of what not to do, finding their “focus on discerning a single topic of speech is less than satisfying.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149 .) It then went on to articulate its two-part test in order “to steer courts away from this mode of analysis.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1249.) 20 Boutique’s limited-audience argument also disregards that the article was posted online and therefore was, and remains, available to the general public. 2024(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140 [the audience and the purpose of the speech are pertinent factors].) The trial court’s ruling and Nelson’s respondent’s brief focus on characterizing Bannon’s statements as “personal 8 grievance[s]” motivated by “revenge.”2 This is precisely the mode of analysis the Court in FilmOn intended to combat with its two- part test. | 1 | 2 |
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.green2 sentences2025Because of that direct link, this case implicates the central concern of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an 16 essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification the value of the property.” (Id. at p. 614, fn. omitted.) The court further explained that “when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as 2015(See Koontz, supra, at pp. - [186 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-714] [“[T]he demand for money at issue here did ‘operate upon ... an identified property interest’ by directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment. [Citation.] In this case ... the monetary obligation burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.”]; id. at p.__ [186 L.Ed.2d at p. 714] [“when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is the proper mo | 1 | 2 |
Raven v. Deukmejiangreen2 sentences2024(See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 , 186–187; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 , 260–261; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 , 891–892; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 , 349–355 (Raven); Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 506–512; Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016 , 1046–1047; Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 440– 457.) The quantitative aspect of the inquiry has become less significant since the adoption of the single-subject rule in 1948, the year we decided McFadden. 2009(See also Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, 355 [contrasting a proposed change to art. | 1 | 2 |
People v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2016In McKinnon, the defendant based his argument that circumstantial evidence was ―central to the prosecution‘s case,‖ such that a circumstantial evidence instruction should have been given, on ―the ‗quality‘ of the evidence,‖ asserting that a finding of substantial reliance is appropriate when ―the quality of the direct evidence is weak, and the quality of the circumstantial evidence is strong.‖ (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 676 & fn. 40.) We rejected that argument, finding ―no persuasive authority for our consideration of [the quality of the evidence] in analyzing whether an instruction on 2015(Id. at p. 676, fn. 40.) Adopting the mode of analysis we rejected in McKinnon , the majority in essence concludes that the prosecution substantially relied on Sergeant Valdemar’s testimony because “the quality of [that] circumstantial evidence is strong” and “the quality of the direct evidence”—defendant’s confession and the eyewitness testimony—“is weak” as to the duration of the watching and waiting. ( McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 676, fn. 40.) Thus, the majority’s reasoning is not only factually inconsistent with the record, it is analytically contrary to our recent precedent. 2 The m | 1 | 2 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences2007(Id. at p. 986.) To resolve this issue, the court applied the mode of analysis set out in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 640 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 ] (Lassiter). 2007(Id. at p. 986.) To resolve this issue, the court applied the mode of analysis set out in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 640 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 ] (Lassiter). | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Irvingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Solisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| American Funeral Concepts v. Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reading School District v. Department of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Boyettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farr v. County of Nevada
green
2 sentences2019In its written order, the court stated section 5152 was not applicable (without further comment) and section 1611.6 did not apply because "the Board's findings 'include[d] all legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate decision' such that [the court] is 'able to trace and adequately examine the Board's mode of analysis.' [ ( ] Farr v. County of Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669 , 686 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ].[ ) ]" Silverado's timely appeal ensued. 2019In its written order, the court stated section 5152 was not applicable (without further comment) and section 1611.6 did not apply because "the Board's findings 'include[d] all legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate decision' such that [the court] is 'able to trace and adequately examine the Board's mode of analysis.' [ ( ] Farr v. County of Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669 , 686 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ].[ ) ]" Silverado's timely appeal ensued. | 6 | 2013–2019 |
County of Amador v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences2023(See County of Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 205, 219 ; Harris v. City of Costa Mesa (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 .) Here, the Board’s rulings and statements during the hearing demonstrate why it excluded pre-lien sales evidence, and that Paramount’s evidence of sales made years after the lien date was, at best, deemed marginally relevant. 2023(See County of Amador v. State 26 Bd. of Equalization (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 205, 219 ; Harris v. City of Costa Mesa (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 .) Here, the Board’s rulings and statements during the hearing demonstrate why it excluded pre-lien sales evidence, and that Paramount’s evidence of sales made years after the lien date was, at best, deemed marginally relevant. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
McMillan v. American General Finance Corp.
green
2 sentences2023Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 .) Rather, the findings need only “‘enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’” (Midstate Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 888 ; see also Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515-516 .) California courts have consistently recognized that in reviewing administrative findings, a court is not limited to 26 the four corners of the findings themselves and may supplement these findings with relevant references or oral statements on the record. 2023Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 184 .) Rather, the findings need only “‘enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’” (Midstate Theatres, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 888 ; see also Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515-516 .) California courts have consistently recognized that in reviewing administrative findings, a court is not limited to the four corners of the findings themselves and may supplement these findings with relevant references or oral statements on the record. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Harris v. City of Costa Mesa
green
2 sentences2023(See County of Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 205, 219 ; Harris v. City of Costa Mesa (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 .) Here, the Board’s rulings and statements during the hearing demonstrate why it excluded pre-lien sales evidence, and that Paramount’s evidence of sales made years after the lien date was, at best, deemed marginally relevant. 2023(See County of Amador v. State 26 Bd. of Equalization (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 205, 219 ; Harris v. City of Costa Mesa (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 .) Here, the Board’s rulings and statements during the hearing demonstrate why it excluded pre-lien sales evidence, and that Paramount’s evidence of sales made years after the lien date was, at best, deemed marginally relevant. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. California
green
2 sentences2022(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 170 .) For cases tried before Johnson v. California, we have “adopted a mode of analysis under which, rather than accord the usual deference to the trial court’s no-prima-facie case determination, we ‘review the record independently to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a prohibited discriminatory basis.’ ” (People v. Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 428–429.) We apply that analytical approach here and consider “ ‘all relevant circumstances’ ” in doing so. 2019“The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers” — not hypothesized answers — “to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.” (Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172 .) If an inference of bias is to be dispelled, it is up to the prosecutor to dispel it by stating credible, race-neutral reasons 2 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Liu, J., dissenting for the strikes. | 2 | 2019–2022 |
People v. Buza
green
2 sentences2021It suffices to note that many of defendant’s assertions about the operation of the expungement process are, at this point, necessarily speculative.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 683 .) Concerning the search and seizure provision under article I, section 13 of our state’s Constitution, the Buza court evaluated that state constitutional claim “by employing the same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King” to analyze the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment. 2021It suffices to note that many of defendant’s assertions about the operation of the expungement process are, at this point, necessarily speculative.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 683 .) Concerning the search and seizure provision under article I, section 13 of our state’s Constitution, the Buza court evaluated that state constitutional claim “by employing the same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King” to analyze the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of 2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Stirling v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2019The phrase ‘arbitrary or capricious’ encompasses conduct not 6 supported by a fair or substantial reason, a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct, or a bad faith legal dispute.” [Citations.] Attorney’s fees may not be awarded simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous, even if it was “clearly erroneous.” ’ ” (American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 910, 934 , quoting Stirling v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1312 .) In resolving Silverado’s complaint for a tax refund based on an excessive asse 2019The phrase ‘arbitrary or capricious’ encompasses conduct not 6 supported by a fair or substantial reason, a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct, or a bad faith legal dispute.” [Citations.] Attorney’s fees may not be awarded simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous, even if it was “clearly erroneous.” ’ ” (American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 910, 934 , quoting Stirling v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1312 .) In resolving Silverado’s complaint for a tax refund based on an excessive asse | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Miller-El v. Cockrell
green
2 sentences2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of 2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Lenix
green
2 sentences2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of 2019(See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322 , 338-340, 342-347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 .) Our Supreme Court follows the same three-step mode of analysis, ending at step three with its individualized focus on discriminatory intent. ( *310 People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630 , 649, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 , 299 P.3d 1185 ; Jones , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 363-369, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 247 P.3d 82 ; Lenix , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 613, 628-631, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 187 P.3d 946 .) Systematic exclusion remains highly relevant at step one, but at step three the peremptory excusal of | 2 | 2019–2019 |
American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin
green
2 sentences2019The phrase ‘arbitrary or capricious’ encompasses conduct not 6 supported by a fair or substantial reason, a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct, or a bad faith legal dispute.” [Citations.] Attorney’s fees may not be awarded simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous, even if it was “clearly erroneous.” ’ ” (American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 910, 934 , quoting Stirling v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1312 .) In resolving Silverado’s complaint for a tax refund based on an excessive asse 2019The phrase ‘arbitrary or capricious’ encompasses conduct not 6 supported by a fair or substantial reason, a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct, or a bad faith legal dispute.” [Citations.] Attorney’s fees may not be awarded simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous, even if it was “clearly erroneous.” ’ ” (American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 910, 934 , quoting Stirling v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1312 .) In resolving Silverado’s complaint for a tax refund based on an excessive asse | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside
green
2 sentences2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water District
green
2 sentences2014The findings are adequately detailed and specific and we have “ ‘no trouble under the circumstances discerning “the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 956, 971 .) Appellant appears to contend the City took an impermissible “shortcut” in referring to the FEIR and adopting and incorporating the conclusions of that document, rather than repeating at length the entire analysis for each impact.23 We find no fault in 23 The CEQA findings document explains 2014The findings are adequately detailed and specific and we have “ ‘no trouble under the circumstances discerning “the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 956, 971 .) Appellant appears to contend the City took an impermissible “shortcut” in referring to the FEIR and adopting and incorporating the conclusions of that document, rather than repeating at length the entire analysis for each impact.23 We find no fault in 23 The CEQA findings document explains | 2 | 2014–2014 |
North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water District Board of Directors
green
2 sentences2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 2014Bd. of Directors, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 654-655.) 22 Guidelines section 15091, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: “(a) No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified which identifies one or more significant environmental effects of the project unless the public agency makes one or more written findings for each of those 55 between the raw evidence and ultimate decision’ so as to allow a reviewing court . . . ‘to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Carpenter
green
2 sentences2004(E.g., In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 ( Hamilton ).) [13] As the Court of Appeal dissent suggested, the trial court's mode of analysis, and particularly its use of terms, did not precisely adhere to the two-pronged test we set forth in Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 , for determining whether a juror's improper receipt of extraneous material gives rise to a substantial likelihood of actual bias. 2004(E.g., In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 ( Hamilton ).) [13] As the Court of Appeal dissent suggested, the trial court's mode of analysis, and particularly its use of terms, did not precisely adhere to the two-pronged test we set forth in Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 , and Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 , for determining whether a juror's improper receipt of extraneous material gives rise to a substantial likelihood of actual bias. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Nesler green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Environmental Defense Fund, Incorporated v. William D. Ruckelshaus green | 2 | 1974–1974 |
| Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park District v. County of Orange green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Brosnahan v. Brown green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| PROFESSIONAL ENG'RS IN CAL. GOV. v. Kempton green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Lance W. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hays v. Wood green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Strauss v. Horton green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Frierson green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Dearborne green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Neder v. United States green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Merritt green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Holmes v. South Carolina green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Baldwin v. County of Tehama green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Colbert green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Aas v. Superior Court red | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Rhoades green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Aledamat green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Witzerman green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Kelly green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.