mode analysis in Colorado

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1995To the contrary, the Court has emphasized its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); see also Lee, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Larson, 456 U.S. at 228 , 102 S.Ct. at 1674-75 .

1993Id.; cf. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 , 1396 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating that “the only question open to [a lower court is] whether the Supreme Court has created a right, which, fairly defined, covers the case before [it] or whether the Supreme Court has specified a mode of analysis, a methodology, which, honestly applied, reaches the case [it] must now decide”).

1991See Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 295 , 149 S.E.2d 691 (1966); Hotels Statler Co. v. District of Columbia, 199 F.2d 172 (D.C.

1991See Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 295 , 149 S.E.2d 691 (1966); Hotels Statler Co. v. District of Columbia, 199 F.2d 172 (D.C.Cir.1952); Theo.

1986In People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo.1985), we employed a new mode of analysis to determine whether a particular substantive crime can provide a foundation for criminal attempt liability.

1986In People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985), we employed a new mode of analysis to determine whether a particular substantive crime can provide a foundation for criminal attempt liability.

1986By contrasting the mode of analysis that we adopt here with the more limited analytical framework imposed in a similar situation in State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65 , 563 P.2d 1028 (1977), the courts of Colorado may be guided in their application of the principles articulated in this opinion.

1986By contrasting the mode of analysis that we adopt here with the more limited analytical framework imposed in a similar situation in State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65 , 563 P.2d 1028 (1977), the courts of Colorado may be guided in their application of the principles articulated in this opinion.

1986I write separately, however, to emphasize that the mode of analysis adopted in Illinois v. Gates recognizes the continuing significance of the probable cause considerations established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 783 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1986I write separately, however, to emphasize that the mode of analysis adopted in Illinois v. Gates recognizes the continuing significance of the probable cause considerations established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 783 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1986I write separately, however, to emphasize that the mode of analysis adopted in Illinois v. Gates recognizes the continuing significance of the probable cause considerations established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 783 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1986I write separately, however, to emphasize that the mode of analysis adopted in Illinois v. Gates recognizes the continuing significance of the probable cause considerations established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 783 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1983In Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F.Supp. 449 (E.D.Pa.1979), the court, after concluding that a police officer’s private sexual relationships are constitutionally protected unless they adversely affect the police department, noted that: “The mode of analysis used [in Whalen v. Roe, supra] appears to be akin to a balancing test, whereby the state’s interests in disclosure are weighed against the privacy needs of the individual.” See Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.1971); Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1969).

1983In Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F.Supp. 449 (E.D.Pa.1979), the court, after concluding that a police officer’s private sexual relationships are constitutionally protected unless they adversely affect the police department, noted that: “The mode of analysis used [in Whalen v. Roe, supra] appears to be akin to a balancing test, whereby the state’s interests in disclosure are weighed against the privacy needs of the individual.” See Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.1971); Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1969).

1983In Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F.Supp. 449 (E.D.Pa.1979), the court, after concluding that a police officer’s private sexual relationships are constitutionally protected unless they adversely affect the police department, noted that: “The mode of analysis used [in Whalen v. Roe, supra] appears to be akin to a balancing test, whereby the state’s interests in disclosure are weighed against the privacy needs of the individual.” See Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.1971); Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1969).