alibi defense in Montana

1994In upholding the defendant’s conviction, this Court stated that: “Defendant cannot restrict the *430 state’s case by merely asserting intent to rely on an alibi defense for a limited period of time within which the crime could have occurred.” Shaver, 760 P.2d at 1234-35 ; citing State v. Clark (1984), 209 Mont. 473, 483 , 682 P.2d 1339, 1344 .

1994In upholding the defendant’s conviction, this Court stated that: “Defendant cannot restrict the *430 state’s case by merely asserting intent to rely on an alibi defense for a limited period of time within which the crime could have occurred.” Shaver, 760 P.2d at 1234-35 ; citing State v. Clark (1984), 209 Mont. 473, 483 , 682 P.2d 1339, 1344 .

1988In Clark, this Court looked to the case of State v. Hall (1976), 171 Mont. 33 , 554 P.2d 755 in regard to the argument that noticing an alibi defense thereby confers materiality and makes time a necessary element of the State’s case.

1988In Clark, this Court looked to the case of State v. Hall (1976), 171 Mont. 33 , 554 P.2d 755 in regard to the argument that noticing an alibi defense thereby confers materiality and makes time a necessary element of the State’s case.

1983LaMere points out that in State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61 , 585 P.2d 1328 , this Court approved the limitation of testimony from the defendant's mother as to the whereabouts of the defendant during the time of the robbery, when the defendant had not given notice of an alibi defense; in McGuinn v. State (1978), 177 Mont. 215 , 581 P.2d 417 , this Court held that an alibi could not be relied on by the defendant since no notice of that defense was given as required *556 by the then pertinent statute.

1983LaMere points out that in State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61 , 585 P.2d 1328 , this Court approved the limitation of testimony from the defendant's mother as to the whereabouts of the defendant during the time of the robbery, when the defendant had not given notice of an alibi defense; in McGuinn v. State (1978), 177 Mont. 215 , 581 P.2d 417 , this Court held that an alibi could not be relied on by the defendant since no notice of that defense was given as required *556 by the then pertinent statute.

2017Sartain v. State, 2012 MT 164, ¶ 11 , 365 Mont. 483 , 285 P.3d 407 . ¶17 Bullman asserts his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: failed to obtain school, counseling, and medical records; colluded with the prosecution; failed to be familiar with the evidence to sufficiently present an alibi defense; failed to adequately investigate the case by failing to contact, interview, and subpoena witnesses; failed to effectively cross-examine, impeach, and discredit the State’s expert witness Wendy Dutton, J.T.’s school counselor Joanna Lyon, and J.T.; and allowed Dutton’s testimony to interru

2017Sartain v. State, 2012 MT 164, ¶ 11 , 365 Mont. 483 , 285 P.3d 407 . ¶17 Bullman asserts his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: failed to obtain school, counseling, and medical records; colluded with the prosecution; failed to be familiar with the evidence to sufficiently present an alibi defense; failed to adequately investigate the case by failing to contact, interview, and subpoena witnesses; failed to effectively cross-examine, impeach, and discredit the State’s expert witness Wendy Dutton, J.T.’s school counselor Joanna Lyon, and J.T.; and allowed Dutton’s testimony to interru

2005The District Court denied the Motion. ¶19 On appeal, Ferguson argues that Spaeny should not have been allowed to testify because she was subjected to “shocking” coercion which made her “an inherently unreliable witness.” In advancing this argument, Ferguson relies on United States v. Vavages (9th Cir. 1998), 151 F.3d 1185 , wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial because the prosecutor intimidated a witness by making “thinly veiled threats to prosecute” her for perjury and to withdraw her plea agreement in an unrelated case if s

2003Finally, he argues the State merely recited an allowable purpose-motive-and failed to follow up with its stated purpose during trial. ¶86 The State consistently asserted that it sought to introduce Ayers’ prior conviction to show motive, providing the following theory: the commission of the Wyoming offense-sexual assault and vehicle theft-gave rise to a motive to kill Phyllis during the commission of the instant offense so as to “silence the victim in order to prevent arrest.” In its amended notice of intent to introduce evidence of other acts, the State added “identity” as another purpose for

2003Finally, he argues the State merely recited an allowable purpose-motive-and failed to follow up with its stated purpose during trial. ¶86 The State consistently asserted that it sought to introduce Ayers’ prior conviction to show motive, providing the following theory: the commission of the Wyoming offense-sexual assault and vehicle theft-gave rise to a motive to kill Phyllis during the commission of the instant offense so as to “silence the victim in order to prevent arrest.” In its amended notice of intent to introduce evidence of other acts, the State added “identity” as another purpose for

2000Hildreth, 267 Mont, at 430-31 , 884 P.2d at 776 .

2000Hildreth, 267 Mont, at 430-31 , 884 P.2d at 776 .

1994In upholding the defendant’s conviction, this Court stated that: “Defendant cannot restrict the *430 state’s case by merely asserting intent to rely on an alibi defense for a limited period of time within which the crime could have occurred.” Shaver, 760 P.2d at 1234-35 ; citing State v. Clark (1984), 209 Mont. 473, 483 , 682 P.2d 1339, 1344 .

1984We conclude, as the Idaho Supreme Court did in State v. Rogers (Idaho 1929), 48 Idaho 567 , 283 P. 44 , “It would be a very weak rule of law that would permit a man to ravish a fifteen year old girl . . . and then say in effect: ‘You cannot convict me of this crime, as you did not guess the right date.’ “ We hold that the amended information stated the time and place of the charged offenses as definitely as could be done under the circumstances of this case.

1984We conclude, as the Idaho Supreme Court did in State v. Rogers (Idaho 1929), 48 Idaho 567 , 283 P. 44 , “It would be a very weak rule of law that would permit a man to ravish a fifteen year old girl . . . and then say in effect: ‘You cannot convict me of this crime, as you did not guess the right date.’ “ We hold that the amended information stated the time and place of the charged offenses as definitely as could be done under the circumstances of this case.

1983Witsoe v. Nelson (1974), 164 Mont. 511, 512 , 524 P.2d 1111 .

1983Witsoe v. Nelson (1974), 164 Mont. 511, 512 , 524 P.2d 1111 .

1983State v. Rozzell (1971), 157 Mont. 443, 450 , 486 P.2d 877, 881 .

1983State v. Rozzell (1971), 157 Mont. 443, 450 , 486 P.2d 877, 881 .

1983LaMere points out that in State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61 , 585 P.2d 1328 , this Court approved the limitation of testimony from the defendant's mother as to the whereabouts of the defendant during the time of the robbery, when the defendant had not given notice of an alibi defense; in McGuinn v. State (1978), 177 Mont. 215 , 581 P.2d 417 , this Court held that an alibi could not be relied on by the defendant since no notice of that defense was given as required *556 by the then pertinent statute.

1983LaMere points out that in State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61 , 585 P.2d 1328 , this Court approved the limitation of testimony from the defendant's mother as to the whereabouts of the defendant during the time of the robbery, when the defendant had not given notice of an alibi defense; in McGuinn v. State (1978), 177 Mont. 215 , 581 P.2d 417 , this Court held that an alibi could not be relied on by the defendant since no notice of that defense was given as required *556 by the then pertinent statute.

1978This latter rule has been applied to cases in which the defendant relies upon an alibi defense, State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451 , 578 P.2d at 1177 , and cases in which the defendant relies upon a defense of mitigation, but presents no evidence on that point.

1978This latter rule has been applied to cases in which the defendant relies upon an alibi defense, State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451 , 578 P.2d at 1177 , and cases in which the defendant relies upon a defense of mitigation, but presents no evidence on that point.

1978State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456 , 571 P.2d at 781 ; State v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238 , 557 P.2d 283, 285 .

1978State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456 , 571 P.2d at 781 ; State v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238 , 557 P.2d 283, 285 .

1978State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456 , 571 P.2d at 781 ; State v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238 , 557 P.2d 283, 285 .

1978State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456 , 571 P.2d at 781 ; State v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238 , 557 P.2d 283, 285 .