alibi defense in Tennessee

2010Cole v. State, 187 Tenn. 459 , 215 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1948); Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim.

2006Cole v. State, 187 Tenn. 459 , 215 S.W.2d 824, 825 (1948); Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim.

2026See Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757 .

2014Id. -8- A. Failure to File Notice of Alibi Defense The petitioner first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of an alibi defense.

2010Cole v. State, 187 Tenn. 459 , 215 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1948); Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Cole v. State, 187 Tenn. 459 , 215 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1948); Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim.

2017State v. Cate, 746 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn. Crim.

2014State v. Cate, 746 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn. Crim.

2017Juvenile counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on rebutting probable cause through the presentation of alibi witnesses given the dearth of favorable witnesses to present during the “best interest” portion of the transfer hearing. “‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266,

2011Given her conclusion that Alma and Joseph’s testimony would be not only unhelpful but also potentially disastrous, we conclude that Counsel’s decision to forego an alibi defense did not fall below “an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; Mitchell, 753 S.W.2d at 149 ; House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 .

2015State v. Crawford, 635 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tenn. Crim.

2013Crawford, 635 S.W.2d at 705 .

2011Christian v. State, 555 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tenn. 1977).

1977Mattress also complains of the alibi instruction, citing Christian v. State, 555 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn.1977).

2024Moffitt v. State, 29 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tenn. Crim.

2001Moffitt v. State, 29 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at 9 .

2000See, Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).

2011See id. at 568 ; see also Neil Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 4.04(9), p. 4–84 (4th ed. 2000) (“Although motive itself is rarely an issue in a case, it is often circumstantial proof of some other important matter, such as identity, intent, or lack of accident.”).

2005See id. at 568 ; see also Neil Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 4.04(9), p. 4-84 (4th ed. 2000) (“Although motive itself is rarely an issue in a case, it is often circumstantial proof of some other important matter, such as identity, intent, or lack of accident.”).

2001See Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tenn. 1977) (credibility of alibi witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determined exclusively by the jury).

1983Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tenn.1977).

1998Id. at 85 , 90 S.Ct. at 1898 ; see also Johnson, 673 S.W.2d at 882 (approving a rule which required the defendant to provide notice of intent to present an alibi defense).

1998Id. at 85 , 90 S.Ct. at 1898 ; see also Johnson, 673 S.W.2d at 882 (approving a rule which required the defendant to provide notice of intent to present an alibi defense).

2024Manning v. State, 500 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 1973).

2024In Manning, our supreme court identified three sets of circumstances where an alibi defense could be fairly raised: “(1) where the defendant’s alibi has been corroborated by other credible witnesses; (2) where the victim has been unable to identify the defendant; [or] (3) where the proof against the defendant is wholly circumstantial.” Id. at 916 (citations omitted).

2020Id. (citing Manning, 500 S.W.2d at 916 ).

2007See Poe, 370 S.W.2d at 489-90 (holding that failure to give instruction on an alibi defense was reversible error); Davis v. State, 64 Tenn. 612, 612 (1875) (same).

2014Compare King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 331-32 (Tenn. 1999) (concluding that trial counsel’s decision to change trial strategy in response to surprise testimony, which was admitted over his objection, did not constitute ineffective assistance), with State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. Crim.

2014Cf. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d at 228 (concluding that trial counsel’s recommendation to defendant not to testify after counsel had commented in its opening statement that the jury would hear from the defendant was deficient because nothing occurred at trial requiring an “an abrupt change of strategy”).

1999Id. at 128-29 .

1998P. 12.1(f) (“Evidence of an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who gave notice of the intention.”); see also State v. Meeks, 876 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tenn. Crim.

2017Juvenile counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on rebutting probable cause through the presentation of alibi witnesses given the dearth of favorable witnesses to present during the “best interest” portion of the transfer hearing. “‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266,

2016See State v. Allen, 69 *420 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tenn.2002) (“The evidence, not the theories of the parties, controls whether an instruction is required.”); State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 726-27 (Tenn.2001) (holding that a trial court’s obligation to instruct on all lesser-included offenses, when supported by the evidence, derived not only from statute, but more importantly from article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution). 2 Trial counsel mistakenly thought that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 still required the trial court to give the jury these lesser-included offense instructio

2016Moreover, the indictment was not specific as to date, and “[a] variance between an indictment and the proof in a criminal case is not material where the allegations and the proof substantially correspond, the variance is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at trial and is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.” State v. Moss, 662 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1984).

2016See id.

2014Compare King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 331-32 (Tenn. 1999) (concluding that trial counsel’s decision to change trial strategy in response to surprise testimony, which was admitted over his objection, did not constitute ineffective assistance), with State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. Crim.

2013However, the jury instruction at issue in the case cited by the Defendant was not invalidated solely because it used the term “if believed.” Instead, it was found to improperly shift the burden onto the defendant because it failed to state that the prosecution “had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt” in addition to using the words “if believed.” People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 468 N.E.2d 677, 680 (1984); cf. Fox v. Mann, 71 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2nd Cir.1995) (concluding that an alibi instruction which stated that the jury was to determine if alibi witne

2013However, the jury instruction at issue in the case cited by the Defendant was not invalidated solely because it used the term “if believed.” Instead, it was found to improperly shift the burden onto the defendant because it failed to state that the prosecution “had the burden of disproving the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt” in addition to using the words “if believed.” People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 468 N.E.2d 677, 680 (1984); cf. Fox v. Mann, 71 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2nd Cir.1995) (concluding that an alibi instruction which stated that the jury was to determine if alibi witne