alibi defense in Utah

2019See State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991) (stating that an alibi defense is often not “a realistic 20170064-CA 17 2019 UT App 143 State v. Rhodes possibility” when a defendant has “continual contact” with a child victim over an extended period). ¶41 Rhodes contends his trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to call Employer “because it helped build [Rhodes’s] alibi.” Rhodes concedes his counsel did call one of his employers but that the witness “only gave vague estimates about the timeframe that Rhodes worked.” He argued Employer could have “helped” Rhodes build a better ali

2018Otherwise, "[a]n abuser could escape prosecution merely by claiming that the child's inability to remember the exact dates and places of the abuse impaired the abuser's ability to prepare an alibi defense." Id. ¶38 Here, Defendant had sufficient notice of the alleged crimes and dates to allow him to adequately prepare his defense.

2022Accordingly, a “mere assertion of an alibi defense does not impose on the prosecution the additional burden of proving the precise date of the act.” Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1213 .

2013See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Utah 1987) ("[An alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove the statutory elements.

2022An abuser could 20210421-CA 8 2022 UT App 78 State v. Silveira escape prosecution merely by claiming that the child’s inability to remember the exact dates and places of the abuse impaired the abuser’s ability to prepare an alibi defense.”); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (“We recognize that children are often not able to identify with a high degree of reliability, and sometimes not at all, when an event in the past took place.”); In re J.E.G., 2020 UT App 94, ¶ 23 , 468 P.3d 1048 (“Victim’s inability to remember the specific date is not fatal to the State’s case.”).

2010See Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1032 (stating that notice is constitutionally inadequate if the lack of specificity compromises the defense or makes the defendant vulnerable to multiple prosecutions for the same offense); [2] see also id. at 1033 (as a basis for affirming the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss that was premised on the defendant's claim that he was deprived of an alibi defense by the vagueness of the time frames in the charges, the supreme court noted that the defendant had failed to show that such a defense was a realistic possibility); cf. Robbins, 709 P.2d at 773 (affirming

2013See id. at 917-21 .

2013See id. at 917–21.

2014T 9; see also State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 31 , 106 P.3d 734 ("[The mere assertion of an alibi defense does not impose on the prosecution the additional burden of proving the precise date of the act.

2014T 9; see also State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ¶ 31 , 106 P.3d 734 ("[The mere assertion of an alibi defense does not impose on the prosecution the additional burden of proving the precise date of the act.

2021Therefore, the juvenile court’s ruling on DAT’s preserved challenge comported with “[t]he overriding consideration” with notice-of-alibi claims: “the avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to either party, not an exaltation of technical formalities.” See State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 1985).

2019See Burke v. State, 2015 UT App 1, ¶ 18 , 342 P.3d 299 (holding that there is a “strong presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance” when reviewing the alleged failure of trial counsel to investigate an alibi defense (cleaned up)).

2019See Burke v. State, 2015 UT App 1, ¶ 18 , 342 P.3d 299 (holding that there is a “strong presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance” when reviewing the alleged failure of trial counsel to investigate an alibi defense (cleaned up)).

2019See State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991) (stating that an alibi defense is often not “a realistic 20170064-CA 17 2019 UT App 143 State v. Rhodes possibility” when a defendant has “continual contact” with a child victim over an extended period). ¶41 Rhodes contends his trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to call Employer “because it helped build [Rhodes’s] alibi.” Rhodes concedes his counsel did call one of his employers but that the witness “only gave vague estimates about the timeframe that Rhodes worked.” He argued Employer could have “helped” Rhodes build a better ali

2018See State v. Wilcox , 808 P.2d 1028 , 1033 (Utah 1991) (indicating that "situations in which the abuse occurred on many occasions over a long period of time" exacerbate the problem of young children who are unable to specify a date on which abuse occurred); see also State v. Bradley , 2002 UT App 348 , ¶ 49, 57 P.3d 1139 (stating that the defendant was "adequately notified of the time frame in which the alleged abuse occurred" even though the children, who were eight and ten years old, were "not able to specify exact times and dates of the alleged abuse"). ¶40 Defendant further suggests that t

2018See State v. Wilcox , 808 P.2d 1028 , 1033 (Utah 1991) (indicating that "situations in which the abuse occurred on many occasions over a long period of time" exacerbate the problem of young children who are unable to specify a date on which abuse occurred); see also State v. Bradley , 2002 UT App 348 , ¶ 49, 57 P.3d 1139 (stating that the defendant was "adequately notified of the time frame in which the alleged abuse occurred" even though the children, who were eight and ten years old, were "not able to specify exact times and dates of the alleged abuse"). ¶40 Defendant further suggests that t

2011See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 28 , 192 P.3d 867 (referring, in dicta, to "affirmative defenses[ ] such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense"); State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214-15 (Utah 1985) (stating, in a case involving self-defense, and without any further analysis, that "the prosecution has *529 the same burden of proof[, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt,] with respect to such defenses as lack of mental capacity and alibi"); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977) (stating, in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, that an alibi defense is "on the same foot

2011See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 28 , 192 P.3d 867 (referring, in dicta, to "affirmative defenses[ ] such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense"); State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214-15 (Utah 1985) (stating, in a case involving self-defense, and without any further analysis, that "the prosecution has *529 the same burden of proof[, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt,] with respect to such defenses as lack of mental capacity and alibi"); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977) (stating, in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, that an alibi defense is "on the same foot

2011The presence of the accused at the time and place must be shown as essential to the commission of the crime.'") (quoting I Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 333 (10th ed.)); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 259 (Alaska Ct.App.1981) ("In this case, [the defendant] did raise an alibi defense, but alibi is not an affirmative defense."); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (reiterating the language of a previous case holding that alibi is not an affirmative defense); Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del.2008) ("[B]ecause the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the

2011The presence of the accused at the time and place must be shown as essential to the commission of the crime.'") (quoting I Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 333 (10th ed.)); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 259 (Alaska Ct.App.1981) ("In this case, [the defendant] did raise an alibi defense, but alibi is not an affirmative defense."); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (reiterating the language of a previous case holding that alibi is not an affirmative defense); Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del.2008) ("[B]ecause the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the

2011Accordingly, Defendant cannot meet the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, see Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6 , 89 P.3d 162 (stating that in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively deficient), which is fatal to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see generally State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Utah 1994) ("Because [the defendant] has not satisfied the first prong of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] test, we do not need to determine whether he has satisfied the second prong.").

2011The presence of the accused at the time and place must be shown as essential to the commission of the crime.'") (quoting I Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 333 (10th ed.)); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 259 (Alaska Ct.App.1981) ("In this case, [the defendant] did raise an alibi defense, but alibi is not an affirmative defense."); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (reiterating the language of a previous case holding that alibi is not an affirmative defense); Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del.2008) ("[B]ecause the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the

2011The presence of the accused at the time and place must be shown as essential to the commission of the crime.'") (quoting I Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 333 (10th ed.)); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 259 (Alaska Ct.App.1981) ("In this case, [the defendant] did raise an alibi defense, but alibi is not an affirmative defense."); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (reiterating the language of a previous case holding that alibi is not an affirmative defense); Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del.2008) ("[B]ecause the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the

2011See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 28 , 192 P.3d 867 (referring, in dicta, to "affirmative defenses[ ] such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense"); State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214-15 (Utah 1985) (stating, in a case involving self-defense, and without any further analysis, that "the prosecution has *529 the same burden of proof[, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt,] with respect to such defenses as lack of mental capacity and alibi"); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977) (stating, in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, that an alibi defense is "on the same foot

2011The presence of the accused at the time and place must be shown as essential to the commission of the crime.'") (quoting I Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 333 (10th ed.)); Doisher v. State, 632 P.2d 242, 259 (Alaska Ct.App.1981) ("In this case, [the defendant] did raise an alibi defense, but alibi is not an affirmative defense."); People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (reiterating the language of a previous case holding that alibi is not an affirmative defense); Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 838 (Del.2008) ("[B]ecause the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the

2011See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 28 , 192 P.3d 867 (referring, in dicta, to "affirmative defenses[ ] such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense"); State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214-15 (Utah 1985) (stating, in a case involving self-defense, and without any further analysis, that "the prosecution has *529 the same burden of proof[, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt,] with respect to such defenses as lack of mental capacity and alibi"); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977) (stating, in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, that an alibi defense is "on the same foot

2011This position is consistent with Utah case law, see id.; Romero, 554 P.2d at 219 , as well as case law from other jurisdictions, see Ragland v. State, 238 Ala. 587 , 192 So. 498, 501 (1939) ("`The defense of an alibi not only goes to the essence of guilt, but it traverses one of the material averments of the indictment, namely, that the defendant did then and there the particular act charged.

2011This position is consistent with Utah case law, see id.; Romero, 554 P.2d at 219 , as well as case law from other jurisdictions, see Ragland v. State, 238 Ala. 587 , 192 So. 498, 501 (1939) ("`The defense of an alibi not only goes to the essence of guilt, but it traverses one of the material averments of the indictment, namely, that the defendant did then and there the particular act charged.

2011Second, these cases are directly contrary to other supreme court cases that have specifically concluded that "alibi is not an affirmative defense but merely a denial that [a defendant] was where he was said to be at the time the crime was committed," see State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976); see also State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Utah 1987) ("[A]n alibi defense ... is not one that has merit independent of whether the State can prove the statutory elements of the crime; rather, an alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove the statutory elements."). ¶ 16 We hold tha

2011Second, these cases are directly contrary to other supreme court cases that have specifically concluded that "alibi is not an affirmative defense but merely a denial that [a defendant] was where he was said to be at the time the crime was committed," see State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976); see also State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Utah 1987) ("[A]n alibi defense ... is not one that has merit independent of whether the State can prove the statutory elements of the crime; rather, an alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove the statutory elements."). ¶ 16 We hold tha

1991See State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234 , 700 P.2d 630, 634 (1985).

1991See State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234 , 700 P.2d 630, 634 (Mont.1985).

1991See State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234 , 700 P.2d 630, 634 (1985).

1991See State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234 , 700 P.2d 630, 634 (Mont.1985).

1989We dealt with the importance of proposed alibi evidence in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986), where the defendant also had an alibi defense which was not pursued after the motion to. suppress was denied.

1988In order to interpret that phrase in our rule, Utah courts must look to the federal decisions interpreting Fed.Rule Evid. 609(a)(2), State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986), recognizing that the federal courts are not in full agreement on what constitutes “dishonesty or false statement" under their rule.

1988In order to interpret that phrase in our rule, Utah courts must look to the federal decisions interpreting Fed.Rule Evid. 609(a)(2), State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986), recognizing that the federal courts are not in full agreement on what constitutes "dishonesty or false statement" under their rule.