alibi defense in California

2021Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 472, 475 (Wardius), reversed the conviction of a defendant who was prevented from presenting an alibi defense for failure to comply with a state statute that required defendants to provide notice of an alibi defense but afforded defendants no discovery rights, including no right to notice of witnesses the prosecution plans to use to refute the alibi defense.

2015In particular, Campbell relies on 7 Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 82 ], a case involving an Oregon discovery rule requiring the defendant to give notice if an alibi defense is to be raised, holding that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.

1989Relying on People v. Parrish (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 942, 946-948 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 118 ], and a line of cases running back to People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199-202 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ], defendant asserts that the instruction should not have been given because he denied participation in the crimes and proffered an alibi defense.

1989Relying on People v. Parrish (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 942, 946-948 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 118 ], and a line of cases running back to People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199-202 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ], defendant asserts that the instruction should not have been given because he denied participation in the crimes and proffered an alibi defense.

2021(See People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437 [“ ‘in the absence of any request . . . it is not the duty of the trial court to give a specific charge upon [alibi]’ ”]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742 , 803–804; see also Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [the decisions of our Supreme Court are binding upon this and all other state courts of California].) Defendant nevertheless maintains that omitting the alibi instruction violated his federal right to due process, jury trial, and to present a defense.

2015It would have been redundant to have required an additional instruction which directed the jury to acquit if a reasonable doubt existed regarding defendant’s presence during the crime.… [N]o juror could possibly be misled by the failure to instruct on the significance of defendant’s alibi defense.” (People v. Freeman, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 438 .) 66.

2014As stated in [People v. Whitson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 593, 604 ], no juror could possibly be misled by the failure to instruct on the significance of defendant’s alibi defense.” (Id. at p. 438.) In People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 803-804 , the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on identity (CALJIC No. 2.91), eyewitness identification factors (CALJIC No. 2.92), and alibi (CALJIC No. 4.50). ( Alcala, supra, at p. 804 .) The court explained, “[i]t is sufficient that the jury be instructed generally to consider all the evi

1978Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 166 , 463 P.2d 390 ]; and see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) Included within this duty is the ‘. . . obligation to instruct on defenses, . . . and on the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged offense . . .’ where ‘. . . it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense . . . .’ (People v. Sedeno, supra, at p. 716.)” (People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 117 , 544 P.2d 1317 ], ita

1985The Attorney General argues that appellant failed to establish prejudice as his testimony did not inform the court “of . . . the nature of what [the missing witnesses’] testimony would have been, when they became unavailable, . . .; nor did [he] disclose any facts indicating that these witnesses . . . would have been available had criminal proceedings been reinstituted within a short time—that is, that the loss of evidence and unavailability of witnesses was caused by the prosecutorial delay. ” (People v. Sahagun (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 1, 24 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) It appears clear to us that th

1985The Attorney General argues that appellant failed to establish prejudice as his testimony did not inform the court “of . . . the nature of what [the missing witnesses’] testimony would have been, when they became unavailable, . . .; nor did [he] disclose any facts indicating that these witnesses . . . would have been available had criminal proceedings been reinstituted within a short time—that is, that the loss of evidence and unavailability of witnesses was caused by the prosecutorial delay. ” (People v. Sahagun (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 1, 24 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) It appears clear to us that th

1983“For example, if the defense witnesses identified are friends or relatives of an accused, the prosecution can anticipate an alibi defense; if police officers the defense of entrapment can be projected.” (Allen v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 526, fn. 4 .) The Coleman rule, despite the fact that it prohibits use of the probationer’s testimony and “the fruits” thereof, simply could not protect against this type of discovery, which effectively allows the prosecutor to become aware of the basic defense strategy without making any improper use even of “fruits” of the probationer’s revocat

1983"For example, if the defense witnesses identified are friends or relatives of an accused, the prosecution can anticipate an alibi defense; if police officers the defense of entrapment can be projected." ( Allen v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 526, fn. 4 .) The Coleman rule, despite the fact that it prohibits use of the probationer's testimony and "the fruits" thereof, simply could not protect against this type of discovery, which effectively allows the prosecutor to become aware of the basic defense strategy without making any improper use even of "fruits" of the probationer's revoca

2021(See People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437 [“ ‘in the absence of any request . . . it is not the duty of the trial court to give a specific charge upon [alibi]’ ”]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742 , 803–804; see also Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [the decisions of our Supreme Court are binding upon this and all other state courts of California].) Defendant nevertheless maintains that omitting the alibi instruction violated his federal right to due process, jury trial, and to present a defense.

2021Further, “with respect to an alibi defense, it is sufficient that the jury be instructed generally to consider all the evidence, and to acquit the defendant in the event it entertains a reasonable doubt regarding his or her guilt.” (See People v. Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 803–804.) Here, the jury was appropriately instructed that a defendant is presumed innocent, which “requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” It was also instructed to “consider all the evidence” in determining whether the prosecution had met its burden, and unless defendant is proved

2012In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], the high court upheld a state law that required a criminal accused who intended to present an alibi defense to disclose to the prosecution, prior to trial, where he claimed to have been at the time of the charged offense and the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses he intended to call; in return, the prosecution was required similarly to disclose to the defense the witnesses it proposed to call in rebuttal.

2012In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], the high court upheld a state law that required a criminal accused who intended to present an alibi defense to disclose to the prosecution, prior to trial, where he claimed to have been at the time of the charged offense and the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses he intended to call; in return, the prosecution was required similarly to disclose to the defense the witnesses it proposed to call in rebuttal.

1968(Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) We are fortunate in having the trial court’s reasoning before finding defendant guilty, as part of the record.' 3 It is evident that although the court discussed the evidence in some detail, the discrepancy between the statement given to Officer KcKnight and the alibi defense played no part in its reasoning.

1968(Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) We are fortunate in having the trial court’s reasoning before finding defendant guilty, as part of the record.' 3 It is evident that although the court discussed the evidence in some detail, the discrepancy between the statement given to Officer KcKnight and the alibi defense played no part in its reasoning.

2019(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 [under the federal constitution, the failure to instruct the jury on an element of the crime is reviewed for whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158 , 1208, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 , citing People v. Watson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , 299 P.2d 243 [under the state constitution, the inquiry is whether there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different had the trial court properly instructed the j

2019(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 [under the federal constitution, the failure to instruct the jury on an element of the crime is reviewed for whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158 , 1208, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 , citing People v. Watson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , 299 P.2d 243 [under the state constitution, the inquiry is whether there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different had the trial court properly instructed the j

2023(See Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 923 [noting one witness “was a habitual drug user, and the trial court reasonably concluded her memory would not have been the best in any case”]; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 432 [observing if defendant had lost his ability to recall much earlier “due to drug use or some other cause,” then “any claim that he would have been able to construct an alibi defense had the prosecution commenced sooner is speculative”]; People v. Butler (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 455, 464 [“Appellant’s memory was impaired, but the impairment appears to have had nothing to do with the

2010He therefore had an incentive to record any exculpatory information he had regarding his whereabouts, the property, or the identity of alibi witnesses. 10 On the other hand, if by early 1985 defendant had already lost the ability to recall his whereabouts in September of the previous year—whether due to drug use or some other cause (see People v. Butler (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 455, 464 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 ])—any claim that he would have been able to construct an alibi defense had the prosecution commenced sooner is speculative.

1991To the extent a *1600 defendant can offer an alibi defense covering some time periods alleged in the information, this fact could undermine the credibility of the victim’s testimony as to the remaining counts. ( 51 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) In addition, where the case turns on the credibility of the victim, the defendant has numerous trial techniques available: his own direct testimony, cross-examination of the child and supporting witnesses, and expert character evidence showing that the defendant does not have the personality profile of a child molester. ( 51 Cal.3d at p. 320 .) Finally, a defenda

1991To the extent a *1600 defendant can offer an alibi defense covering some time periods alleged in the information, this fact could undermine the credibility of the victim’s testimony as to the remaining counts. ( 51 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) In addition, where the case turns on the credibility of the victim, the defendant has numerous trial techniques available: his own direct testimony, cross-examination of the child and supporting witnesses, and expert character evidence showing that the defendant does not have the personality profile of a child molester. ( 51 Cal.3d at p. 320 .) Finally, a defenda

1978The appellant submitted three special instructions concerning eyewitness identification along with CALJIC No. 2.91. 12 The court refused these instructions “because the alibi instruction is given.” The alibi instruction as set forth in CALJIC No. 4.50 is set forth in footnote 13. 13 Refusal to give the instruction requested has particular importance to the verdict in this incident because no alibi was offered as a defense in the matter as was done with respect to the incident involving Angela O. 14 *842 In refusing to give CALJIC No. 2.91 the court specifically relied on People v. Gomez (1972)

1978The appellant submitted three special instructions concerning eyewitness identification along with CALJIC No. 2.91. 12 The court refused these instructions “because the alibi instruction is given.” The alibi instruction as set forth in CALJIC No. 4.50 is set forth in footnote 13. 13 Refusal to give the instruction requested has particular importance to the verdict in this incident because no alibi was offered as a defense in the matter as was done with respect to the incident involving Angela O. 14 *842 In refusing to give CALJIC No. 2.91 the court specifically relied on People v. Gomez (1972)

1926(People v. Craig, 196 Cal. 19 [ 235 Pac. 721 ] People v. Casada, 194 Cal. 679 [ 230 Pac. 9 ]; *501 People v. Wolfgang, 192 Cal. 754 [ 221 Pac. 907 ]; People v. Connelly, 195 Cal. 584 [ 234 Pac. 374 ]; People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623 [ 234 Pac. 890 ].) The alibi instruction given in People v. Lee Gam, 69 Cal. 552 [ 11 Pac. 183 ], was given verbatim in the instant case.

1926(People v. Craig, 196 Cal. 19 [ 235 Pac. 721 ] People v. Casada, 194 Cal. 679 [ 230 Pac. 9 ]; *501 People v. Wolfgang, 192 Cal. 754 [ 221 Pac. 907 ]; People v. Connelly, 195 Cal. 584 [ 234 Pac. 374 ]; People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623 [ 234 Pac. 890 ].) The alibi instruction given in People v. Lee Gam, 69 Cal. 552 [ 11 Pac. 183 ], was given verbatim in the instant case.

1928Alibi, as you know, is the fact of a person, accused of crime, being at another place and time to that charged in the information.” Appellant contends that it was error for the court to refer to an alibi as a defense, and complaint is also made of the court’s statement that the jury should scrutinize the evidence with care, claiming that in both respects the instruction was violative of the rules declared in People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 137 ], and People v. Girotti, 67 Cal. App. 399 [ 227 Pac. 936 ], We are unable to agree with *140 either of the foregoing contentions.

1928Alibi, as you know, is the fact of a person, accused of crime, being at another place and time to that charged in the information.” Appellant contends that it was error for the court to refer to an alibi as a defense, and complaint is also made of the court’s statement that the jury should scrutinize the evidence with care, claiming that in both respects the instruction was violative of the rules declared in People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377 [ 55 Pac. 137 ], and People v. Girotti, 67 Cal. App. 399 [ 227 Pac. 936 ], We are unable to agree with *140 either of the foregoing contentions.

2019DISCUSSION Defendant argues trial counsel violated his “Sixth Amendment right to choose the objective of his defense by conceding guilt against his express wishes.” The People counter that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in McCoy is distinguishable because in this case, defendant did not consistently assert his right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense, did not object to counsel’s concession of guilt until after he was convicted, and did not present an alibi defense like the defendant in McCoy. 4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 4 We find that the re

2019DISCUSSION Defendant argues trial counsel violated his “Sixth Amendment right to choose the objective of his defense by conceding guilt against his express wishes.” The People counter that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in McCoy is distinguishable because in this case, defendant did not consistently assert his right to maintain innocence as the objective of his defense, did not object to counsel’s concession of guilt until after he was convicted, and did not present an alibi defense like the defendant in McCoy. 4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 4 We find that the re

2001(People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal:4th 489, 531 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199 , 828 P.2d 101 ] [defense’s failure to argue án alternative theory to reasonable doubt as to guilt is not objectively indicative of ineffective representation as a matter of *1006 law]; People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852-853 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 640 P.2d 776 ] [counsel not ineffective in choosing an alibi defense instead of diminished capacity as a matter of tactics].) c.

2001(People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal:4th 489, 531 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199 , 828 P.2d 101 ] [defense’s failure to argue án alternative theory to reasonable doubt as to guilt is not objectively indicative of ineffective representation as a matter of *1006 law]; People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852-853 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 640 P.2d 776 ] [counsel not ineffective in choosing an alibi defense instead of diminished capacity as a matter of tactics].) c.

2021“In People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 . . . , we distinguished between instructions which properly ‘“pinpoint[] the theory of the defense”’ and those which ‘improperly impl[y] certain conclusions from specified evidence . . . .’ (Id. at p. 1137.) In that case we gave as an example of the former an alibi instruction which directs the jury to acquit a defendant if it believed him not to be present at the time the crime was committed.

1996In People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 [ 248 Cal. Rptr. 600 , 755 P.2d 1049 ], we distinguished between instructions which properly "`pinpoint[] the theory of the defense'" and those which "improperly impl[y] certain conclusions from specified evidence...." ( Id. at p. 1137.) In that case we gave as an example of the former an alibi instruction which directs the jury to acquit a defendant if it believed him not to be present at the time the crime was committed.

2007Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a defendant in a reciprocal discovery scheme has no valid self-incrimination claim against compelled disclosure of an alibi defense or defense witnesses. ( Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 83 , 90 S.Ct. *957 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 366-372, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 .) It follows that no such federal or state right generally exists when a defendant seeks discovery of confidential records, and the showing required may be made by his attorney on information and belief.

2007Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a defendant in a reciprocal discovery scheme has no valid self-incrimination claim against compelled disclosure of an alibi defense or defense witnesses. ( Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 83 , 90 S.Ct. *957 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 366-372, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 .) It follows that no such federal or state right generally exists when a defendant seeks discovery of confidential records, and the showing required may be made by his attorney on information and belief.

2014(People v. Fritts (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 319, 326 ; People v. Aylwin (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 826, 841-842 ; People v. Amy (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 .) The date change was not material to the charged offense in count one.

1984(People v. Fritts (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 319, 324 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; People v. Aylwin (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 826, 841-842 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 824 ]; People v. Amy (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 [ 223 P.2d 69 ].) The jury was properly instructed it was not necessary the proof show a crime was committed on a precise date.

2014(People v. Fritts (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 319, 326 ; People v. Aylwin (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 826, 841-842 ; People v. Amy (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 .) The date change was not material to the charged offense in count one.

1984(People v. Fritts (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 319, 324 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; People v. Aylwin (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 826, 841-842 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 824 ]; People v. Amy (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 [ 223 P.2d 69 ].) The jury was properly instructed it was not necessary the proof show a crime was committed on a precise date.