alibi defense in Connecticut

2003See State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 536 , 534 A.2d 1159 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003“That a defendant may offer an alibi defense is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a motion [for a bill of particulars], but an alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Laracuente, supra, 520 ; State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 535 , 534 A.2d 1159 , cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003See State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 536 , 534 A.2d 1159 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003“That a defendant may offer an alibi defense is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a motion [for a bill of particulars], but an alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Laracuente, supra, 520 ; State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 535 , 534 A.2d 1159 , cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003See State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 536 , 534 A.2d 1159 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003“That a defendant may offer an alibi defense is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a motion [for a bill of particulars], but an alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Laracuente, supra, 520 ; State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 535 , 534 A.2d 1159 , cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2016As the United States Supreme Court has observed in a case involving this very issue, "[w]hen viewed in this light, the '[reasonable] decision' the [majority and the state both] invoke to justify counsel's [failure to pursue] mitigating evidence resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to [trial]." Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510 , 526-27, 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). **539 Not surprisingly, both Sherman and his associate, Jason Throne, testified without contradiction that an objective and unbiased witne

2016As the United States Supreme Court has observed in a case involving this very issue, "[w]hen viewed in this light, the '[reasonable] decision' the [majority and the state both] invoke to justify counsel's [failure to pursue] mitigating evidence resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to [trial]." Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510 , 526-27, 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). **539 Not surprisingly, both Sherman and his associate, Jason Throne, testified without contradiction that an objective and unbiased witne

2018See, e.g., Griffin v. Warden , 970 F.2d 1355 , 1359 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[e]yewitness identification evidence ... is precisely the sort of evidence that an alibi defense refutes best"); Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 164 Conn. App. at 545 , 138 A.3d 378 ("alibi testimony is frequently the best way to counter eyewitness testimony of a defendant's involvement in a crime").

2016See Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355 , 1359 (4th Cir.1992) ("[e]yewitness identification evidence ... is precisely the sort of evidence that an alibi defense refutes best"); State ex rel.

2018See, e.g., Towns v. Smith , 395 F.3d 251 , 259 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Without even attempting to interview [the witness], counsel simply decided not to call him as a witness.

2016See, e.g., Towns v. Smith , supra, 395 F.3d at 259 ("Without even attempting to interview [the witness], counsel simply decided not to call him as a witness.

2018Furthermore, a thorough investigation of an alibi defense is especially important when "the missing witness is disinterested in a case in which the other witnesses have a relationship to the defendant." Carter v. Duncan , supra, 819 F.3d at 943 ; see also Blackmon v. Williams , supra, 823 F.3d at 1104-1105 (explaining that unreasonableness of counsel's *24 failure to investigate was compounded by "significant potential benefits of obtaining alibi testimony from witnesses unimpaired by family ties to [the petitioner]"); Montgomery v. Petersen , 846 F.2d 407 , 413 (7th Cir. 1988) (characterizing

2016Furthermore, the failure to conduct a thorough investigation of an alibi defense is perhaps most damaging **557 when "the missing witness is disinterested in a case in which the other witnesses have a relationship to the defendant." Carter v. Duncan , supra, 819 F.3d at 943 ; see also Blackmon v. Williams , supra, 823 F.3d at 1104-1105 (explaining that unreasonableness of counsel's failure to investigate was compounded by "significant potential benefits of obtaining alibi testimony from witnesses unimpaired by family ties to [the petitioner]"; Montgomery v. Petersen , 846 F.2d 407 , 413 (7th C

2015Specifically, the peti- tioner argues that Kirschbaum was ineffective because he failed to investigate the state’s case and witnesses, the petitioner’s third-party culpability claim, and the petitioner’s alibi defense.4 We begin by setting forth our well settled standard of review governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ‘‘In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to eff

2015Specifically, the peti- tioner argues that Kirschbaum was ineffective because he failed to investigate the state’s case and witnesses, the petitioner’s third-party culpability claim, and the petitioner’s alibi defense.4 We begin by setting forth our well settled standard of review governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ‘‘In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to eff

2003“That a defendant may offer an alibi defense is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a motion [for a bill of particulars], but an alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Laracuente, supra, 520 ; State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 535 , 534 A.2d 1159 , cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2003“That a defendant may offer an alibi defense is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant a motion [for a bill of particulars], but an alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Laracuente, supra, 520 ; State v. Evans, 205 Conn. 528, 535 , 534 A.2d 1159 , cert. denied, 485 U.S. 988 , 108 S. Ct. 1292 , 99 L.

2019Id., at 548 , 138 A.3d 378 . **550 As a result, defense counsel decided not to offer an alibi defense at trial.

2019Id., at 548 , 138 A.3d 378 . **550 As a result, defense counsel decided not to offer an alibi defense at trial.

2018Of course, that is exactly what the word "impossible" means, and other jurisdictions have adopted the stringent version of the partial alibi rule that the majority criticizes as "clearly [defying] reason and common sense." See State v. Tutson , 278 Conn. 715 , 733 n.10, 899 A.2d 598 (2006).

2018Of course, that is exactly what the word "impossible" means, and other jurisdictions have adopted the stringent version of the partial alibi rule that the majority criticizes as "clearly [defying] reason and common sense." See State v. Tutson , 278 Conn. 715 , 733 n.10, 899 A.2d 598 (2006).

2018Furthermore, a thorough investigation of an alibi defense is especially important when "the missing witness is disinterested in a case in which the other witnesses have a relationship to the defendant." Carter v. Duncan , supra, 819 F.3d at 943 ; see also Blackmon v. Williams , supra, 823 F.3d at 1104-1105 (explaining that unreasonableness of counsel's *24 failure to investigate was compounded by "significant potential benefits of obtaining alibi testimony from witnesses unimpaired by family ties to [the petitioner]"); Montgomery v. Petersen , 846 F.2d 407 , 413 (7th Cir. 1988) (characterizing

2017Furthermore, the failure to conduct a thorough inves- tigation of an alibi defense is perhaps most damaging when ‘‘the missing witness is disinterested in a case in which the other witnesses have a relationship to the defendant.’’ Carter v. Duncan, supra, 819 F.3d 943 ; see also Blackmon v. Williams, supra, 823 F.3d 1104–1105 (explaining that unreasonableness of counsel’s failure to investigate was compounded by ‘‘significant potential benefits of obtaining alibi testimony from witnesses unimpaired by family ties to [the petitioner]’’); Mont- gomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407, 413 (7th Cir. 198

2003An alibi claim is a factual question that should be left to the jury once all of the evidence has been presented.” State v. Bergin, supra, 214 Conn. 675 -76. “[A]n alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blasius, 211 Conn. 455, 461 , 559 A.2d 1116 (1989).

2003An alibi claim is a factual question that should be left to the jury once all of the evidence has been presented.” State v. Bergin, supra, 214 Conn. 675 -76. “[A]n alibi defense does not create a per se requirement that the state limit the times in the information more narrowly than the evidence available warrants.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blasius, 211 Conn. 455, 461 , 559 A.2d 1116 (1989).

2019Id., at 697 , 89 A.3d 426 .

2019Id., at 697 , 89 A.3d 426 .

2022We disagree. ‘‘[I]ntent, or any other essential element of a crime, is always at issue unless directly and explicitly admitted before the trier of fact.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Irizarry, 95 Conn. App. 224 , 233–34, 896 A.2d 828 , cert. denied, 279 Conn. 902 , 901 A.2d 1224 (2006); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 69–70, 112 S. Ct. 475 , 116 L.

2022We disagree. ‘‘[I]ntent, or any other essential element of a crime, is always at issue unless directly and explicitly admitted before the trier of fact.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Irizarry, 95 Conn. App. 224 , 233–34, 896 A.2d 828 , cert. denied, 279 Conn. 902 , 901 A.2d 1224 (2006); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 69–70, 112 S. Ct. 475 , 116 L.

2019See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction , 324 Conn. 904 , 152 A.3d 545 (2017).