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12 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gregggreen2 sentences2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶11] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . 2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶11] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . | 3 | 3 |
Bank of North Dakota v. Browngreen2 sentences2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶11] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . 2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶12] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Gagnongreen2 sentences2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶11] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . 2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶12] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . | 3 | 3 |
Stoner v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶11] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . 2014Stoner v. State of Cal. , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house . . . a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see, e.g. , State v. Gregg , 2000 ND 154, ¶ 24 , 615 N.W.2d 515 . [¶12] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Gagnon , 2012 ND 198, ¶ 8 , 821 N.W.2d 373 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Fuglestengreen2 sentences2026“In a motion to suppress, a person alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure.” Id. (citation omitted). 2026“Under the automobile exception, law enforcement may search for illegal contraband without a warrant when probable cause exists.” Id. (citation omitted). [¶9] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Fuglesten, 2024 ND 74, ¶ 10 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lubenow v. North Dakota State Highway Commissionergreen1 sentence2024Comm’r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531-32 (N.D. 1989), we explained Lubenow had no expectation of privacy regarding his activities in an open garage, but Lubenow had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the officer’s intrusion into his garage. [¶10] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Steelegreen1 sentence2024“In a motion to suppress, a person alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure.” Steele, 2023 ND 220, ¶ 8 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
Interest of E.L.green1 sentence2023“Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 2 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fieldgreen1 sentence1995See United States v. Field, 855 F.Supp. 1518 (W.D.Wis.1994); United States v. Ishmael, 843 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Tex.1994); State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kuruc
green
2 sentences2024Comm’r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531-32 (N.D. 1989), we explained Lubenow had no expectation of privacy regarding his activities in an open garage, but Lubenow had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the officer’s intrusion into his garage. [¶10] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). 2024Comm’r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531-32 (N.D. 1989), we explained Lubenow had no expectation of privacy regarding his activities in an open garage, but Lubenow had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the officer’s intrusion into his garage. [¶10] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). | 2 | 2023–2024 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2024Comm’r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531-32 (N.D. 1989), we explained Lubenow had no expectation of privacy regarding his activities in an open garage, but Lubenow had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the officer’s intrusion into his garage. [¶10] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). 2024Comm’r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531-32 (N.D. 1989), we explained Lubenow had no expectation of privacy regarding his activities in an open garage, but Lubenow had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the officer’s intrusion into his garage. [¶10] “Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 7 , 862 N.W.2d 831 (quoting State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, ¶ 12 , 846 N.W.2d 314 ). | 2 | 2023–2024 |
State v. Torkelsen
green
2 sentences2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). 2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Graf
green
2 sentences2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). 2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Mitzel
green
2 sentences2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). 2016Mitzel , 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N.W.2d 120 . [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelsen , 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 (quoting Graf , 2006 ND 196, ¶ 9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
City of Jamestown v. Casarez
green
2 sentences2023In a motion to suppress, “[a] person alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure.” City of Jamestown v. Casarez, 2021 ND 71, ¶ 16 , 958 N.W.2d 467 (quoting Schmidt, 2016 ND 187, ¶ 8 ). 2023In a motion to suppress, “[a] person alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure.” City of Jamestown v. Casarez, 2021 ND 71, ¶ 16 , 958 N.W.2d 467 (quoting Schmidt, 2016 ND 187, ¶ 8 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence2023In a motion to suppress, “[a] person alleging a Fourth Amendment violation has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure.” City of Jamestown v. Casarez, 2021 ND 71, ¶ 16 , 958 N.W.2d 467 (quoting Schmidt, 2016 ND 187, ¶ 8 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Biwer
green
2 sentences2019"Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule." Williams , at ¶ 7 ; State v. Biwer , 2018 ND 185 , ¶ 13, 915 N.W.2d 837 . 2019"Evidence discovered during a warrantless search when no exception exists must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule." Williams , at ¶ 7 ; State v. Biwer , 2018 ND 185 , ¶ 13, 915 N.W.2d 837 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Avila
green
2 sentences2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). 2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2016Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12 , 685 N,W.2d 120. [¶23] “‘Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement,’ but the consent must be voluntary and the State has the burden of proof.” Torkelseri, 2008 ND 141, ¶ 21 , 752 N.W.2d 640 ' (quoting Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶9 , 721 N.W.2d 381 ), “A district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38 , 809 N.W.2d 309 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16 , 566 N.W.2d 410 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Segura v. United States
green
2 sentences2012Id. at ¶ 12. [¶ 9] The State argues Niebuhr’s “quick walk” through Gagnon’s residence was lawful under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). 2012Id. at ¶ 12. [¶ 9] The State argues Niebuhr’s “quick walk” through Gagnon’s residence was lawful under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Blumler
green
1 sentence1998Blu mler, 458 N.W.2d at 302 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Ishmael
green
1 sentence1995See United States v. Field, 855 F.Supp. 1518 (W.D.Wis.1994); United States v. Ishmael, 843 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Tex.1994); State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences1995See United States v. Field, 855 F.Supp. 1518 (W.D.Wis.1994); United States v. Ishmael, 843 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Tex.1994); State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994). 1995See United States v. Field, 855 F.Supp. 1518 (W.D.Wis.1994); United States v. Ishmael, 843 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Tex.1994); State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173 , 867 P.2d 593 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.