Ford motion in New York

2009While Ford should have attached a copy of the pleadings to its cross motion (CPLR 3212 [b]), the defect was properly overlooked (see Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 46 AD3d 484 , 485 [2007], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 11 NY3d 768 [2008]).

2009While Ford should have attached a copy of the pleadings to its cross motion (CPLR 3212 [b]), the defect was properly overlooked (see Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 46 AD3d 484 , 485 [2007], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 11 NY3d 768 [2008]).

2007We further conclude, under the unusual circumstances of this case, that the court providently exercised its discretion in granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time in which to effectuate service of process upon the Ford defendants pursuant to CPLR 306-b (see Rivera v Ostad, 37 AD3d 374 [2007]; Rosenzweig v 600 N. St., LLC, 35 AD3d 705 [2006]; Arango v Bonilla, 29 AD3d 834 [2006]).

2007We further conclude, under the unusual circumstances of this case, that the court providently exercised its discretion in granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time in which to effectuate service of process upon the Ford defendants pursuant to CPLR 306-b (see Rivera v Ostad, 37 AD3d 374 [2007]; Rosenzweig v 600 N. St., LLC, 35 AD3d 705 [2006]; Arango v Bonilla, 29 AD3d 834 [2006]).

2007We further conclude, under the unusual circumstances of this case, that the court providently exercised its discretion in granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time in which to effectuate service of process upon the Ford defendants pursuant to CPLR 306-b (see Rivera v Ostad, 37 AD3d 374 [2007]; Rosenzweig v 600 N. St., LLC, 35 AD3d 705 [2006]; Arango v Bonilla, 29 AD3d 834 [2006]).

2005The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Ford’s motion for leave to renew, as the new facts upon which the motion was based would not have changed the court’s prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]; Gorman v Ochoa, 2 AD3d 582 [2003]).

2005Contrary to plaintiffs argument, this appeal does not fall within the exception to the rule (see Matter of City of New York v Mobil Oil Corp., 12 AD3d 77 [2004]) because the orders being challenged do not limit the legal theory of the liability case.

1999Further, as to the Rossback defendants, CPLR 214 (6), as amended, is applicable to a claim of appraiser malpractice, such as here, that accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment but was not yet interposed as of the effective date of the amendment, regardless of how pleaded (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, supra; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447 ).

1999Further, as to the Rossback defendants, CPLR 214 (6), as amended, is applicable to a claim of appraiser malpractice, such as here, that accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment but was not yet interposed as of the effective date of the amendment, regardless of how pleaded (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, supra; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447 ).

1998Since there is no dispute that, at the time of the commencement of the action, plaintiff and decedent retained their home in Schoharie County and that this is the location where plaintiff was appointed administrator (see, CPLR 503 [a], [b]), we find no abuse of Supreme Court’s considerable discretion in granting Ford’s motion (see, Levi v Levi, 201 AD2d 794, 795 ).

1998Finally, Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ cross motion to retain venue based on the convenience of material witnesses (see, CPLR 510 [3]; Schaefer v Schwartz, 226 AD2d 619, 620 ; O’Brien v Vassar Bros.

1998Co., 238 AD2d 483, 484 ).

1992As to Ford’s argument that Supreme Court erred in denying Ford’s motion to dismiss HP’s cross claim against it for indemnification, HP’s potential strict products liability for selling the allegedly defective vehicle gives it a cause of action for indemnification against Ford as the manufacturer responsible for the defect (see, McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211 ; cf., Rosado v Proctor & Schwartz, 66 NY2d 21 ).

1992As to Ford’s argument that Supreme Court erred in denying Ford’s motion to dismiss HP’s cross claim against it for indemnification, HP’s potential strict products liability for selling the allegedly defective vehicle gives it a cause of action for indemnification against Ford as the manufacturer responsible for the defect (see, McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211 ; cf., Rosado v Proctor & Schwartz, 66 NY2d 21 ).

1988However, the rule has been established that "the existence of a defect may be proven circumstantially” (Brandon v Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 125 AD2d 625, 626 ; see also, Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386 ; Iadicicco v Duffy, 60 AD2d 905 ).

1988However, the rule has been established that "the existence of a defect may be proven circumstantially” (Brandon v Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 125 AD2d 625, 626 ; see also, Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386 ; Iadicicco v Duffy, 60 AD2d 905 ).

1979Order affirmed with $50 costs and disbursements (see Ribley v Harsco Corp., 57 AD2d 228 ; Goff v Econetics, Inc., 94 Misc 2d 869 ).

1979Order affirmed with $50 costs and disbursements (see Ribley v Harsco Corp., 57 AD2d 228 ; Goff v Econetics, Inc., 94 Misc 2d 869 ).

1961(Campo v. Scofield, 301 N. Y. 468, 471 .) Defendant Ford’s motion is granted only to the extent of dismissing the fourth cause of action as to it and in all other respects the motion is denied.