11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Panetti v. Dretkegreen2 sentences2007Panetti appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a prisoner who lacks a rational understanding of the State's reason for execution." Panetti, 448 F.3d at 817-18. 2007Panetti appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a prisoner who lacks a rational understanding of the State's reason for execution." Panetti, 448 F.3d at 817-18. | 1 | 1 |
Baird v. Stategreen2 sentences2006As I stated in dissenting in Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 34 (Ind.2005), I am not confident that the Ford standard will ultimately prove to be the test for eligibility to be executed consistent with the Eighth Amendment. 2006As I stated in dissenting in Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 34 (Ind.2005), I am not confident that the Ford standard will ultimately prove to be the test for eligibility to be executed consistent with the Eighth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Rhodes v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2006See, eg., Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 385 (holding that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Martinez-Villarealgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 528 U.S. 637 , 645, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 1622 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998). 2005See, e.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 528 U.S. 637 , 645, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 1622 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Timberlake v. State
green
2 sentences2024For example, in Timberlake, our court rejected the Ford claim even though Timberlake suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia because he had “the mental capacity to understand that he [was] about to be executed and why.” Timberlake, 858 N.E.2d at 626 . 2024For example, in Timberlake, our court rejected the Ford claim even though Timberlake suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia because he had “the mental capacity to understand that he [was] about to be executed and why.” Timberlake, 858 N.E.2d at 626 . | 2 | 2007–2024 |
Panetti v. Quarterman
green
2 sentences2013The Ford standard for “insane”, as articulated by Justice Powell, encompasses persons “who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” As to Panetti which clarifies that a person is to have a “rational understanding” of the State’s rationale for an execution, we stated in our opinion: As we read Panetti , a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the 2013The Ford standard for “insane”, as articulated by Justice Powell, encompasses persons “who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” As to Panetti which clarifies that a person is to have a “rational understanding” of the State’s rationale for an execution, we stated in our opinion: As we read Panetti , a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the | 2 | 2007–2013 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences2005In this context, persons are insane if they are "unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2954 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (effectively adopting Justice Powell's definition of insane from his concurring opinion in Ford ), abrogated in part on other grounds in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); accord Order, Fleenor v. State, No. 41S00-9910, MS-625 (Ind. Dec. 6, 1999) (unpublished; applying Ford standard of insanity to prisoner's successive post-convic 2005In this context, persons are insane if they are "unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2954 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (effectively adopting Justice Powell's definition of insane from his concurring opinion in Ford ), abrogated in part on other grounds in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); accord Order, Fleenor v. State, No. 41S00-9910, MS-625 (Ind. Dec. 6, 1999) (unpublished; applying Ford standard of insanity to prisoner's successive post-convic | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Overstreet v. State
green
2 sentences2013The Ford standard for “insane”, as articulated by Justice Powell, encompasses persons “who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” As to Panetti which clarifies that a person is to have a “rational understanding” of the State’s rationale for an execution, we stated in our opinion: As we read Panetti , a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the 2013The Ford standard for “insane”, as articulated by Justice Powell, encompasses persons “who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” As to Panetti which clarifies that a person is to have a “rational understanding” of the State’s rationale for an execution, we stated in our opinion: As we read Panetti , a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation
green
2 sentences2009The case cited by the dissent, In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, 7 F.Supp.2d 792 (E.D.La.1998) does discuss a Ford instruction to put children in the rear seat when possible. 2009The case cited by the dissent, In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, 7 F.Supp.2d 792 (E.D.La.1998) does discuss a Ford instruction to put children in the rear seat when possible. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2005In this context, persons are insane if they are "unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2954 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (effectively adopting Justice Powell's definition of insane from his concurring opinion in Ford ), abrogated in part on other grounds in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); accord Order, Fleenor v. State, No. 41S00-9910, MS-625 (Ind. Dec. 6, 1999) (unpublished; applying Ford standard of insanity to prisoner's successive post-convic 2005In this context, persons are insane if they are "unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2954 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (effectively adopting Justice Powell's definition of insane from his concurring opinion in Ford ), abrogated in part on other grounds in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); accord Order, Fleenor v. State, No. 41S00-9910, MS-625 (Ind. Dec. 6, 1999) (unpublished; applying Ford standard of insanity to prisoner's successive post-convic | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lytle v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2004FACTS 1 As we reported in Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 696 N.E.2d 465 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, the relevant facts of this case are as follows: On August 31, 1987, Lytle, his wife Kyong and their daughter Michelle were riding in their 1987 Ford Ranger pickup truck when it was struck by another vehicle. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Burris v. Porter
green
2 sentences1991PAFCO claimed at the trial level in its response to Ford's motion that PAFCO's suit is properly filed in Orange County pursuant to T.R. 75(A)(2). [2] We addressed this issue previously in Burris v. Porter (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 879, 881 . 1991PAFCO claimed at the trial level in its response to Ford’s motion that PAFCO’s suit is properly filed in Orange County pursuant to T.R. 75(A)(2). 2 We addressed this issue previously in Burris v. Porter (1985), Ind.App., 477 N.E.2d 879, 881 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Eskridge v. State
green
2 sentences1988Given Ford's claim of insufficient evidence, "the State should have had an opportunity to supply such insufficiency or reopen the case for that purpose, even after it had rested, since a trial is not a game of technicalities, but one in which the facts and truth are sought." Eskridge v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 363, 369 , 281 N.E.2d 490, 493 . 1988Given Ford's claim of insufficient evidence, "the State should have had an opportunity to supply such insufficiency or reopen the case for that purpose, even after it had rested, since a trial is not a game of technicalities, but one in which the facts and truth are sought." Eskridge v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 363, 369 , 281 N.E.2d 490, 493 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.