Ford motion in California

2008(See Bado-Santana v. Ford Motor Co. (D.P.R.2005) 364 F.Supp.2d 79, 92-94 [in rollover case involving *299 Explorer, court denied Ford's motion in limine to exclude evidence of design and development history of Bronco II as too dissimilar to Explorer, finding such evidence relevant to Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability design flaws].) Moreover, "[w]hen evidence is offered to show only that defendant had notice of a dangerous condition, the requirement of similarity of circumstances is relaxed: `"[A]ll that is required ... is that the previous injury should be such as to attrac

2006(See Bado-Santana v. Ford Motor Co. (D.P.R. 2005) 364 F.Supp.2d 79, 92-94 [in rollover case involving Ford Explorer, court denied Ford’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of design and development history of Bronco II as too dissimilar to Explorer, finding such evidence relevant to Ford’s knowledge of and failure to correct stability design flaws].) Moreover, “[w]hen evidence is offered to show only that defendant had notice of a dangerous condition, the requirement of similarity of circumstances is relaxed: ‘ “[A]ll that is required ... is that the previous injury should be such as to attr

1980It has been held that an apparent Ford error is not prejudicial when the evidence in question is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence to the same effect. ( People v. Bowen (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 267, 292-293 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 ].) Defendant claims the testimony of Robison is not merely cumulative because she was a more credible witness than Khan and her testimony thus corroborated his. [12] Nevertheless, after a review of the entire record we are of the opinion that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of this erro

1980It has been held that an apparent Ford error is not prejudicial when the evidence in question is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence to the same effect. ( People v. Bowen (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 267, 292-293 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 ].) Defendant claims the testimony of Robison is not merely cumulative because she was a more credible witness than Khan and her testimony thus corroborated his. [12] Nevertheless, after a review of the entire record we are of the opinion that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of this erro

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

1980Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement — i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value — has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 ] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 522 P.2d 681 ]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the

2015(Id. at p. 523.) The Hess court found Hess offered no reasonable alternative construction of the broad language of the release and failed to allege any ambiguity so his only defense to Ford’s claim was mutual mistake. ( Hess, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 525.) The court found, however, the uncontroverted extrinsic evidence established a mutual mistake as all the parties to the release did not intend to release Ford.

2002According to the majority, plaintiff had the burden of establishing "mutual mistake as his only defense to Ford's claim of third party beneficiary status." (Maj. opn., ante, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 227 , 41 P.3d at p. 52 .) Implicit in that statement is the assumption that Ford did show it was a third party beneficiary of the release form that Phillip's insurer, Continental, had plaintiff sign.

2015“Moreover, even if we were to consider the release as evidence supporting Ford’s claim to be a third party beneficiary, the properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly refutes its claim.” (Ibid.) Although the same result was reached by either analysis in this case, the concurrence noted that may not always be the case as the difference in whether the party claiming to be a third party beneficiary or the party claiming a mutual mistake bears the burden of proof “could be decisive in another case.” (Id. at p. 536.) “[T]he question of how much evidence a defendant must present to establish a right

2015“Moreover, even if we were to consider the release as evidence supporting Ford’s claim to be a third party beneficiary, the properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly refutes its claim.” (Ibid.) Although the same result was reached by either analysis in this case, the concurrence noted that may not always be the case as the difference in whether the party claiming to be a third party beneficiary or the party claiming a mutual mistake bears the burden of proof “could be decisive in another case.” (Id. at p. 536 (cone. opn. of Kennard, J.).) “[T]he question of how much evidence a defendant must p

2008This failure in itself would allow this court to disregard Ford's arguments concerning damages. ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 , 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 .) Nevertheless, we elect to consider Ford's contention on the merits. [8] We also note, as discussed, ante, that we do not review whether the jury's original award of $118 million to the Wilsons "shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury." ( Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 507 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 364 P.2d 337 .) Rather, since the court remitted the award to $70 million as a condi

2008This failure in itself would allow this court to disregard Ford's arguments concerning damages. ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 , 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 .) Nevertheless, we elect to consider Ford's contention on the merits. [8] We also note, as discussed, ante, that we do not review whether the jury's original award of $118 million to the Wilsons "shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury." ( Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 507 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 364 P.2d 337 .) Rather, since the court remitted the award to $70 million as a condi

2023(Ford Warranty, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1333.) The Ford Warranty court explained, “That the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting [the manufacturer] has no right to demand arbitration.” (Ford Warranty, at p. 1334, italics omitted.) The Ford Warranty court agreed with Felisilda that “[e]quitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued [the manufacturer] based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied [the manufacturer] could enfo

2023(Ford Warranty, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1333.) The Ford Warranty court explained, “That the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting [the manufacturer] has no right to demand arbitration.” (Ford Warranty, at p. 1334, italics omitted.) The Ford Warranty court agreed with Felisilda that “[e]quitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued [the manufacturer] based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied [the manufacturer] could enfo

2023(Ford Warranty, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1333.) The Ford Warranty court explained, “That the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting [the manufacturer] has no right to demand arbitration.” (Ford Warranty, at p. 1334, italics omitted.) The Ford Warranty court agreed with Felisilda that “[e]quitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued [the manufacturer] based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied [the manufacturer] could enfo

2014(Ibid.) The Court also concluded the car dealer was strictly liable for defects in cars sold by it because, like manufacturers, car dealers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public and are “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.” (Vandermark, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 262 .) Samuel’s proposed special instruction was an incomplete recitation of the rule stated in Vandermark, i.e. that “a manufacturer of a completed product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect to a co

2014(Ibid.) The Court also concluded the car dealer was strictly liable for defects in cars sold by it because, like manufacturers, car dealers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public and are “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.” (Vandermark, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 262 .) Samuel’s proposed special instruction was an incomplete recitation of the rule stated in Vandermark, i.e. that “a manufacturer of a completed product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect to a co

2013The Act “is a remedial measure intended for protection of consumers and should be given a construction consistent with that purpose.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 801 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 ].) As a result, the plaintiff is not obligated to identify or prove the cause of the car’s defect.

2013The Act “is a remedial measure intended for protection of consumers and should be given a construction consistent with that purpose.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 801 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731 ].) As a result, the plaintiff is not obligated to identify or prove the cause of the car’s defect.

2013(Ford, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611 .) Century expressly rejects the Ford standard where a stay is involved and holds that a nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum is of “lesser significance.” (Century, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 412 ; accord, Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 713 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] [in upholding an order dismissing a defective-heart-valve case filed in California by nonresident plaintiffs who asserted their choice of forum was entitled to substantial weight, the court stated, “That factor derives most of its meaning from cases in which the plaintiff is a

2013(Ford, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611 .) Century expressly rejects the Ford standard where a stay is involved and holds that a nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum is of “lesser significance.” (Century, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 412 ; accord, Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 713 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] [in upholding an order dismissing a defective-heart-valve case filed in California by nonresident plaintiffs who asserted their choice of forum was entitled to substantial weight, the court stated, “That factor derives most of its meaning from cases in which the plaintiff is a

2013(Ford, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611 .) Century expressly rejects the Ford standard where a stay is involved and holds that a nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum is of “lesser significance.” (Century, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 412 ; accord, Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 713 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] [in upholding an order dismissing a defective-heart-valve case filed in California by nonresident plaintiffs who asserted their choice of forum was entitled to substantial weight, the court stated, “That factor derives most of its meaning from cases in which the plaintiff is a

2013(Ford, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611 .) Century expressly rejects the Ford standard where a stay is involved and holds that a nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum is of “lesser significance.” (Century, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 412 ; accord, Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 713 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ] [in upholding an order dismissing a defective-heart-valve case filed in California by nonresident plaintiffs who asserted their choice of forum was entitled to substantial weight, the court stated, “That factor derives most of its meaning from cases in which the plaintiff is a