Ford claim in Ohio

2025Under these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to order a new competency hearing following the Atkins/Ford hearing. {¶70} Indeed, the fact that defense counsel, who presumably had the most familiarity with Deloney’s capacity to assist in his own defense, requested no further competency hearings after 2020 distinguishes this case from State v. Were, 2002-Ohio-481 .

2025Under these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to order a new competency hearing following the Atkins/Ford hearing. {¶70} Indeed, the fact that defense counsel, who presumably had the most familiarity with Deloney’s capacity to assist in his own defense, requested no further competency hearings after 2020 distinguishes this case from State v. Were, 2002-Ohio-481 .

2023Appellant argued he was entitled to relief from the court’s denial of his Atkins claim because subsequent events, including the updated definition of intellectual disability under Ohio law rendered it inequitable to continue under his prior Atkins postconviction relief judgment. {¶22} The State moved to dismiss appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, arguing that it should be recast as a second petition for postconviction relief under State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2008-Ohio-545 , 882 N.E.2d 431 because it was: (1) filed subsequent to his direct appeal; (2) claimed a denial of his constitution

2023Appellant argued he was entitled to relief from the court’s denial of his Atkins claim because subsequent events, including the updated definition of intellectual disability under Ohio law rendered it inequitable to continue under his prior Atkins postconviction relief judgment. {¶22} The State moved to dismiss appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, arguing that it should be recast as a second petition for postconviction relief under State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2008-Ohio-545 , 882 N.E.2d 431 because it was: (1) filed subsequent to his direct appeal; (2) claimed a denial of his constitution

2021Clermont No. -6- Madison CA2019-10-027 CA2020-04-020, 2020-Ohio-5566, ¶ 37 .

2021“A criminal statute is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to contain ascertainable standards of guilt.” State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256, 257 , 479 N.E.2d 901 (8th Dist.1984), citing State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370 , 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980).

2021“A criminal statute is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to contain ascertainable standards of guilt.” State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256, 257 , 479 N.E.2d 901 (8th Dist.1984), citing State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370 , 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980).

2021Therefore, because "[f]ew decisions at trial are as subjective or prone to individual attorney strategy as juror voir dire," State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , ¶ 64, Ford's claim that he was provided ineffective assistance when Attorney Culbert failed to properly object to two potential jurors lacks merit. {¶ 17} Ford finally argues that Attorney Culbert provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel when Attorney Culbert (1) failed to "ask any questions of the victim regarding her prior inconsistent statements" as to the cause of her injuries and (2) failed to "ask any

2021Fayette No. CA2006-08-030, 2009-Ohio-197, ¶ 49 , Ford's claim that he was provided ineffective assistance when Attorney Culbert failed to issue subpoenas and call as witnesses the medical professionals who treated the victim for her injuries lacks -5- Madison CA2019-10-027 merit. {¶ 16} Ford next argues Attorney Culbert was ineffective by failing to properly object to two potential jurors – one juror who knew the prosecutor from social settings and another juror who was married to a police officer employed at another department.

2021“A criminal statute is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to contain ascertainable standards of guilt.” State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256, 257 , 479 N.E.2d 901 (8th Dist.1984), citing State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370 , 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980).

2021“A criminal statute is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to contain ascertainable standards of guilt.” State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256, 257 , 479 N.E.2d 901 (8th Dist.1984), citing State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370 , 406 N.E.2d 499 (1980).

2020Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial court, in rejecting Ford’s claim that his conduct constituted proper and reasonable parental discipline, did not clearly lose its way and create such a manifest 4 Ford cites State v. Ivey, 98 Ohio App.3d 249 , 648 N.E.2d 519 (8th Dist.1994), to support his claim that the corporate punishment he administered on K.C. and the resulting harm was not excessive.

2020Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial court, in rejecting Ford’s claim that his conduct constituted proper and reasonable parental discipline, did not clearly lose its way and create such a manifest 4 Ford cites State v. Ivey, 98 Ohio App.3d 249 , 648 N.E.2d 519 (8th Dist.1994), to support his claim that the corporate punishment he administered on K.C. and the resulting harm was not excessive.

2019Thomas v. Othman , 2017-Ohio-8449 , 99 N.E.3d 1189 , ¶18 (1st Dist.).

2019Thomas v. Othman , 2017-Ohio-8449 , 99 N.E.3d 1189 , ¶18 (1st Dist.).

2019In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court confronted with an allegation of external tampering or contact with a juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury “should determine the circumstances, the impact [of the circumstances] upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.” Id. at 230 . {¶ 275} Nonetheless, “not all communications with jurors warrant a hearing for a determination of potential bias.” White v. Smith,

2019In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court confronted with an allegation of external tampering or contact with a juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury “should determine the circumstances, the impact [of the circumstances] upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.” Id. at 230 . {¶ 275} Nonetheless, “not all communications with jurors warrant a hearing for a determination of potential bias.” White v. Smith,

2019There is no evidence of police overreaching. {¶ 211} We also reject Ford’s claim that Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), shows that his statements to Beech were involuntary.

2019There is no evidence of police overreaching. {¶ 211} We also reject Ford’s claim that Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), shows that his statements to Beech were involuntary.

2019Id. 38 January Term, 2019 {¶ 145} The record belies Ford’s claim that the trial court unduly limited defense questioning about juror No. 72’s views about the death penalty.

2019Id. 38 January Term, 2019 {¶ 145} The record belies Ford’s claim that the trial court unduly limited defense questioning about juror No. 72’s views about the death penalty.

2019It is like unringing his own bell.” However, Ford’s claim overlooks that “a judge is presumed to be capable of separating what may be properly considered from what may not be considered.” In re Disqualification of Forsthoefel, 135 Ohio St.3d 1316 , 2013-Ohio-2292 , 989 N.E.2d 62, ¶ 9 .

2019It is like unringing his own bell.” However, Ford’s claim overlooks that “a judge is presumed to be capable of separating what may be properly considered from what may not be considered.” In re Disqualification of Forsthoefel, 135 Ohio St.3d 1316 , 2013-Ohio-2292 , 989 N.E.2d 62, ¶ 9 .

2016In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-370, 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test as follows: Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to 1On January 23, 2015, the trial court granted Ford’s motion to stay the sheriff’s sale and waiver of supersedeas bond. judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have th

2016The plain error doctrine is applicable in civil cases only where the error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121-123 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. {¶26} In response to Ford’s motion in limine, Sunbridge argued that evidence of Ford’s prior workers’ compensation claims was admissible because Ford denied having any prior low back injuries when she sought treatment from Dr. Stern.

2016The plain error doctrine is applicable in civil cases only where the error “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121-123 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. {¶26} In response to Ford’s motion in limine, Sunbridge argued that evidence of Ford’s prior workers’ compensation claims was admissible because Ford denied having any prior low back injuries when she sought treatment from Dr. Stern.

2016In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-370, 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test as follows: Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to 1On January 23, 2015, the trial court granted Ford’s motion to stay the sheriff’s sale and waiver of supersedeas bond. judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have th

2016In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-370, 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 , the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test as follows: Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to 1On January 23, 2015, the trial court granted Ford’s motion to stay the sheriff’s sale and waiver of supersedeas bond. judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have th

2015Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

2013Tran v. McGrath, 78 Ohio St.3d 45 , 676 N.E.2d 108 (1997). {¶3} Ford cannot establish the requisite elements that would merit the issuance of a writ of mandamus. {¶4} This original action concerns the trial court’s December 22, 2009 judgment entry that denied Ford’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea in Cuyahoga C.P.

2013Tran v. McGrath, 78 Ohio St.3d 45 , 676 N.E.2d 108 (1997). {¶3} Ford cannot establish the requisite elements that would merit the issuance of a writ of mandamus. {¶4} This original action concerns the trial court’s December 22, 2009 judgment entry that denied Ford’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea in Cuyahoga C.P.

2011Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), 551 U.S. 930, 946 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 , 168 L.Ed.2d 662 , citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (1998), 523 U.S. 637 , 118 S.Ct. 1618 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 . {¶ 5} On September 26, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court found that probable cause existed to believe that Brooks was presently insane within the meaning of R.C. 2949.28(A) and, therefore, was entitled to further proceedings on the insanity inquiry under the statute. {¶ 6} On October 11, 2011, the trial court commenced the inquiry pursuant to R.C. 2949.29.

2011Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), 551 U.S. 930, 946 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 , 168 L.Ed.2d 662 , citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (1998), 523 U.S. 637 , 118 S.Ct. 1618 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 . {¶ 5} On September 26, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court found that probable cause existed to believe that Brooks was presently insane within the meaning of R.C. 2949.28(A) and, therefore, was entitled to further proceedings on the insanity inquiry under the statute. {¶ 6} On October 11, 2011, the trial court commenced the inquiry pursuant to R.C. 2949.29.

2011Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), 551 U.S. 930, 946 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 , 168 L.Ed.2d 662 , citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (1998), 523 U.S. 637 , 118 S.Ct. 1618 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 . {¶ 5} On September 26, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court found that probable cause existed to believe that Brooks was presently insane within the meaning of R.C. 2949.28(A) and, therefore, was entitled to further proceedings on the insanity inquiry under the statute. {¶ 6} On October 11, 2011, the trial court commenced the inquiry pursuant to R.C. 2949.29.

2011Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), 551 U.S. 930, 946 , 127 S.Ct. 2842 , 168 L.Ed.2d 662 , citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (1998), 523 U.S. 637 , 118 S.Ct. 1618 , 140 L.Ed.2d 849 . {¶ 5} On September 26, 2011, following a hearing, the trial court found that probable cause existed to believe that Brooks was presently insane within the meaning of R.C. 2949.28(A) and, therefore, was entitled to further proceedings on the insanity inquiry under the statute. {¶ 6} On October 11, 2011, the trial court commenced the inquiry pursuant to R.C. 2949.29.

2008Retting v. General Motors Corp. , Cuyahoga App. No. 86837, 2006-Ohio-6576 .

2006See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit v. Foster, Cuyahoga App. No. 85623, 2005-Ohio-6091 ("The record reflects that Judge Keith Belkins, an acting judge, not a magistrate, granted Ford's motion for summary judgment; therefore, Civ.R. 53 does not apply). {¶ 63} Defendants' reliance upon In re J.V., Franklin App. No. 04AP-621, 2005-Ohio-4925 and Ludwick v. Ludwick, Fayette App. No. CA2002-08-017, 2003-Ohio-2925 , is misplaced.

2005Tracy v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 147 , 152 . {¶ 10} In this case, the trial court granted Ford's motion in limine and prohibited plaintiff from playing the portion of Dr. Schonfeld's videotaped deposition that related to his opinions of Vay's August 11, 2003 x-ray. {¶ 11} A motion in limine is a preliminary ruling.

2005Pena v. Northeast Ohio Emergency Affiliates, Inc. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 96 , 108 ; Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 1 , 4 .

2005Pena v. Northeast Ohio Emergency Affiliates, Inc. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 96 , 108 ; Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 1 , 4 .