created exception in Texas

2015This Court created an exception to that rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2015This Court created an exception to that rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2023Reasoning that “[t]olling the expert-report period both protects a claimant’s absolute right to nonsuit and is consistent with the statute’s overall structure,” the court created a rule-based solution holding that “when a claimant nonsuits a claim governed by the TMLA before the expiration of the statutory deadline to serve an expert report and subsequently refiles the claim against the same defendant, the expert-report period is tolled between the date nonsuit was taken and the date the new lawsuit is filed.” See id. at 234 .

2014Prevot then discusses three Texas Supreme Court cases in which the Court created an exception to the bill of review requirements: Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. 1964), Petro-Chemical Transport, Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1974), and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1975).

2013App. 1987) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)). 3 advice, this court created a standard in Ex parte Lemke.6 We held that, when an applicant received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, he was “prejudiced [simply] by the missed opportunity of accepting such bargain and presenting it to the trial court for consideration.”7 After examining the holdings of other jurisdictions, we concluded that the applicant did not need to show the trial court would have actually accepted the plea agreement.8 We noted that a California court had suggested that a defendant may be

2010Michigan v. Jackson In Jackson, the Court created a presumption that any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is likewise invalid if police initiate interrogation once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or formal preliminary hearing initiating criminal proceedings, analogizing to the similar prophylactic rule 43 498 U.S. at 156 , 111 S. Ct. at 492 . 44 462 U.S. 1039 , 1044–46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 2834–35 (1983); see Cross v. State, 144 S.W .3d 521, 526–27 (Tex. Crim.

2010Michigan v. Jackson In Jackson, the Court created a presumption that any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is likewise invalid if police initiate interrogation once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or formal preliminary hearing initiating criminal proceedings, analogizing to the similar prophylactic rule 43 498 U.S. at 156 , 111 S. Ct. at 492 . 44 462 U.S. 1039 , 1044–46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 2834–35 (1983); see Cross v. State, 144 S.W .3d 521, 526–27 (Tex. Crim.

2010Michigan v. Jackson In Jackson, the Court created a presumption that any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is likewise invalid if police initiate interrogation once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or formal preliminary hearing initiating criminal proceedings, analogizing to the similar prophylactic rule 43 498 U.S. at 156 , 111 S. Ct. at 492 . 44 462 U.S. 1039 , 1044–46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 2834–35 (1983); see Cross v. State, 144 S.W .3d 521, 526–27 (Tex. Crim.

2010Michigan v. Jackson In Jackson, the Court created a presumption that any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is likewise invalid if police initiate interrogation once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or formal preliminary hearing initiating criminal proceedings, analogizing to the similar prophylactic rule 43 498 U.S. at 156 , 111 S. Ct. at 492 . 44 462 U.S. 1039 , 1044–46, 103 S. Ct. 2830 , 2834–35 (1983); see Cross v. State, 144 S.W .3d 521, 526–27 (Tex. Crim.

1995Thus, in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1971), this court created the presumption that a surface owner conveying "minerals" did not intend to convey the right to destroy his interest.

1995Thus, in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1971), this court created the presumption that a surface owner conveying “minerals” did not intend to convey the right to destroy his interest.

1994Id. at 293 .

1994Id. at 293 .

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1978In Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 291 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1956), the Court created an exception to the Luling rule to permit a corporation to serve as a limited partner. 291 S.W.2d at 315 .

1978In Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 291 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1956), the Court created an exception to the Luling rule to permit a corporation to serve as a limited partner. 291 S.W.2d at 315 .

1978However, in Ex Parte Moffett, 542 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), this Court created an exception to the rule prohibiting collateral attacks on the sufficiency of evidence.

1978On the basis of this decision, the Court of Civil Appeals held, in a 2-1 decision in Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1974), that it is `permissible in this State to form a limited partnership where a corporation is the only general partner.' 517 S.W.2d at 423 .

1978On the basis of this decision, the Court of Civil Appeals held, in a 2-1 decision in Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1974), that it is `permissible in this State to form a limited partnership where a corporation is the only general partner.' 517 S.W.2d at 423 .