clear showing error in Florida

2016See also Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989) (holding that the “determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error”).

2012See Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989) (“The determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.”).

2004However, this Court has long recognized that a "trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert witness may be allowed to testify, and, unless there is a clear showing of error, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal." Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1980).

1989In Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1980), the supreme court said: The trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert witness may be allowed to testify, and, unless there is a clear showing of error, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal... .

2022While a trial court has “discretion to determine a witness’s qualifications to express an opinion as an expert,” a trial court’s exclusion of an expert’s opinion will only be upheld “absent a clear showing of error.” Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 892 (Fla. 2000).

2018An expert witness may acquire 9 this specialized knowledge through an occupation or business or frequent interaction with the subject matter.”); Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 892 (Fla. 2000) (“It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine a witness’s qualifications to express an opinion as an expert, and the trial court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.”).

2012See generally Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 682 (Fla.1995) ("A trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert witness can testify, and, absent a clear showing of error, the court’s ruling on such matters will be upheld.”). .

2004See Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 682 (Fla. 1995) ("A trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert witness can testify, and, absent a clear showing of error, the court's ruling on such matters will be upheld.").

2007See Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774, 777 (Fla.1983); Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So.2d 894, 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citing Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996)).

2003It is well settled that the determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error. [12] See Provenzano v. State, 750 So.2d 597, 602 (Fla.1999); Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999); Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996); Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 960 (Fla.1996); Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989).

2002See Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Fla.1981).

2001See Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Fla.1981).

2019And we observe “that the determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” Anderson v. State, 863 So. 2d 169, 179 (Fla. 2003) (citations omitted).

2012"It is well settled that the determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error." Anderson v. State, 863 So.2d 169, 179 (Fla. 2003) (emphasis added).

2007See Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774, 777 (Fla.1983); Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So.2d 894, 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citing Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996)).

2001See, e.g., Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1996); Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774, 777 (Fla.1983).

2003It is well settled that the determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error. [12] See Provenzano v. State, 750 So.2d 597, 602 (Fla.1999); Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999); Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996); Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 960 (Fla.1996); Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989).

2003In Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 960 (Fla.1996), the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error." Id.

2001Co. v. Lake Region Packing Ass'n, 211 So.2d 25, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (concluding that the determination of a witness' qualification to express an opinion, which would include an inquiry into and an evaluation of the basis of the witness' knowledge, is peculiarly a matter within the realm of the trial judge who should not be reversed in the absence of a clear showing of error); see also Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1982) ("[E]ven if the comment is objectionable on some obvious ground, the proper procedure is to request an instruction from the court that the jury disregard the re

1971Co. v. Lake Region Packing Ass'n, Fla.App. 1968, 211 So.2d 25, 31 , wherein we stated: "* * * The determination of a witness' qualification to express an opinion — which would include an inquiry into and an evaluation of the basis of the witness' knowledge — is peculiarly a matter within the realm of the trial judge who should not be reversed in the absence of a clear showing of error." The defendant's second point is: "Did the trial judge err in determining that the condition of the crossing was *314 not a fact question for the jury to decide and allowing plaintiff's witness, Donald E.

2026Swiss v. Flanagan, 329 So. 3d 199 , 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citing Estate of Brock v. Brock, 692 So. 2d 907, 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). 2 self-authentication, was non-compliant due to several technical violations of the notary statute, section 117.05 of the Florida Statutes.

2018In sum, as our sister court stated in Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996): It is axiomatic that the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence will not be disturbed by a reviewing court in the absence of a clear showing of error, or that the conclusions reached are erroneous.

1985See, Tampa Bay Moving Systems, Inc. v. Frederick, 433 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

1984Tampa Bay Moving Systems, Inc. v. Frederick, 433 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

2022A witness is qualified to provide expert testimony if he or she possesses specialized “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” so long as “(1) [t]he testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) [t]he testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) [t]he witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2020) (incorporating the standard for admission of expert testimony found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, In

2021See Madrigal, 22 So. 3d 829 (noting: “It is axiomatic that the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence will not be 6 disturbed by a reviewing court in the absence of a clear showing of error, or that the conclusions reached are erroneous”) (internal quotation omitted).

2018“Under Frye . . . , expert opinion testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified and the opinion falls within the witness's expertise.” Baan v. Columbia Cty., 180 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2015As explained in Chavez v. State, 12 So.3d 199, 205 (Fla.2009), it “is within the court’s discretion to determine the qualifications of a witness to express an expert opinion, and this determination will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” The court noted that the prior version of section 90.702, Florida Statutes; “requires the court to make two preliminary determinations: (1) whether the subject matter, will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a disputed fact, and (2) . whether the witness is adequately qualified to express an opinion on the m

2015As explained in Chavez v. State, 12 So.3d 199, 205 (Fla.2009), it “is within the court’s discretion to determine the qualifications of a witness to express an expert opinion, and this determination will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” The court noted that the prior version of section 90.702, Florida Statutes; “requires the court to make two preliminary determinations: (1) whether the subject matter, will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a disputed fact, and (2) . whether the witness is adequately qualified to express an opinion on the m

2015As explained in Chavez v. State, 12 So.3d 199, 205 (Fla.2009), it “is within the court’s discretion to determine the qualifications of a witness to express an expert opinion, and this determination will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” The court noted that the prior version of section 90.702, Florida Statutes; “requires the court to make two preliminary determinations: (1) whether the subject matter, will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a disputed fact, and (2) . whether the witness is adequately qualified to express an opinion on the m

2007See Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774, 777 (Fla.1983); Davis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 787 So.2d 894, 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citing Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996)).

2007See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 815 (Fla.2002); Finney, 660 So.2d at 682 .

2006“The determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.” Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 575 (Fla.2005)(quoting Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989)).

2003Caudill's qualifications were similar to those of the blood spatter expert in Cheshire *180 v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 913 (Fla. 1990). [13] In Cheshire, we stated: Cheshire alleges that the trial court improperly qualified a man named Allen Miller as an expert in blood-spatter evidence.