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12 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). 2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). | 2 | 4 |
Nelson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013That doctrine, established by Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 , and other state and federal cases, “was formulated so that an accused is not required to surrender one constitutional right in order to gain the benefit of another.” Nelson v. State, 765 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. 2013That doctrine, established by Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 , and other state and federal cases, “was formulated so that an accused is not required to surrender one constitutional right in order to gain the benefit of another.” Nelson v. State, 765 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Arizmendigreen1 sentence2025Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 150 (“Consequently, appellee’s failure to obtain the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing was due to [his] lack of diligence.”). 9 Third, the “evidence [wa]s merely impeaching” of Johnson or Gillespie. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Enriquezgreen1 sentence2023In response to Alonso’s jurisdictional challenge, the State maintains that “[c]ause number CR-16-05952-A(W) is not currently before the Court”; an incorrect cause number is insufficient to divest this Court of its jurisdiction, and we have the authority to sua sponte assign a new criminal cause number to create compliance with Article 11.072 to the extent it is necessary; and although the trial court’s discharge of a defendant’s community supervision “would normally divest jurisdiction from the trial court . . . , the Legislature has clearly extended the jurisdiction of a trial court for the l | 1 | 1 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2013Heinrichs testified with regard to the appellate fees when the court agreed to reopen evidence for the limited purpose of hearing additional testimony on attorney’s fees. -4- 04-11-00800-CV 282 S.W.3d at 629 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 & n.16. | 1 | 1 |
Urquhart v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See also Urquhart v. State, 128 S.W.3d 701, 706-07 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, pet. ref’d); Bhakta v. State, 124 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Reale v. State, No. 14-02-00621-CR, 2003 WL 22208385 , at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sep. 25, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Young v. State, No. 10-02-00186-CR, 2003 WL 22023670 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Waco Aug. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Washburn v. State, No. 04-99-00927-CR, 2002 WL 31015255 , at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Sep.11, 2002, no pet.) (not desig | 1 | 1 |
Bhakta v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See also Urquhart v. State, 128 S.W.3d 701, 706-07 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, pet. ref’d); Bhakta v. State, 124 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Reale v. State, No. 14-02-00621-CR, 2003 WL 22208385 , at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sep. 25, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Young v. State, No. 10-02-00186-CR, 2003 WL 22023670 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Waco Aug. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Washburn v. State, No. 04-99-00927-CR, 2002 WL 31015255 , at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Sep.11, 2002, no pet.) (not desig | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eric Ramirez v. State of Texas
green
2 sentences2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). 2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Crosson v. State
green
2 sentences2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). 2013In response to the objection, and after asking the State about the applicability of the limited purpose doctrine, the trial judge stated that he had compared Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), and Crosson v. State, 36 S.W.3d 642 , 643–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), with Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152 , 154–56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Lopez v. State
green
2 sentences1979There were, of course, examining trials and habeas corpus hearings to reduce bail, etc. Under the influence of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), 2 this court in Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), overruling Gonzales and Rubens sub silentio, held that an accused might testify for a limited purpose in a hearing conducted in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the confession. 1979There were, of course, examining trials and habeas corpus hearings to reduce bail, etc. Under the influence of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), [2] this court in Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), overruling Gonzales and Rubens sub silentio, held that an accused might testify for a limited purpose in a hearing conducted in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the confession. | 2 | 1969–1979 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1979There were, of course, examining trials and habeas corpus hearings to reduce bail, etc. Under the influence of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), 2 this court in Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), overruling Gonzales and Rubens sub silentio, held that an accused might testify for a limited purpose in a hearing conducted in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the confession. 1979There were, of course, examining trials and habeas corpus hearings to reduce bail, etc. Under the influence of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), 2 this court in Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), overruling Gonzales and Rubens sub silentio, held that an accused might testify for a limited purpose in a hearing conducted in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the confession. | 2 | 1969–1979 |
Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry
green
1 sentence2013Heinrichs testified with regard to the appellate fees when the court agreed to reopen evidence for the limited purpose of hearing additional testimony on attorney’s fees. -4- 04-11-00800-CV 282 S.W.3d at 629 ; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 & n.16. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Russell v. State
green
2 sentences1994We addressed the subsequent use of testimony from a limited-purpose hearing in Russell v. State, 604 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 1994We addressed the subsequent use of testimony from a limited-purpose hearing in Russell v. State, 604 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Montgomery v. State
green
2 sentences1994Id. 1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Brumfield v. State
green
2 sentences1992On petition to this Court, the State cited Chavez as supporting the admissibility of the prior testimony; Nelson relied on Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (On State’s Motion for Rehearing) for the contrary 11 , and the limited purpose doctrine from Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). 1992On petition to this Court, the State cited Chavez as supporting the admissibility of the prior testimony; Nelson relied on Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim.App.1969) (On State's Motion for Rehearing) for the contrary [11] and the limited purpose doctrine from Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Estelle v. Smith
green
1 sentence1983In Smith , the Supreme Court specifically excepted examinations used for this limited purpose from the warning requirement. 101 S.Ct. at 1874 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Masters v. State
green
2 sentences1979There the court said: “Should the defendant testify at such a hearing, the cross-examination of the defendant shall be limited solely to the facts surrounding the voluntariness of the confession, and the defendant shall not be subject to cross-examination except for the limited purpose of facts involving the voluntary nature of his confession, nor shall the defendant be compelled to take the stand upon the trial of the cause upon its merits because of his testimony at this hearing.” In Masters v. State, 545 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), it was held that the court reversibly erred in refusing t 1979There the court said: "Should the defendant testify at such a hearing, the cross-examination of the defendant shall be limited solely to the facts surrounding the voluntariness of the confession, and the defendant shall not be subject to cross-examination except for the limited purpose of facts involving the voluntary nature of his confession, nor shall the defendant be compelled to take the stand upon the trial of the cause upon its merits because of his testimony at this hearing." In Masters v. State, 545 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Cr.App.1977), it was held that the court reversibly erred in refusing | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.