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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp.green1 sentence2023(See Mangini, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 1090 [deeming nuisance permanent and agreeing action was time-barred, where plaintiff presented no evidence condition could be abated; declining to opine if timely- filed action required proof of abatement at reasonable cost].) But the permanence of a nuisance impacts both timeliness and damages, and abatability has been accepted as a crucial test. | 1 | 1 |
Karp v. Dunngreen1 sentence2016(See Karp v. Dunn, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 192, 195 [dismissal of first action “before any trial of the second action . . . completely dispose[s] of the plea of another action pending”].) The statute’s abatement clause was given its natural meaning in Mares v. Baughman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 672, 679 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ], which County has cited for the proposition that an injured person’s lawsuit merely suspends, but does not extinguish, a county’s right of action under section 23004.1. | 1 | 1 |
Mares v. Baughmangreen2 sentences2016(See Karp v. Dunn, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 192, 195 [dismissal of first action “before any trial of the second action . . . completely dispose[s] of the plea of another action pending”].) The statute’s abatement clause was given its natural meaning in Mares v. Baughman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 672, 679 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ], which County has cited for the proposition that an injured person’s lawsuit merely suspends, but does not extinguish, a county’s right of action under section 23004.1. 2016(See Karp v. Dunn, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 192, 195 [dismissal of first action “before any trial of the second action . . . completely dispose[s] of the plea of another action pending”].) The statute’s abatement clause was given its natural meaning in Mares v. Baughman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 672, 679 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 264 ], which County has cited for the proposition that an injured person’s lawsuit merely suspends, but does not extinguish, a county’s right of action under section 23004.1. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nasalgagreen2 sentences2002Under the doctrine of abatement, the amended statute controls as to all convictions not yet final as of the amended statute's effective date. ( People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 790 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 .) The doctrine applies when: (1) a statute describing an offense or punishment is amended; (2) the amendment lessens the punishment for the offense; and (3) there is an intent that the amended statute be applied to pending cases. 2002Under the doctrine of abatement, the amended statute controls as to all convictions not yet final as of the amended statute's effective date. ( People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 790 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 .) The doctrine applies when: (1) a statute describing an offense or punishment is amended; (2) the amendment lessens the punishment for the offense; and (3) there is an intent that the amended statute be applied to pending cases. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2001(Cf. People v. Andrews (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 ] [different prosecutorial charging policies, as long as they each follow the law, do not result in a denial of equal protection].) As there is no statutory amendment at issue in this case, the doctrine of abatement does not apply. 2. 2001(Cf. People v. Andrews (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 ] [different prosecutorial charging policies, as long as they each follow the law, do not result in a denial of equal protection].) As there is no statutory amendment at issue in this case, the doctrine of abatement does not apply. 2. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rossigreen2 sentences1989(See People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-304 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) Government Code section 9608 provides that prosecution for criminal acts is not barred where the act is committed before the law is repealed. 1 The Rossi case held that Government Code section 9608 does not entirely abrogate the abatement rule. 1989(See People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-304 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) Government Code section 9608 provides that prosecution for criminal acts is not barred where the act is committed before the law is repealed. 1 The Rossi case held that Government Code section 9608 does not entirely abrogate the abatement rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute 2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute | 3 | 2022–2023 |
Southern Service Co. v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2023(Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1,13 .)” (Zipperer, at p. 1023.) Where I part company with my colleagues is in the application of the abatement doctrine to this case. 2023(Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1,13 .)” (Zipperer, at p. 1023.) Where I part company with my colleagues is in the application of the abatement doctrine to this case. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara
green
2 sentences2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute 2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District v. Mann
green
2 sentences2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute 2023The abatement doctrine provides that, “Although the courts normally construe 15 statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ ” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 .) This doctrine applies, however, only in “limited circumstances.” (Rankin v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253 .) Where a statute | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . 2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . 2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo
green
2 sentences2023Where two statutory construction tools operate in similar contexts and result in opposite outcomes, it is unsurprising that the 6 For instance, in People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo (1910) 159 Cal. 65 , our Supreme Court recited the abatement doctrine in considering the retroactive effect of a repealed statute that previously allowed the Attorney General to seek a decree declaring a bank insolvent. 2023Where two statutory construction tools operate in similar contexts and result in opposite outcomes, it is unsurprising that the 6 For instance, in People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo (1910) 159 Cal. 65 , our Supreme Court recited the abatement doctrine in considering the retroactive effect of a repealed statute that previously allowed the Attorney General to seek a decree declaring a bank insolvent. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Krause v. Rarity
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . 2023Accordingly, the abatement doctrine does not apply, and we apply the ordinary rule of prospective statutory construction. 16 Our conclusion is consistent with Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644 , and with Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 , overruled on other grounds in Z.B., N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn.
green
1 sentence2021We agree with the former argument and therefore need not reach the latter.7 6 Appellant cites to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 , which upheld an abuse of process action against a collection agency for its alleged practice of filing actions in multiple improper venues. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hansen Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors
green
1 sentence2015At the abatement hearing, plaintiffs repeatedly asserted these rules violated their constitutional rights, and that they were “entitled to all the due process requirements as would apply in a criminal proceeding.” With respect to the substantive matters addressed at the abatement hearing, plaintiffs asserted they had a protected grandfathered use of their property pursuant to Hansen Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1996) 12 Cal.4th 533 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach
green
2 sentences2015Plaintiffs fail to explain the basis for their argument other than to cite to Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , and Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017 . 2015Plaintiffs fail to explain the basis for their argument other than to cite to Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , and Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Haas v. County of San Bernardino
green
1 sentence2015Plaintiffs fail to explain the basis for their argument other than to cite to Clark, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 , and Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Anderson
red
2 sentences2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. 2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Craig v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. 2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Western Security Bank v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. 2002(See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 , Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 , 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 .) However, legislative declarations of a statute's meaning are neither binding nor conclusive in construing a statute because the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 , 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 .) The majority does not address and consider the doctrine of abatement. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Roman
green
2 sentences2002When the doctrine of abatement applies, a sentence imposed under the old statute is considered unauthorized, thus, the issue of abatement may be raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 789, fn. 4 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 ; People v. Roman (2001) 92 Cal. App.4th 141 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 .) When the rules of statutory construction are applied in conjunction with the doctrine of abatement, a different result from that reached by the majority is dictated, as set forth, post. 2002When the doctrine of abatement applies, a sentence imposed under the old statute is considered unauthorized, thus, the issue of abatement may be raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 789, fn. 4 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 ; People v. Roman (2001) 92 Cal. App.4th 141 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 .) When the rules of statutory construction are applied in conjunction with the doctrine of abatement, a different result from that reached by the majority is dictated, as set forth, post. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Scoggins
green
2 sentences2002The majority does not (1) address the doctrine of abatement, (2) apply the rule of lenity, (3) adhere to well-established rules of statutory construction, and (4) analyze In re Scoggins, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 650 , 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 508 . 2002The majority does not (1) address the doctrine of abatement, (2) apply the rule of lenity, (3) adhere to well-established rules of statutory construction, and (4) analyze In re Scoggins, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 650 , 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 508 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach
green
2 sentences2002Measures adopted through the initiative process are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction. ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 .) Whether a ballot initiative is to apply to pending cases is, in part, a question of statutory interpretation. ( Herniosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534, 548 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 .) Section 8 of the initiative measure adopted as Proposition 36 clearly states that it applies "prospectively." However, there is no indication in the propos 2002Measures adopted through the initiative process are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction. ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 .) Whether a ballot initiative is to apply to pending cases is, in part, a question of statutory interpretation. ( Herniosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534, 548 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 .) Section 8 of the initiative measure adopted as Proposition 36 clearly states that it applies "prospectively." However, there is no indication in the propos | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Evangelatos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2002Measures adopted through the initiative process are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction. ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 .) Whether a ballot initiative is to apply to pending cases is, in part, a question of statutory interpretation. ( Herniosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534, 548 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 .) Section 8 of the initiative measure adopted as Proposition 36 clearly states that it applies "prospectively." However, there is no indication in the propos 2002Measures adopted through the initiative process are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction. ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 .) Whether a ballot initiative is to apply to pending cases is, in part, a question of statutory interpretation. ( Herniosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534, 548 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 .) Section 8 of the initiative measure adopted as Proposition 36 clearly states that it applies "prospectively." However, there is no indication in the propos | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Fowden v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co.
green
2 sentences1997The leading case in this court is Fowden v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 151 [ 86 P. 178 ] (hereafter Fowden ). 1997The leading case in this court is Fowden v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 151 [ 86 P. 178 ] (hereafter Fowden ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.